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Abstract 
The Italian labour market seems unable to allocate a significant fraction of the working age 
population efficiently. The gap between the employment rate in Italy and in the other developed 
economies is foremost attributable to the low employment rates of youth, seniors and women. The 
low employment rates of these three groups are due to several factors limiting both labour demand 
and labour supply. For women in particular, constraints on the allocation of time play a crucial role in 
determining labour supply behaviour. In this thesis we try to understand how non-standard time 
constraints may affect the behaviour of women, and their labour supply in particular.    
In the first chapter we study how the constraints on work-schedules affect the time allocation 
of workers in Italy. For a large fraction of employed individuals the work schedule is very rigid, as a 
consequence of outdated industrial relations. In order to understand whether constraints on the 
work-schedule produce significant effects on the allocation of time of wage/salary workers in Italy, we 
exploit the intrinsic differences between them and self employed workers. In fact, one of the main 
features of self-employment is the greater control over the days worked and daily hours of work. We 
use the last wave of the Italian time use survey (2008-2009) to provide evidence that the distribution 
of hours of work of self-employed workers is much more dispersed than that of wage/salary workers 
and that average standard deviation of their daily minutes of work within a week is significantly larger. 
Then we show that self-employed workers respond more to shocks affecting the value of leisure. We 
show that on sunny days the increase of leisure and the reduction of work are significantly larger for 
self-employed workers. We address whether unobservable characteristics, such as preferences for 
leisure and for outdoor activities in particular, determine this differential response and find no 
evidence for this. We interpret the differential response to weather shocks as a consequence of the 
time constraints on work-schedules. This evidence is relevant for female labour force participation 
since in Italy a large fraction of women choose not to work because they would otherwise not be able 
to reconcile family and work responsibilities. 
In the second chapter we study the Added Worker Effect (AWE). The retrospective 
questions provided by the new labour force survey allow identification of transitions between labour 
market states in a 12 month time-window. Since we are able to identify the reason for the husband’s 
job loss, we distinguish between transitions associated with low or high income losses. We find that 
both the wife’s probability of joining the labour force and that of finding a job increase when the 
husband is dismissed or he is forced to quit his job for health reasons, two cases of usually high 
income losses. Moreover, we estimate the wife’s full transition matrix between labour market states 
and we find that the loss of a job by a husband increases the probability that his wife will enter the 
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labour force. Finally, we provide some descriptive evidence that time constraints can also impact the 
magnitude of the AWE. Focusing on mothers with young children, we show that the estimated AWE 
is positively correlated with the regional provision of child care services.  
The third chapter is based on the time use files of the Canadian General Social Survey. We 
study how Sunday shopping deregulation changed the time allocation of women, with a particular 
focus on those with children. The empirical analysis relies on the provincial variation in the time of 
the policy change. Our results suggest that women with children, who usually face stringent time 
constraints, respond to the policy change by substituting weekday shopping with Sunday shopping. 
The amount of time these women save from doing shopping on weekdays allows them to increase 
their minutes of work. On Sunday, shopping increases at the expense of leisure. The main result of 
this chapter is that the labour supply of mothers may change even when non-obvious constraints on 
the allocation of time change.  
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Introduction 
 
Economics studies the efficient allocation of scarce resources. Time is a scarce resource, and 
most decisions in human life, such as education, family creation and dissolution, parenthood, labour 
supply and retirement, are strongly related to the use of time. Time is not only limited in its 
endowment, but it is also limited in the way it can be allocated. For instance, a certain amount of sleep 
is unavoidable, regardless of preferences and of the desire to allocate time to other activities. Timing 
of work is also constrained by production technologies, often requiring complementarity of 
production factors. Leisure activities are also constrained by the need of synchronization with other 
people and by the service hours of most facilities. In Italy labour-market regulations are outdated and 
impose further and presumably unnecessary constraints on the allocation of time. A better 
understanding of these constraints may be a necessary step in reforming the Italian labour market. 
From 2000 until 2011 the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in Italy was the 
lowest among the OECD countries. Over this period Italy was the only OECD country that 
experienced a negative average growth rate (-0.1 per cent). Canada grew 0.9 per cent per year; 
Germany 1.2. Until 2011 the average growth was higher even in a more fragile economy such as 
Greece (0.8 per cent). Discussing all factors accounting for the particularly poor performance of the 
Italian economy is beyond the scope of this thesis. We focus on the labour market, a key weakness of 
the Italian economy. In 2011, before the recent further worsening of the Italian economy, the 
employment rate was 56.9 per cent, 8 percentage points below the OECD average. In the same year 
the employment rate in Canada was 72 per cent. The gap between Italy and other developed 
economies is attributable to the low employment rates of youth, seniors and women. In 2011 the 
employment rate of individuals aged 15-24 in Italy was 23.1 per cent; in Canada it was 54.5 and the 
OECD average was 42.8. In the same year, the employment rate for individuals aged at least 65 was 
5.6 per cent in Italy, about a third of the number for Canada and for the OECD average. The female 
employment rate in Italy was 47 percent, much lower than in Canada (70.6 per cent) and the average 
of OECD countries (58.8 per cent).  
These low employment rates are due to a multiplicity of factors limiting both labour demand, 
such as high labour cost and low productivity, and labour supply. For women in particular, constraints 
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on the allocation of time play a crucial role in determining labour supply behaviour.  In Italy the 
provision of services helping mothers reconcile work and family obligations is meagre; flexible few 
hour jobs for youths who want to invest on post-secondary education are also scarce. Finally, for 
workers at older ages it is not possible to reduce the number of hours worked, and the only option 
available when they want to reduce work is retirement.  
In this thesis we try to understand how nonstandard time constraints may affect the 
behaviour of women, and their labour supply in particular. In the first chapter we study how the 
constraints on work schedules affect the time allocation of workers in Italy. Regulations that shape 
industrial relations in Italy were enacted during the 1970s, when manufacturing and assembly lines 
played a central role in the economy. This kind of economy required high levels of synchronization of 
capital and labour, and of different groups of workers. Therefore, work schedules were rigid and the 
fraction of jobs offering nonstandard hours was low.  With the reduced importance of assembly lines 
this regulation is outdated. In order to understand whether these constraints produce significant 
effects on the allocation of time of wage/salary workers in Italy, we exploit the intrinsic differences 
between self-employed and employed workers. In fact, one of the main features of self-employment is 
the greater control over the days worked and daily hours of work. We use the last wave of the Italian 
time use survey (2008-2009) to provide evidence that the distribution of hours of work of 
self-employed workers is much more dispersed than that of wage/salary workers and their average 
standard deviation of daily minutes of work within a week is significantly larger. Then we show that 
self-employed workers respond more to shocks affecting the value of leisure. In particular, we exploit 
the information on the exact day of the interview, which is an uncommon feature for this kind of 
data, and we match it with precise weather data. We show that on sunny days the increase of leisure 
and the reduction of work are significantly larger for self-employed workers. We address whether 
unobservable characteristics, such as preferences for leisure and for outdoor activities in particular, 
determine this differential response. Studying the allocation of time on non-working days we find no 
evidence of different preferences between the two groups of workers. Therefore, we interpret the 
differential response to weather shocks as a consequence of the time constraints on work schedules. 
The main result of the first chapter is that wage/salary workers in Italy face tight time constraints and 
they find it difficult to reallocate their time when shocks occur. This evidence is relevant for female 
labour force participation since in Italy a large fraction of women choose not to work because they 
would otherwise not be able to reconcile family and work responsibilities.1  
                                                     
1 One question of the 2008-2009 Italian time use survey reports that about 37 per cent of women above age 25 
never worked. Almost 40 per cent of those women declare that the inability to reconcile child care and work 
obligations was the main reason for not working.   
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In the second chapter we study the Added Worker Effect (AWE), which may have been an 
important determinant of the recent increase in female labour supply in Italy. By AWE we refer to the 
increase in the labour supply of married women due to their husband’s job loss. A rich literature on 
the AWE has developed, but its results are mixed. The main factors determining a change in the 
wife’s labour supply in response to their husband’s job loss include the magnitude of the income loss 
and the inability, due to borrowing constraints, to smooth this loss over the life cycle. In Italy several 
conditions coexist that should lead to a significant AWE: large increase in the unemployment rate for 
married men, increase in long term unemployment, tight borrowing constraints, and low female 
labour force participation. Between 2007 and 2012 the probability that a married man lost his job 
grew from 1.9 to 4.7 percent. The female participation rate in 2012 was 3 percentage points higher 
than in 2007. The retrospective questions provided by the new labour force survey allow identification 
of transitions between labour market states in a 12 month time window. Since we are able to identify 
the reason for the husband’s job loss, we can distinguish between transitions associated with low or 
high income losses even without explicit income data. We find that both the wife’s probability of 
joining the labour force and that of finding a job increase when the husband is dismissed or he is 
forced to quit his job for health reasons. Moreover, we estimate the wife’s full transition matrix 
between labour market states and we find that the loss of a job by a husband increases the probability 
that his wife will enter the labour force. Finally, we provide some descriptive evidence that time 
constraints can also impact the magnitude of the AWE. Focusing on mothers with young children, we 
show that the estimated AWE is positively correlated with the regional provision of child care 
services, indicating that laxer time constraints indeed allow for large labour market effects.   
The third chapter is based on the time use file of the Canadian General Social Survey. We 
study how the relaxation of one particular constraint limiting the allocation of time changed the 
behaviour of women, with a particular focus on those with children. Since the mid-1980s Canadian 
provinces have deregulated Sunday shopping. We develop existing theoretical models of the extension 
of shopping hours by adding heterogeneity in time costs. These costs can be thought of as the time 
spent on unavoidable activities, such as certain forms of child care. The introduction of this source of 
heterogeneity makes clear that busy individuals are likely to be those who respond most to Sunday 
shopping deregulation. The empirical analysis relies on the provincial variation in the time of the 
policy change. Our results suggest that women with children, who usually face stringent time 
constraints, do respond to the policy change by substituting weekday shopping with Sunday shopping. 
The amount of time these women save from doing shopping on weekdays allows them to increase 
their minutes of work, while on Sunday shopping is done at the expense of leisure. The main result of 
this chapter is that the labour supply of mothers may change even when non-obvious constraints on 
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the allocation of time change. At the beginning of 2012 the Italian government passed a set of norms 
that aimed to increase the competitiveness of the Italian economy. Among these reforms there was 
the complete deregulation of shopping hours and Sunday shopping. The Italian data do not yet allow 
us to study whether this policy change produced effects similar to those we find for Canada. To some 
extent, it is hard to believe that wage/salary workers in Italy would significantly respond in terms of 
time of work, since, as discussed in chapter 1, their work schedule is very rigid. However, they may 
benefit from the deregulation of shopping hours through the reduction of the congestion costs that 
they currently pay doing shopping in the busiest hours. Self-employed women, who account for about 
20 per cent of working women, may on the other hand also change their labour supply behaviour. 
This topic is left for future research.   
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1  Self-employment and Constraints 
on the Allocation of Time 
1.1  Introduction 
In standard labour supply models the amount of work is chosen optimally, equating the wage 
rate to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. A key assumption in these 
models is that individuals can choose any amount of work they want. This assumption is sometimes 
defended with the observation that individuals can choose among employers offering different hours 
of work (Bundell and MaCurdy, 1999). In some countries the number of offered schedules is high 
enough that the standard labour supply model may provide a good description of the agent’s 
behavior. In other countries, such as Italy, the number of hours worked can be chosen among only a 
few options.  
In dynamic frameworks it is also usually assumed that individuals can choose their optimal 
labour supply over the entire life and that they can adjust the desired amount of work at any moment 
of time, when unexpected shocks occur. However both these assumptions are unlikely to be satisfied 
in reality. As an example, the lengthening of the work life is associated with an increasing demand for 
part-time jobs at older ages (Loretto et al., 2005), but employers do not usually offer this kind of 
contracts to older workers. Short-run adjustments are also often costly for workers; their ability to 
respond to shocks modifying the desired (daily) labour supply substantially may be limited.  
The allocation of time also depends on constraints on the timing of work and on inability to 
reallocate activities within a day. These constraints are relevant since productivity at work and 
enjoyment of leisure are not usually constant over a 24 hour period. Therefore, jobs with very strict 
hours might prevent individuals from taking advantage of hours when their productivity and 
enjoyment peak.  
We address the relevance of some of these constraints on the allocation of time. In particular 
we focus on how lack of work-schedule flexibility affects short run adjustments of the time allocation. 
Using Italian time use data, we show that workers with weaker time constraints respond more to 
shocks affecting the value of leisure and labour supply. Italy is characterized by a heavily regulated 
labour market, which imposes restrictions on work schedules for a large fraction of wage/salary 
workers. However, Italy also has a very high self-employment rate. Exploiting the intrinsic differences 
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between employed and self-employed workers highlights the role of timing constraints on the overall 
allocation of time. The literature has often claimed that one of the main features of self-employment 
is the “more control over the days and daily hours they work” (Hamermesh, 1996). However, the literature on 
time use has mostly focused on evidence that self-employed individuals work longer hours, but not 
that they have more control over their time use. We explore this topic here. 
Exploiting information on the exact day of the interview that is provided for the first time in 
the last wave of the Italian time use survey, we study how labour supply responds to weather shocks. 
Previous research for the U.S. found small average effects of weather on labour supply 
(Connoly, 2008). However, these small average effects may be due to overlooked time and timing 
constraints on the allocation of time faced by a large fraction of the working population. In fact, after 
documenting both the higher variability of hours of work among self-employed workers and the 
higher individual day to day variability of work, we show that self-employed workers respond much 
more to shocks affecting the value of leisure. We address whether unobservable characteristics, such 
as preferences for leisure and for outdoor activities in particular, determine this differential response. 
Studying the allocation of time on non-working days we find no evidence of different preferences 
between the two groups of workers. Therefore, we interpret the differential response to weather 
shocks as a consequence of the time constraints on work schedules.   
The analysis provides relevant welfare implications, suggesting that welfare of workers would 
be increased if they could allocate time more flexibly, keeping constant the total amount of hours 
worked. On the side of firms, for a lot of jobs it is not clear why increasing the flexibility of 
work-schedules should negatively affect productivity, in particular considering how new technologies 
have changed many tasks. In Italy, most of the rigidity of work-schedules is due to old laws that have 
shaped industrial relations since the 1970s.  The core of these laws was passed when a large fraction 
of employment was in manufacturing where assembly line are prevalent and before computers 
completely changed jobs in the service industry. Existing regulations are overly-restrictive for current 
technology. Allowing for more flexible work-schedules could be beneficial both for firms and 
workers. 
Understanding the relevance of constraints on the allocation of time is crucial for reforming 
the Italian labour market. Italy shows very low employment rates of women, youth and seniors. For 
all three categories a flexible work schedule seems to be particularly desirable. Women usually struggle 
to reconcile work and family obligations; youth might still want to have the opportunity to invest in 
human capital; seniors may wish to make work more compatible with their health needs.  
7 
 
Section 1.2 provides a short discussion of the related literature. Section 1.3 describes 
self-employment in Italy. Section 1.4 provides a detailed description of the data used for this work. 
Section 1.5 analyses work-schedule flexibility for self-employed and wage/salary workers. Section 1.6 
contains the empirical specification adopted to estimate the differential impact of weather shocks on 
the allocation of time for the two types of workers. Results and robustness analysis are presented in 
sections 1.7 and 1.8. Section 1.9 concludes.  
1.2  Literature 
From a theoretical point of view, the seminal contribution of G. Becker (1965) clearly 
pointed out the relevance of the allocation of time for economic decisions. The first empirical studies 
on time use date back to the end of the 1970s (Juster and Stafford, 1991), but the recent 
improvements in the availability of (micro) data have stimulated new interest in the topic.  
An aspect that has not received a lot of attention yet concerns the timing of human activities 
and its constraints. Hamermesh (2008) argues that individuals modify timing of activities in order to 
coordinate their time use. The prevailing interpretation is that coordination arises from input 
complementarity in production processes and synchronization of leisure (Hallbeg, 2003). Part of 
timing regularities across individuals are related to physiological constraints as well (Weiss, 1996).  
Coordination of capital and labour, and among groups of complementary workers, imposes 
restrictions on work-schedules. In Italy work-schedules are heavily affected by the main law regulating 
industrial relations, the so called statuto dei lavoratori, passed in 1970. The dramatic technological 
changes that have occurred since then have presumably made work-schedules unnecessarily 
restrictive. Moreover, a large fraction of jobs and work-schedules are also regulated through collective 
agreement between the class representatives of the workers and of the employers (Eurofound, 2009).  
All these constraints result in only few available work-schedules for wage/salary workers. 
Part-time contracts typically set hours per week at 18, 20, 24 or 30. Full time jobs usually allow 36 or 
40 hours of work. Forms of flexibility trying to facilitate the balance between private and professional 
life are generally undeveloped as well (Platenga and Remery, 2009). For instance, in Italy it is not 
usually possible for a worker to reduce hours for specific needs of the family, or to take temporary 
leave to take care of an ill family member or career breaks. Time accounts are also very rare. Italy 
shows one of the most rigid regulations in terms of hours of work compared to the other main 
economies of the European Union (EU henceforth). Plantenga and Remery (2009) use an ad hoc 
module of the EU labour force survey collected for the year 2004 and show that in Germany more 
than 50 per cent of the working population have access to flexible working-time schedules (more than 
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60 per cent in Denmark). Italy and France show similar levels of access to flexible working-time 
schedules (about 30 per cent) In France 10.5 per cent of women work from home, but this is only 1.3 
per cent in Italy. 
In order to show that these time constraints matter we study how workers respond to shocks 
affecting their optimal allocation of time. If the response to such shocks were the same across 
workers with different constraints, we should conclude that these constraints do not matter much. 
However, using weather data as a source of exogenous shocks to the value of leisure, we find that the 
response is much larger among self-employed workers, who have more flexible work-schedules. 
Previous studies have already focused on the effect of weather on the allocation of time, in particular 
on labour supply and leisure (Connoly, 2008). Shi and Skuterud (2012) show that absenteeism 
increases when favorable weather conditions occur. These studies do not explicitly address constraints 
limiting the reallocation of time. This may explain why small effects are usually found. The relevance 
of time and timing constraints have been noted by Biddle (1988), who shows that a life-cycle 
intertemporal labour supply model is misspecified when estimated under the assumption that workers 
are unconstrained.  
This chapter focuses on allocation of time of Italian workers, making use of the last wave of 
the Italian time use survey. Several studies have already used previous waves of this survey. 
Bloemen et al. (2010) present a detailed descriptive analysis of the allocation of time of Italian couples 
and reviews the main studies using the Italian time use survey. Other studies focused more on (macro) 
economic outcomes, such as Alesina and Giuliano (2010).  
1.3  Self-employment in Italy 
Among OECD countries, Italy has one of the highest self-employment rates. Several factors 
explain this outcome, such as the heavy regulation of product markets and a high labour income tax 
(Torrini, 2002). The very strict regulation of the labour market, which significantly limits the varieties 
of work-schedules, can also be a determinant of the high level of self-employment in Italy.  
The conventional wisdom in most developed countries is that self-employment is beneficial 
for reducing poverty, increasing employment and female labour force participation, and supporting 
innovation (Blanchflower, 2000). Despite incentives trying to increase self-employment, it remains 
below 10 percent of total employment in most Western countries, such as Canada and the US (Table 
1). In Italy self-employment represented more than 25 percent of total employment in 2010, with a 
higher incidence among men (30.3 percent). In Italy the share of self-employed workers is relevant in 
almost any sector. The service industry, commercial and non-commercial, accounts for a large fraction 
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of self-employment (Table 2), but a significant fraction of self-employed workers are also found in 
agriculture, manufacturing and construction. 
Comparing self-employment across countries requires care since its definitions vary. The EU 
labour force survey defines self-employment to be “workers running their own business without employing any 
other person”. The definition we use is broader and also includes individuals running small firms and 
employing other workers. This choice is consistent with the Italian experience, where a lot of small 
businesses employ some workers, and it is also consistent with the national legal framework defining 
self-employment.2 We place self-employed workers into one of three groups: i) entrepreneurs, who 
run their own business with some employees; ii) professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.) who may or may 
not employ other workers; iii) craft workers (artisans or farmers) who often run their business with 
the support of other family members. 
 A phenomenon that is important to be aware of when talking of self-employment in Italy is 
that in the last decade the country experienced a significant growth in the number of workers who are 
formally identified as self-employed, but whose work resembles quite closely a paid job. These 
workers typically work fixed hours, for only one “customer”, and their job is very similar to the job 
done by the employees of their “customer” (employer). This phenomenon depends on increasing 
economic integration and on the rapid technological changes that have made some industries much 
more likely to be hit by shocks (ILO, 1999). Firms operating in countries with strict Employment 
Protection Legislation have therefore an incentive to satisfy some of their demand for labour through 
formally self-employed workers, who can be more easily dismissed if needed. The data allows us to 
identify these workers formally: in what follows they will be considered as paid-employees.  
1.4  Data 
This chapter is based on the most recent Italian Time Use Survey (TUS henceforth). The 
survey is conducted by the Italian Statistics Office (Istat), with a periodicity of about 5 years. The 
survey covers 12 consecutive months, February 2008 to January 2009. The scope of the TUS is to 
represent the allocation of time of the Italian population over the whole year. This is achieved 
through a complex sampling scheme, which makes the survey suitable for analysis on specific 
socio-demographic groups or on specific seasons. The survey follows the Guidelines on Harmonised 
European Time Use Surveys published in September 2002. It therefore meets Eurostat’s standards. 
                                                     
2 In Italy the principal normative source for the distinction between subordinate employment and self-employment (Codice 
Civile, CC) defines a self-employed worker as a person who ‘undertakes to perform a work or a service for remuneration, 
mainly by means of his/her own labour and without a relationship of subordination to the client’. The main requirements for 
being considered self-employed are: i) absence of subordinate status; ii) professionalism; iii) non-occasional job. 
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The 2008/09 TUS is based on 18,000 households (41,000 individuals).  Information is 
collected by self-reported diaries, indicating the exact time each activity begins and ends, where such 
activity is performed, and with whom (spouse, kids, friends, or colleagues).  The sample is divided into 
three almost equal parts: week days (Monday to Friday), Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.  
The Italian TUS comprises two files. The first is the usual episode file, common to most time 
use surveys. It collects the entire sequence of activities for each participant. By aggregating over 
similar activities it is possible to calculate the total daily allocation of time to work, domestic work, 
leisure, and sleep. More detailed aggregations are possible as well. The second file reports all episodes 
of work for seven consecutive days. The first of these seven days coincides with the diary day; then 
the next six days follow. It is important to remark that only for the first day the entire allocation of 
time over the 24 hours is provided. For the following six days only time and timing of market work 
are known. This second file offers a coarser allocation of time than the diary file, since answers are 
provided only in intervals of 30 minutes. Another relevant feature of the 2008/09 TUS is that the 
exact day of the interview is provided. We exploit this information – not available for earlier TUS – by 
matching each interview with weather data. Finally, different from most available time use surveys, all 
household members are interviewed, allowing for analysis of the intra-household allocation of time.  
The aim of this chapter is to study how constraints on hours of work affect the overall 
allocation of time. Therefore, the sample is restricted only to workers. Moreover, since the main 
empirical strategy adopts weather data as the source for exogenous variation for the value of leisure, 
workers in industries where productivity is clearly affected by the weather are excluded (agriculture 
and tourism). The sample size reduces to 14,800 observations (Table 3). The sample is composed of 
about 25 percent of self-employed workers, matching very closely the share calculated from the labour 
force survey. Men represent about 60 percent of the sample and married individuals are 58 percent. 
Since self-employed workers are found in every industry and their incidence is high, the differential 
effect of weather shocks on labour supply between the two groups of workers is unlikely to be due to 
the concentration of the self-employed in services that display lower demand on sunny days. Single 
mothers whose time allocation might have been potentially be very interesting for further study 
represent only an insignificant fraction of the data set.  
The weather data that are used for this chapter are taken from the most popular website for 
weather forecasts in Italy (www.ilmeteo.it). This web-site provides detailed historical data on daily 
weather conditions (http://www.ilmeteo.it/portale/archivio-meteo/). Data can be downloaded in a 
clean .csv format.  
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Italy is usually considered a country blessed by good weather. However, the orographic 
conformation of the country (rich in mountains) and its extension from North to South gives 
significant weather variation within a year and across regions. For instance it goes from only 0.09 
percent of days with no precipitation in Emilia-Romagna on December 2008, to very dry summer in 
some of the Southern regions (Table 4).  
For each respondent to the TUS the region where he/she lives is known. Italy is divided into 
20 regions, some of them really small.3 Each region has its own capital. We assume that all individuals 
in the same region are exposed to the weather occurring at the capital. This assumption is not 
particularly strong, due to the small size of regions and to the fact that these capitals are always the 
most populated cities in each region. With this approach, it turns out that 62 percent of observations 
in the sample experience good weather, 38 percent experience one of the following conditions: hail, 
fog, snow, snow storm, rain, showers, or combinations of them.   
1.5  Flexibility of the work schedule 
Flexibility of the work schedule is a concept involving more than just one dimension. The 
first way work flexibility may be defined refers to the actual possibility of workers choosing the 
preferred number of hours. Standard economic models assume that the choice set for the number of 
hours is convex, and agents can choose exactly the optimal amount of work. In reality however this is 
not always realized. Certain countries might have a less regulated labour market, leading to a denser 
choice set. In Italy the hours of work are heavily regulated and influenced by the agreements between 
unions and class representatives of firms. It turns that only a few work schedules are available to most 
employed workers. Typical part-time contracts set the amount of hours at 18, 20, 24 or 30. Full time 
jobs usually allow for 36 or 40 hours of work.  
Looking at the empirical distributions of hours of work, we find strong evidence of the lack 
of available (offered) work-schedules. We first present the distribution of the usual (normal) hours of 
work per week. Information on the usual weekly hours of work is not derived by time use diaries, but 
is rather directly asked of TUS participants. The hours normally worked by the wage/salary workers 
are concentrated around the regulated hours. Women are much more likely to work part-time, 
whereas a large fraction of employed men work around 40 hours (Figure 1). The distribution of hours 
of the self-employed is on the other hand much more dispersed, even though some reference answers 
emerge at 48, 50, 55, 60, and 70.  
                                                     
3 In our analysis only 19 regions are displayed. Val d’Aosta, the smallest region, is jointed with Piemonte, as common in most 
of the regional analysis in Italy. 
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Time use diaries provide a second source of information on the hours of work. For each 
individual the amount of work in the reference day (the day the diary is completed) is known as well 
as the number of days worked in a week. Using this information, and not considering individuals that 
are sampled on weekends, holidays or days off, we can impute the number of weekly hours of work 
(Figure 2).4 Again the empirical distribution of the hours worked by the self-employed is more 
dispersed. Reference answers disappear, but still a very large fraction of the employed individuals 
work around 40 hours. 
The distribution obtained through the diaries is however much more smooth than the 
distribution of normal hours of work, which implies that both employed and self-employed workers 
experience day to day changes in their amount of work. The day to day variation of time spent 
working is another dimension of schedule flexibility that we explore.  In fact, showing that the 
distribution of hours worked by the self-employed is more dispersed is not enough to argue that they 
have more flexibility, since it does not tell us how easily work can be reallocated over different days of 
the week. Data on work episodes for the entire week, which the Italian TUS have, allow studying the 
reallocation of work within a week.  
The first piece of evidence concerns the dispersion of hours of work during the week. The 
standard deviation of hours worked is larger for self-employed individuals in every single day from 
Monday to Friday (Figure 3). Both employed and self-employed workers show clear Monday and 
Friday effects: on these two days standard deviation of hours of work is higher, since workers are 
more likely either to take the day off or to leave (enter) work earlier (later). Second, looking at the 
average individual variability of daily minutes of work over the week we have a descriptive measure of 
work-schedule flexibility. The average standard deviation of daily minutes of work within the 
work-week for the self-employed is about 12.5 percent higher than for the paid-employed.  
To conclude, all the presented descriptive statistics suggest that self-employed workers have 
more control over their allocation of time. The amount of hours of work does not peak at levels 
dictated by the law and they also show larger average reallocation of work within a week. In the 
following section we study whether this feature of self-employment is reflected in the overall 
allocation of time and in their response to shocks.  
 
                                                     
4 Every person is asked the number of minutes worked in the reference day (call this mi). Then it’s asked how many days per week they 
usually work (call this di). Hence the imputed number of weekly hours hi is calculated as    
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1.6  Empirical Specification 
1.6.1   Quality of Leisure: responses to a sunny day 
To estimate the differential impact of a shock on the allocation of time of workers with 
different degrees of flexibility, we study how time spent on each of the main time-use categories 
responds to weather shocks. Following the literature (Shi and Skuterud, 2012), we assume that good 
weather is associated with a higher value of leisure. When the state of nature is realized and the 
weather is known, labour supply should be adjusted according to the weather outcome. If the weather 
is better than usual, conditional on the region and on the season, leisure should increase at the 
expense of work. 
An issue that is worth discussing is why good weather should significantly affect the 
allocation of time in a country with very temperate climate. In fact, as claimed in 
Shi and Skuterud (2012), the value of a sunny day is particularly high in countries, such as Canada, 
where the climate is not as temperate as in the Mediterranean. First, we define sunny days as those 
with no precipitation. Hence, it is reasonable to think that rain and snow affect the behavior of people 
more in countries where these conditions are relatively rare.  Second, the value of a sunny day is also 
given by the available amenities: the response to weather conditions is unlikely to be the same in 
Toronto and in Vancouver. Almost all regions in Italy are on the sea, which is itself a valuable natural 
amenity. There is therefore no a priori reason to think that in Italy the average response to weather 
shocks is smaller than in other countries, where similar studies have already been conducted (US, 
Canada, The Netherlands).  
Everything else equal, when the value of leisure increases the amount of work remains 
constant only if compensated by a wage increase. Since there is no day to day wage rate variation, an 
increase of the value of leisure should in principle be reflected in a reduction of work and in an 
increase of leisure. Workers with very rigid schedules may however find it difficult to adjust the 
amount of time worked to take advantage of a sunny day. As descriptive evidence presented in in 
section 1.5 suggests, paid-employed workers are on average more constrained with their allocation of 
time than the self-employed. Individuals running their own business have several options to reduce 
work and increase leisure: they can start work later, take a break during the day, have a lunch break 
longer than usual, and leave work earlier. Most of these options are normally not available to 
paid-employed workers. 
We study the reaction of labour supply to weather conditions in two consistent settings, 
exploiting both the time diary and the file containing all weekly work episodes. The first approach is 
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very similar to the one adopted by Connoly (2008), and it identifies how the total amount of work in a 
day is affected by the weather. The second approach captures the dynamics, estimating the effects of 
weather changes on the day to day variation of work.  
We begin presenting the first model. To capture the differential response to weather shocks 
between self-employed and wage/salary workers on the total allocation of time we estimate the 
following model: 
 
                                                                 [1.1] 
 
Where     represents the amount of time expressed in minutes in activity   (work, leisure, 
personal care) by individual  . The coefficient     captures the average effect of being self-employed, 
    represents the effect of a day with no precipitation (called sunny),    is the interaction between 
the binary variable indicating self-employed workers and the binary variable indicating a sunny day. 
Therefore,    captures the differential effect between self-employed and employed workers on a 
sunny day. When    is negative and significant, it means that self-employed workers reduce time spent 
on activity   more than wage/salary workers. We estimate clustered standard errors, allowing the error 
term to be correlated between observations within each region in each month.  
In our model we include vectors X and I of individual characteristics (such as gender, age, 
education, presence of young children) and industry dummies. Since the effect of weather is highly 
heterogeneous across months and regions we also include month (M) and region (G) fixed effects. 
The inclusion of regional fixed effects is crucial, since southern Italy is characterized by better average 
weather and fewer hours of work per worker. 
Model [1.1] is estimated for three main time use categories representing almost the entire 24 
hour endowment: work, pure leisure and personal care (including sleep).  Since time allocated to each 
activity cannot be negative, we adopt a Tobit specification, accounting for censoring at zero. The 
appropriateness of the Tobit model for time-use data analysis is an ongoing debate.  Stewart (2009) 
shows that the adoption of a Tobit specification may lead to biased estimates when the reported zeros 
may not correspond to actual corner solutions. This problem is particularly relevant the focus is on 
infrequent activities and the horizon of analysis is longer than a single day (i.e. a year). In that case in 
fact the reported zeros do not correspond to individuals who never perform the activity of interest on 
the relevant time for the analysis (corner solutions). They rather correspond to measurement errors 
due to aggregation bias. In these cases an OLS specification is preferable (Stewart, 2009). In our case 
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the fraction of censored observation is however low (7 per cent for work, 3 per cent for leisure, no 
censored observations for personal care) and OLS estimates do not differ significantly. Estimates are 
therefore robust to the possible bias introduced by misspecified Tobit with time use data.   
The second model is derived by model [1.1] and identifies intertemporal adjustments of 
labour supply in response to weather changes. The intertemporal model allows us to exploit the 
longitudinal component of the Italian time use data, which is not usually provided in other similar 
surveys. This exercise also represents a robustness check for our previous and main estimation. Since 
for almost all working individuals in the survey the amount of work for seven consecutive days is 
provided, the data allow us to identify an explicit dynamic model, where work is shifted from today to 
tomorrow when the weather today is better than tomorrow. In principle a dynamic model of labour 
supply should use weather forecasts rather than actual weather. However, since the time horizon is 
only two days and weather forecasts are very accurate over short time intervals, the adoption of actual 
data seems to be not really problematic. From model [1.1] it is straightforward to derive the following 
dynamic model:  
  (   )    ( )         ( )              ( )       [1.2] 
The left hand side of equation [1.2] represents the difference between tomorrow’s and today’s 
work. For instance when individuals decide to work more tomorrow than today we have:  
(  (   )    ( ))>0 
In this framework we are interested in capturing the effect of the quality of the weather 
tomorrow relative to today. We define  
     ( )      (   )      ( ) 
Therefore:  
      ( ) {
                                  
                                 
                                  
 
  
The differential response between self-employed and employed individuals to weather 
changes on labour supply is captured by the coefficient   of the interaction term. Since this model is 
derived by simple manipulation of model [1.1], the validity of its specification relies on the validity of 
16 
 
the specification of model [1.1]. In particular, we assume that the marginal effects of time invariant 
characteristics affect only the level of the dependent variable, but not its (day to day) variation. We 
have also estimated the intertemporal model including all control variables in [1.1], a specification that 
implies that the marginal effects of time invariant controls affect the daily adjustments. It turns out 
that almost all coefficients are highly insignificant.  
1.7  Results  
1.7.1   Main Results 
Table 5 reports the estimates of model [1.1] for the four activities covering almost the entire 
time endowment of a day (1,440 minutes). The first column of coefficients reports estimates for the 
model with minutes of market work as dependent variable. The second column of coefficients refers 
to domestic work. The third column of coefficients reports estimates of the model when minutes of 
leisure is the dependent variable. Here leisure is a broad category and it contains more than just those 
activities that are most directly affected by the weather, such as outdoor activities. In fact, weather 
conditions affect a wide range of recreational activities: outdoor activities are positively affected, but 
also museum visits, movie attendance, socializing with friends. Therefore, to capture the overall effect 
and to increase the precision of our estimates, we consider all leisure activities together. The fourth 
column of coefficients refers to sleep and personal care activities that should be only marginally 
affected by weather conditions.  
In line with previous research (Hyytinen and Ruuskanen, 2007), we find that self-employed 
workers in Italy work longer hours than employed individuals. Since sleep and personal care do not 
differ significantly, the extra amount of work comes at the expense of leisure. Our estimates show that 
the effect of the weather on the allocation of time is relevant. The average effect of Sun (absence of 
precipitation) on daily minutes of work is significant in Italy. Market work of wage/salary workers is 
reduced by about 49 minutes on sunny days. Relative to the unconditional mean of daily minutes of 
market work for employed individuals, this means a 10.1 percent reduction. Since the interaction term 
  is negative and significant, self-employed workers’ reduction of work in sunny day is larger than that 
for wage/salary workers. The estimated effect of Sun on total work for the self-employed group is 
captured by the sum between    and  . Hence, on sunny days self-employed workers reduce total 
work by 77 minutes, which means a 14.6 percent reduction relative to their unconditional mean of 
market work. On average self-employed workers work 112 minutes more per day than the 
paid-employed in rainy days (  ). This gap is however reduced by 28 minutes on sunny days ( ). 
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Hence when weather conditions are favourable self-employed individuals work about 84 minutes 
more than the paid-employed (    ). The differential effect of Sun on domestic work between 
self-employed and wage salary workers is on the other hand not significant, suggesting that constraints 
on work schedules are crucial for understanding the response of workers to weather shocks. 
The reduction of paid work is mirrored in the increase of leisure. The conditional average 
increase of leisure due to the Sun is 13 minutes for wage/salary workers (equivalent to a 5 percent 
increase, relative to the unconditional mean). The interaction term   is positive and significant, 
meaning that the increase of self-employed workers’ leisure on sunny days is larger. The differential 
effect of Sun on leisure is in fact 19 minutes. Consistent with evidence on work, normally 
self-employed workers consume fewer minutes of leisure. The estimate for coefficient    indicates 
that their leisure is on average 35 minutes lower. However, on sunny days this gap is reduced by about 
19 minutes, resulting in only 16 minutes of difference between wage/salary and self-employed 
workers. 
In short, these estimates tell us that self-employed workers enjoy less leisure, but the gap 
between the amount of their leisure and the amount of leisure enjoyed by the paid-employed workers 
is significantly reduced when favourable weather conditions are realized. We interpret this reduction 
as a consequence of the different degrees of work-schedule flexibility of these two types of workers. 
 
Table 6 reports coefficients’ estimates for the dynamic model described by equation [1.2]. 
The Tobit specification is now not required, since the daily variation in the amount of work 
(wi(t+1)-wi(t)) is not censored at zero and it can be either positive or negative. When comparing these 
results with Table 5, we have to keep in mind that the week diary reports only market work time. 
Therefore we cannot include domestic work in our dynamic specification.  
This model confirms that the weather has a significant effect on the allocation of time, in 
particular on minutes of work. When weather tomorrow is better than today, work tomorrow is 
reduced and work today is increased, resulting in a difference of 26 minutes for wage/salary workers. 
Self-employed workers respond even more, with additional 32 minutes of difference between today’s 
and tomorrow’s work when weather tomorrow is better than today. The large magnitude of the 
estimated effect reflects not only adjustments on the intensive margin of work, but also adjustments 
on the extensive margin and the effect of weather conditions on commuting time.  
These results support the idea that self-employed workers are more capable of modifying 
labour supply at time t relative to labour supply at t+1, confirming that wage/salary workers face 
significantly tighter time and timing constraints. 
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1.7.2  Other Results 
The response to good weather should in principle be stronger when sunny days are a scarce 
resource. In order to test whether the effect of favourable weather on labour supply is stronger in 
rainy months we estimate model [1.1] separately for rainy and sunny seasons. Table 4 shows the 
percentage of sunny days for each month in our sample.5 Other than February 2008, that turned to be 
unusually dry, the other months follow an expected pattern, with a remarkably dry summers and rainy 
winters and springs.  
We therefore divide the year in two periods: June to October plus February (sunny months) 
and the November to January plus March to May (rainy months). The exclusion of February from the 
sunny months does not change the results.  
Table 7 reports estimates of effect of Sun on leisure time in the dry (column 1) and rainy 
season (column 3). During the rainy season, a sunny day significantly increases average leisure. The 
increase is about 28 minutes for wage/salary workers. The differential response of the self-employed 
is positive and significant, leading to an overall increase of leisure in sunny days of about 51 minutes. 
On the other hand, the effect of Sun vanishes in the summer. Since most of Italian workers take long 
vacations in July and August, these two months could potentially affect our estimates through a 
different underlying model. However, even after excluding these two months, the effect of favourable 
weather conditions is not significant in dry season.  
Even exploiting regional variation in weather the effect of Sun on leisure is stronger when 
good weather is scarce. Table 8 shows separate estimates of model [1.1]: column 1 refers to 
individuals living in regions where in the month of their interview the probability of sunny days was 
above 0.6.6 Column 3 reports estimates for the sample of observations for which such probability is 
below 0.6. Again we find that the amount of leisure time responds more to good weather in wet 
month/regions. 
       
1.8  Robustness 
Heterogeneous average preferences for different types of leisure might however drive our 
results and undermine the interpretation that the different response of self-employed workers is due 
                                                     
5 Table [4] refers to percentage of sunny days calculated within the time use survey. The pattern is however very close to the 
actual National pattern calculated with weather data. This means that the date at which participants are interviewed is not 
affected by the weather.  
6 0.6 was chosen since it is the average probability of Sun in our sample. Therefore we made the arbitrary choice of selecting 
individuals above and below the mean.  
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to higher work-schedule flexibility. Our analysis does not in fact rule out the possibility that 
individuals who enjoy more outdoor activities and who want to take advantage of good weather 
self-select into self-employment. In this section we try to address this issue. We first estimate again the 
differential response to the weather with respect only to employed individuals, exploiting different 
degrees of flexibility within the wage/salary group of workers. This analysis provides a partial answer 
to our concern about self-selection into self-employment. However it might still be the case that 
similar motives drive the choice of wage/salary workers between different types of work-schedules. 
We therefore show that on non-working days the allocation of time of employed and self-employed 
workers is almost identical, as identical is their response to weather conditions. This provides evidence 
against the rejection of the hypothesis that individuals with higher preferences for outdoor activities 
self-select into jobs with more work-schedule flexibility.      
1.8.1  Different types of paid-employed workers 
So far we have studied the relevance of time constraints exploiting the intrinsic differences 
between employment and self-employment. It would be reassuring if differential responses to 
exogenous shocks emerged between wage/salary workers with different levels of work-schedule 
flexibility. These different levels of flexibility may arise because jobs are heterogeneous across 
industries and tasks or because of different levels of seniority across workers.  It is however hard to 
identify exactly the heterogeneous levels of flexibility for paid-employed workers.  
We exploit one of the questions asked of TUS participants.  Every paid-employed worker is 
asked whether his/her job allows for a flexible work-schedule or not. According to the answers 
provided we can distinguish workers that can easily adjust their schedule, workers that can adjust it 
providing notice and workers that are almost incapable of modifying time and timing of work on a 
daily basis.  
With model [1.3] we estimate the differential effect of Sun on work and leisure for 
paid-employed workers self-reporting different levels of flexibility. Since only a few workers can 
adjust their schedule with no notice, we pool together workers with and without notice requirement. 
Therefore we divide employed workers in two groups. The first group represents workers with some 
degree of labour flexibility. The second group represents workers who cannot make changes apart 
from vacation and sick days. The first group represents about 44 per cent of paid-workers. 
Paid-employed workers with flexible schedules are found in all industries and they are not clearly 
more concentrated among women (Table 9).   
The estimated model is 
20 
 
                                                             [1.3] 
 
where flex is a binary variable indicating workers with flexible work-schedules. The other 
covariates are similar to those in previous models. Another difference is that we include a set of 
occupation dummies (  ), that allows a finer description of wage/salary workers.  
Table 10 reports estimates of model [1.3] for work and leisure. The average effect of Sun on 
work and leisure is only marginally significant after removing from the sample the self-employed 
workers and controlling for the provision of flexible schedules within the paid-employed workers 
group. Workers with flexible schedules work 29 minutes per day more. The main result is that the 
differential response to weather shocks is negative and significant, meaning that employed individuals 
with flexible schedules reduce work by 40 minutes more than those with little flexibility. 
Similar insights emerge if we use minutes of leisure. The interaction term   captures the 
differential effect of the weather; it is positive and significant. Even within the group of wage/salary 
workers, the increase of leisure in response to good weather is larger among those with more control 
over their hours of work. These experiments support our main results: labour supply responsiveness 
is significantly affected by time and timing constraints.   
1.8.2  Allocation of time on non-working days 
In this section we try to argue that there is no clear evidence that self-employed and 
wage/salary workers differ in their preference for leisure and for good weather. This is needed in 
order to rule out the possibility that the different responses to weather shocks that we documented 
above are driven by preferences rather than by time and timing constraints. Our hypothesis is that if 
preferences are the same, the allocation of time, in particular the choice of the kind of leisure activity, 
and the response to weather shocks should be the same on non-working days, when constraints on 
the work-schedule do not hold.  
To study whether the allocation of time differs between employed and self-employed 
individuals on non-working days we use a finer classification of leisure activities. We divide leisure 
into indoor and outdoor activities and socializing. Indoor activities are mainly sleep, time spent 
watching TV, playing videogames or surfing the web. Outdoor activities basically refer to any kind of 
outdoor sport. Socializing includes time spent with friends or relatives, and time spent visiting 
museums or watching movies.  
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It is important to make clear how we construct the non-working days. It is not enough to 
consider just days where time spent working is equal to zero. This is because the weather has effects 
also on the extensive margin, increasing the incentive to not work at all when favourable weather 
conditions occur. If employed and self-employed workers can exploit this margin differently, our 
exercise would be biased if we treated all days of no work the same. We need days that are normally 
non-working days, and such that weather does not affect labour supply. 
Therefore, we restrict our sample to workers interviewed on weekends and reporting that 
they usually do not work on Saturday and Sunday. With regard to this sample we estimate, by a Tobit 
specification, whether the allocation of time and the effect of Sun differ between employed and 
self-employed workers. Table 11 reports estimated coefficients for outdoor and indoor activities, 
socializing and domestic work.  
Even having sharply reduced the number of observations, the average effect of Sun remains 
significant. Outdoor activities and socializing increase when the weather is sunny. On the other hand, 
Sun causes a significant reduction of indoor activities and domestic work. Sleep (not reported) 
remains unaffected. 
The estimated coefficients capturing the average effect of being self-employed are never 
significant. None of the five considered activities is systematically different between wage/salary and 
self-employed workers. Furthermore, the interaction term capturing the differential response of 
self-employed workers is also insignificant with respect to all activities. The increase of outdoor 
activities caused by the Sun is statistically the same for employed and self-employed workers. 
Similarly, the reduction of indoor activities or domestic work is the same. 
There is therefore no clear evidence that tastes for outdoor activities and for good weather 
are any different between employed and self-employed individuals. This test may however lack power, 
since the sample used to obtain the main results of section [1.7] is larger. The rejection of the 
hypothesis that allocation of time on non-working days differs between the two types of workers is 
however not marginal.  
1.8.3  Domestic work productivity: the case of shopping 
Having documented that self-employed workers have more control over their allocation of 
time, we describe differences in time spent shopping between the two types of workers. We argue in 
fact that individuals with more flexible schedules should in principle pay lower congestion costs, since 
they can choose a more efficient allocation of time.  
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For most activities related to home production it is really hard to measure productivity. 
Shopping however allows for some analysis of efficiency. Under the assumption that employed and 
self-employed workers consume on average similar bundles of goods and services, time spent 
shopping is an indicator of how productively such activity is carried on.        
Shopping and commuting are two activities that are clearly affected by congestion costs. For 
instance, standard 9 to 5 workers pay very high congestion costs for both commuting and shopping. 
Individuals with less tight constraints on their allocation of time can adjust the timing of their 
activities is order to reduce congestion costs. Here we show that time spent shopping by 
self-employed workers is significantly lower than time spent shopping by paid-employed workers.  
With respect to the whole sample, representing the Italian population, we first determine at 
what hours and on what days people are more likely to shop. The underlying assumption is that the 
higher the fraction of the population shopping at given time the higher the congestion cost. These 
costs can be seen in terms of efficiency (time input required for completing shopping), but also in 
terms of pleasantness.7  
According to the 2008/09 TUS, Saturday is the day when stores are the busiest and almost 20 
percent of the entire Italian population is shopping (Figure 4). From Monday to Friday, the peak is 
reached between 6 pm and 7 pm (about 12 percent), at the end of the standard work day. The fraction 
of population shopping Monday to Friday mornings is on the other hand much lower (the highest 
peak is just above 5 percent).   
Comparing timing of shopping of the two types of workers, it clearly emerges that 
self-employed women are significantly less likely to do shopping when stores are busy. Figure 5 shows 
the fraction of women shopping in any 30 minute interval for week days. In the morning, when stores 
are less crowded, the probability of shopping is much higher for the self-employed. On the other 
hand, in particular around 6 pm, when people leave their jobs, employed women are more than twice 
more likely to do shopping than the self-employed. On the weekends, employed women do more 
shopping both in the morning and the afternoon (Figure 6).   
In order to provide more evidence that self-employed workers actually spend less time 
shopping we estimate the following model: 
                                      [1.4] 
                                                     
7 When stores are busy shopping might also be less pleasant. However we do not consider this further source for congestion 
possible effect of congestion costs. 
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where self is a binary variable indicating self-employed workers, X is a vector of individual 
characteristics (gender, age, education, presence of young children). I, M and G are respectively 
industry, month and geographical area (regional) fixed effects. To describe congestion costs more 
accurately we consider separately the time spent shopping and the time spent driving to the store. In 
the first specification    represents the number of minutes for shopping and in the second minutes 
spent driving to stores. Keeping the two activities together simply leads to bigger and more significant 
coefficients for   .  
Model [1.4] is estimated by a Tobit specification, since almost two thirds of the sample 
reports zero time spent shopping on the reference day. Table 12 report the estimated coefficients. It 
turns out self-employed workers spend less time shopping, even controlling for a wide set of 
observable characteristics. Time spent driving to the store is significantly lower among the 
self-employed as well (-12 minutes). The shorter time needed for shopping and for driving to stores 
by self-employed workers suggest that they actually pay lower congestion costs. 
The other coefficients confirm that women spend more time shopping. From Monday to 
Friday there is less shopping (-33 minutes) and December is the month with the highest average 
shopping time. We have also estimated the model separately for men and women. Self-employment is 
associated with significantly lower shopping time for both genders.   
1.9  Conclusion 
In this chapter we show that the allocation of time of workers is heavily affected by the 
work-schedule and its flexibility. Past research has often claimed that self-employed workers have 
more control over their use of time, but this hypothesis is rarely tested.  
After providing descriptive evidence that self-employment is associated with higher 
dispersion of hours of work and larger day to day variation of minutes work, we test one of the main 
implications derived from more control (flexibility) over the allocation of time. We test in particular 
the differential response between employed and self-employed workers to an exogenous shock 
affecting the value of leisure, hence affecting labour supply. We find that when favorable conditions 
for leisure occur, self-employed workers reduce work and increase leisure much more than the 
paid-employed. In order to rule out the possibility that this result is due to other unobservable 
differences between wage/salary and self-employed workers, we test the same hypothesis on only 
paid-employed individuals reporting different levels of work-schedule flexibility. The results are 
24 
 
confirmed. Moreover, we also study the allocation of time of employed and self-employed workers on 
non-working days. We find that there is no evidence of different preferences for leisure and Sun 
among the two groups. 
The analysis suggests that time constraints significantly restrict agents’ choices. Welfare of 
workers would be increased if they could allocate their time more flexibly, even keeping constant the 
total amount of hours worked. For firms, it is not clear why increasing the flexibility of 
work-schedules should negatively affect productivity in many jobs. In Italy, most of the rigidity of 
work-schedules is due to outdated regulations. Most laws shaping industrial relations were in fact 
passed when a large fraction of employment was in manufacturing and when computers had not 
completely changed jobs in the service industry. Understanding the relevance of constraints on the 
allocation of time is important for reforming the Italian labour market and to encourage greater 
labour force participation of women, youths and seniors.  
  
25 
 
1.10  Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of hours of work in a normal week 
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(1) The number of hours of work in a normal week is self-reported by the participants to the survey
Hours of work in a normal week - (1)
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Figure 2: Distribution of weekly hours of work imputed by time use diaries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Daily standard deviation of minutes of work 
 
Source: 2008-09 Italian TUS. 
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Figure 4: Timing of shopping (1) – entire population 
 
Source: 2008-09 Italian TUS. – (1) Share of the population reporting shopping activity for each 30 minutes interval of the day 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Timing of Monday to Friday shopping (working women) (1) 
 
Source: 2008-09 Italian TUS. – (1) Share of the population reporting shopping activity for each 30 minutes interval of the day 
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Figure 6: Timing of weekend’s shopping (working women) (1) 
 
Source: 2008-09 Italian TUS. – (1) Share of the population reporting shopping activity for each 30 minutes interval of the day 
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Table 1: Self-employment rates as a percentage of total employment 
Country 1990 2000 2005 2010 
Canada 9.5 10.6 9.5 9.2 
France 13.2 9.3 9.1 na 
Germany na 11.0 12.4 11.6 
Italy 28.7 28.5 27.0 25.5 
Sweden 9.2 10.3 9.8 10.9 
United Kingdom 15.1 12.8 12.9 13.9 
United States 8.8 7.4 7.5 7.0 
OECD total na 17.7 16.8 na 
Source: OECD data 
     
 
Table 2: Distribution of self-employed workers across industries 
(percentage points) 
 
LFS TUS Difference 
Agriculture and fishing 9.1 11.3 -2.2 
Mining 0.1 0.5 -0.4 
Manufacturing 12.5 11.5 1.0 
Construction 11.6 10.7 0.8 
Commerce 26.2 25.3 0.9 
Whole non-commercial service industry: 40.6 40.7 -0.1 
  - Health and education services 5.4 5.4 0.0 
  - Public administration and defense 0.4 0.8 -0.4 
  - Other services 34.8 34.5 0.3 
Total 100 100  
Source: Italian LFS (2004, 2008), Italian TUS (2002/03, 2008/09) 
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Table 3: Sample descriptive statistics – 2008-09 Time Use Survey 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Share of men 0.592 0.491 
Age 41.8 10.920 
Occupation:   
    Share of self-employed workers 0.248 0.432 
    Share of wage/salary workers 0.752 0.432 
                Share wage/salary workers with flexible schedule 0.422 0.494 
Industry:   
    Public Administration and Defense 0.095 0.293 
    Oil and mining industry 0.011 0.106 
    Manufacturing 0.195 0.396 
    Construction 0.104 0.305 
    Commerce 0.164 0.370 
    Health and education 0.156 0.363 
    Other services 0.275 0.446 
Education   
    Primary education 0.363 0.481 
    High school diploma 0.468 0.499 
    University degree 0.169 0.375 
Number of household members 3.337 0.952 
Marital status   
    Married 0.581 0.493 
Presence of children in the household   
    Married individuals   
        Share of individuals with kids in age 0-5 0.248 0.432 
        Share of individuals with kids in age 6-13 0.332 0.471 
    Non Married individuals   
        Share of individuals with kids in age 0-5 0.054 0.227 
        Share of individuals with kids in age 6-13 0.053 0.226 
Share of single mothers 0.008 0.092 
Geographical distribution   
    North West 0.254 0.435 
    North East 0.236 0.425 
    Centre 0.192 0.394 
    South 0.223 0.416 
    Sicily and Sardinia  0.096 0.294 
Share of days with no precipitation 0.621 0.485 
Number of observations: 14,879 
Source: 2008/09 Italian TUS 
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Table 4: Sample shares of days with absence of precipitation per Month and Region 
Notes: all the available forms of precipitations are considered: hail, fog, snow, snow storm, rain, showers, or combinations of them. So a sunny day will be defined as a day when none of these 
conditions occur. 
 
Region 
February 
2008 
March 
2008 
April 
2008 
May 
2008 
June 
2008 
July 
2008 
August 
2008 
September 
2008 
October 
2008 
November 
2008 
December 
2008 
January 
2009 
Piemonte - Val d'Aosta 0.73 0.58 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.47 0.91 0.53 0.79 0.56 0.53 0.36 
Lombardia 0.59 0.66 0.57 0.28 0.46 0.46 0.86 0.65 0.33 0.27 0.13 0.17 
Trentino Alto Adige 0.74 0.82 0.53 0.66 0.56 0.55 0.86 0.63 0.89 0.63 0.70 0.85 
Veneto 0.50 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.52 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.50 0.48 0.49 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.75 0.46 0.58 0.33 0.74 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.41 0.59 0.76 
Liguria 0.75 0.40 0.58 0.40 0.56 0.91 0.95 0.61 0.68 0.33 0.75 0.70 
Emilia Romagna 0.70 0.33 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.82 0.79 0.67 0.71 0.51 0.09 0.17 
Toscana 0.71 0.40 0.47 0.65 0.49 0.86 0.97 0.74 0.87 0.56 0.28 0.70 
Umbria 0.87 0.51 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.86 0.94 0.62 0.92 0.25 0.53 0.43 
Marche 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.74 0.58 0.88 0.93 0.45 0.87 0.62 0.21 0.43 
Lazio 0.72 0.27 0.66 0.83 0.92 0.84 0.98 0.67 0.63 0.44 0.36 0.73 
Abruzzo 0.77 0.54 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.96 1.00 0.39 0.81 0.40 0.46 0.44 
Molise NA 0.73 0.64 0.86 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Campania 0.68 0.51 0.56 0.73 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.85 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Puglia 0.92 0.71 0.57 0.90 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.44 0.79 0.61 0.69 0.33 
Basilicata 0.43 0.59 0.44 0.64 0.67 1.00 0.91 0.28 0.65 0.47 0.70 0.37 
Calabria 0.90 0.68 0.71 0.85 0.69 0.97 0.95 0.36 0.73 0.44 0.52 0.24 
Sicilia 0.80 0.71 0.86 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.75 0.54 0.57 0.39 
Sardegna 0.73 0.65 0.72 0.59 0.88 0.79 0.99 0.60 0.84 0.52 0.59 0.41 
National Average 0.72 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.67 0.79 0.92 0.59 0.75 0.50 0.48 0.47 
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Table 5: Tobit estimates (time of work and leisure) and OLS estimates  
(Sleep - no censoring occurring). All dependent variables are expressed in minutes.  
 Market work Domestic work Leisure 
Sleep and personal 
care (OLS) 
 Coefficients s.e. Coefficients s.e. Coefficients s.e. Coefficients s.e. 
Sun -49.07** (23.13) 5.343 (4.543) 12.90** (6.361) 6.676 (4.802) 
Self-employed 111.5*** (22.43) -23.92*** (5.921) -35.24*** (7.099) -4.327 (5.527) 
Interaction ( ) -27.92* (15.66) -5.554 (7.560) 19.13** (8.437) 2.766 (6.136) 
Female -118.3*** (9.868) 189.9*** (4.303) -79.72*** (3.475) -6.118** (2.640) 
Married 1.714 (15.60) 49.80*** (4.891) -26.66*** (4.981) -2.242 (3.976) 
Kids 6-13 years -10.52 (16.78) 30.03*** (4.873) -9.773** (4.542) -5.916 (1.789) 
Kids<=5 years -54.05*** (16.86) 113.5*** (5.083) -47.31*** (5.061) -4.700 (1.080) 
# of hh members 4.843 (7.816) -6.373*** (2.208) 1.855 (2.388) -2.930** (0.0129) 
Age 5.220 (3.561) 11.74*** (1.235) -6.301*** (0.987) -2.668** (1.080) 
Age^2 -0.0802* (0.0443) -0.106*** (0.0139) 0.0789*** (0.0116) 0.0219* (0.0126) 
Education dummies        
    University  -15.66 (21.01) -10.22* (5.368) 16.97*** (5.156) 1.346 (4.724) 
    High-school -33.95** (14.90) 7.273* (4.421) 6.406 (4.425) -2.213 (4.073) 
    Less than h-s   (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Industry dummies        
    PA & Defense -23.22 (21.67) 9.455 (6.368) 12.67* (6.809) -11.66** (5.637) 
    Commerce 127.7*** (20.77) -22.41*** (5.382) -21.18*** (6.159) -20.68*** (5.623) 
    Construction -39.44 (24.52) -8.069 (6.392) 14.98** (7.512) 8.042 (5.595) 
    Manufacturing 17.09 (20.56) 21.21*** (5.642) 0.167 (6.329) -22.18*** (4.420) 
    Oil and mining -61.77*** (18.86) 12.74** (4.984) 9.707* (5.713) 1.457 (4.379) 
    Other services 51.51 (55.07) 3.817 (18.88) -34.94** (14.93) -7.959 (12.14) 
    Health&edu (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Month dummies         
    January -6.248 (29.47) -6.871 (6.688) 10.52 (11.13) 15.91*** (5.713) 
    February 40.65* (21.99) -10.96 (8.414) 0.780 (8.798) 1.024 (5.484) 
    March 12.29 (21.19) -4.401 (7.199) -6.672 (8.391) 15.34** (6.756) 
    April -2.745 (30.29) -6.692 (7.560) -5.477 (9.836) 12.81* (6.640) 
    May 54.13 (35.34) -2.838 (7.356) -8.501 (12.18) -4.180 (6.121) 
    June -0.230 (23.93) -14.85* (7.944) 12.22* (6.835) -3.417 (5.519) 
    July -15.46 (24.06) -21.22*** (6.951) 17.01* (9.970) 13.39** (6.830) 
    August -98.86*** (24.12) -17.35** (8.508) 51.11*** (9.663) -0.157 (7.378) 
    September 31.30 (23.21) -23.34*** (7.391) -1.441 (7.626) 9.770* (4.994) 
    October 42.09* (24.38) -14.96** (7.515) -10.92 (6.760) 8.000 (7.038) 
    November -24.35 (29.27) 1.871 (9.339) 1.995 (7.374) 14.81** (6.767) 
    December   (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Region dummies         
    Piemonte-VDA 13.54 (28.02) 18.85* (10.58) -8.225 (7.913) -11.05 (7.733) 
    Lombardia -3.587 (28.75) 1.063 (10.45) 3.645 (8.191) -2.506 (7.664) 
    Trentino -34.14 (30.49) 4.817 (12.07) 12.78 (8.434) -6.929 (8.745) 
    Veneto 21.67 (30.47) 11.00 (11.77) -11.72 (7.150) -9.849 (8.459) 
    Friuli -11.18 (43.82) 33.52** (13.17) -9.006 (11.80) -6.576 (9.355) 
    Liguria 10.35 (33.70) 4.809 (11.87) 0.0847 (10.52) -14.57 (12.16) 
    Emilia R -10.62 (27.81) 8.430 (11.57) -11.76 (7.696) 0.00845 (9.036) 
    Toscana 16.17 (28.88) 5.164 (10.64) -4.253 (9.748) -4.554 (9.652) 
    Umbria 22.87 (32.61) 7.899 (11.86) -1.711 (10.16) -7.659 (10.50) 
    Marche -27.65 (36.84) 1.495 (12.45) 11.71 (10.26) -3.734 (9.120) 
    Lazio 61.65* (36.66) -9.351 (10.60) -19.41 (12.09) -6.603 (9.207) 
    Abruzzo 24.06 (35.40) -3.116 (11.21) -7.234 (11.63) -1.693 (11.35) 
    Molise 61.79** (28.39) -10.12 (13.20) -2.853 (8.998) -18.72 (11.99) 
    Campania 96.11*** (30.76) -40.98*** (11.86) -12.13 (9.880) -13.86* (8.202) 
    Puglia 80.29** (34.02) -30.46*** (10.94) 3.901 (12.16) -27.81*** (10.46) 
    Basilicata 36.16 (29.91) -14.41 (15.38) -4.403 (10.23) -14.85* (8.718) 
    Calabria 34.26 (35.28) -29.54** (14.04) 5.377 (10.34) -6.940 (7.794) 
    Sardinia 33.70 (28.62) -22.02* (12.02) -3.064 (9.891) 6.684 (8.794) 
    Sicily (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Constant 161.5** (81.29) -453.0*** (29.64) 505.8*** (23.93) 781.5*** (23.39) 
Observations 12,780  12,780  12,780  12,780  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clusters represent regions and months.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
33 
 
 
Table 6: OLS estimates of the effect of sun on intertemporal labour supply (Equation 2). 
   ( )    (   )    
 Coefficients Standard errors 
∆Sun(t) -26.11*** (6.514) 
Self×∆Sun (-1) -32.00** (14.547) 
Observations 13,571  
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Tobit estimates: weather effects on leisure on sunny and rainy months 
 Leisure Leisure 
 Sunny months Rainy months 
 Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
Sun -7.212 (8.477) 27.54*** (8.126) 
Self-employed -36.34*** (13.17) -32.82*** (8.088) 
Interaction ( ) 13.89 (14.89) 24.26** (10.23) 
Female -75.94*** (4.941) -83.71*** (4.795) 
married -28.79*** (6.836) -24.06*** (6.912) 
Kids 6-13 years -1.680 (5.995) -16.49** (6.070) 
Kids<=5 years -53.19*** (7.921) -41.04*** (3.312) 
# of household members 3.431 (3.214) -0.302 (1.402) 
Age -7.778*** (1.377) -4.788*** (1.653) 
Age^2 0.0927*** (0.0168) 0.0641*** (0.0160) 
Education dummies     
    University degree 35.45*** (6.921) 1.124 (6.566) 
    High-school 9.446 (6.231) 4.939 (5.915) 
    Less than high-school (omitted)  (omitted)  
Industry dummies     
    PA & Defense 26.71** (10.39) -0.339 (8.601) 
    Commerce -14.06* (7.271) -28.37*** (8.992) 
    Construction 22.13** (11.16) 6.773 (9.634) 
    Manufacturing 2.098 (8.471) -2.801 (8.833) 
    Oil and mining 7.343 (6.958) 11.71 (8.519) 
    Other services -44.81* (24.90) -30.97* (18.25) 
    Health & education (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)  
Month dummies     
    January   9.571 (11.32) 
    February 11.79 (9.003)   
    March   -7.986 (8.031) 
    April   -7.268 (9.907) 
    May   -10.29 (12.01) 
    June 21.20*** (5.456)   
    July 29.49*** (7.836)   
    August 66.94*** (7.416)   
    September 7.392 (6.494)   
    October     
    November   1.942 (7.649) 
    December     
Region dummies     
    Piemonte - Val d'Aosta -1.216 (9.428) -16.57 (10.28) 
    Lombardia 4.912 (8.632) 1.041 (10.77) 
    Trentino 9.440 (7.756) 12.79 (10.35) 
    Veneto -5.620 (5.479) -15.13 (10.83) 
    Friuli 14.18 (17.89) -31.87** (13.02) 
    Liguria 2.646 (9.171) -1.472 (15.93) 
    Emilia Romagna 0.0830 (8.403) -22.71** (9.860) 
    Toscana 12.30 (8.100) -18.48 (15.71) 
    Umbria 8.057 (12.78) -6.604 (14.19) 
    Marche 23.85* (13.19) 0.883 (13.95) 
    Lazio 2.819 (13.84) -35.96** (16.37) 
    Abruzzo 12.50 (14.87) -25.74 (16.93) 
    Molise 29.77*** (11.32) -34.04** (9.624) 
    Campania 4.616 (8.107) -27.91* (15.53) 
    Puglia 19.57** (8.354) -11.69 (21.85) 
    Basilicata 12.78 (14.94) -23.86** (10.87) 
    Calabria 26.15* (14.41) -16.28 (10.66) 
    Sardegna 22.40* (12.73) -27.76*** (10.56) 
    Sicilia (omitted)  (omitted)  
Constant 517.2*** (32.66) 491.6*** (34.35) 
Observations 6,438  6,342  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clusters represent regions and months.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Tobit estimates: weather effects on leisure on sunny and rainy months/regions 
 Leisure Leisure 
 Dry month/regions Rainy month/regions 
 Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
Sun 11.58 (9.458) 13.65 (8.402) 
Self-employed -13.76 (14.45) -46.62*** (7.554) 
Interaction ( ) 0.183 (15.76) 27.68** (10.87) 
Female -81.51*** (5.127) -78.07*** (4.608) 
Married -29.71*** (8.606) -23.66*** (6.210) 
Kids 6-13 years -5.510 (5.836) -13.56** (6.930) 
Kids<=5 years -40.92*** (7.058) -51.74*** (7.267) 
# of household members -0.500 (3.244) 3.172 (3.321) 
Age -5.946*** (1.544) -6.730*** (1.326) 
Age^2 0.0715*** (0.0187) 0.0864*** (0.0149) 
Education dummies     
    University degree 19.56*** (7.027) 14.66** (7.339) 
    High-school 15.30*** (5.261) -1.713 (6.728) 
    Less than high-school (omitted)    
Industry dummies     
    PA & Defense 29.51*** (9.100) -6.633 (9.840) 
    Commerce -24.66*** (7.271) -18.69** (9.188) 
    Construction 22.54** (9.320) 9.401 (11.19) 
    Manufacturing 5.511 (7.483) -4.939 (9.363) 
    Oil and mining 17.88** (8.580) 2.639 (7.269) 
    Other services -52.79*** (20.43) -17.26 (21.93) 
    Health & education (omitted)    
Month dummies     
    January 18.18 (21.27) 1.673 (12.32) 
    February -4.910 (16.57) 4.980 (10.00) 
    March -11.53 (17.99) -1.265 (9.159) 
    April -36.63** (16.13) 2.702 (9.412) 
    May 3.034 (15.98) -14.05 (13.60) 
    June 14.95 (14.39) 6.042 (7.554) 
    July 25.15* (15.01) -4.507 (16.74) 
    August 50.19*** (16.01)   
    September -7.136 (15.93) 2.143 (12.25) 
    October -11.69 (14.92) -19.21** (8.504) 
    November -8.632 (22.69) 0.586 (8.013) 
    December (omitted)    
Region dummies     
    Piemonte - Val d'Aosta -1.215 (14.31) -19.26 (12.00) 
    Lombardia 7.087 (13.49) -3.940 (12.97) 
    Trentino 8.430 (9.818) 27.29 (17.31) 
    Veneto -17.39 (8.192) -21.34* (11.87) 
    Friuli -9.949 (16.87) -24.09 (16.52) 
    Liguria -2.759 (14.20) -9.440 (15.58) 
    Emilia Romagna -13.65 (11.05) -22.36* (11.56) 
    Toscana -8.706 (11.76) -12.81 (16.98) 
    Umbria -15.62 (15.21) 0.0621 (13.98) 
    Marche 12.72 (13.86) -3.633 (14.71) 
    Lazio -3.488 (14.19) -44.10*** (15.83) 
    Abruzzo 8.843 (13.19) -38.96*** (13.87) 
    Molise 0.626 (10.64)   
    Campania -6.604 (10.69) -39.14*** (12.16) 
    Puglia 2.622 (11.33) -3.817 (29.02) 
    Basilicata 0.807 (15.94) -28.75** (12.20) 
    Calabria 9.931 (13.37) -9.430 (15.50) 
    Sardegna -7.577 (10.85) 6.406 (15.19) 
    Sicilia (omitted)  (omitted)  
Constant 505.3*** (38.70) 525.2*** (32.38) 
Observations 6,762  6,018  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clusters represent regions and months.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Share of paid-workers with flexible work schedules across industries 
Industry Men Women 
Mining 0.54 0.76 
Manufacturing  0.38 0.41 
Construction 0.31 0.52 
Commerce 0.47 0.40 
Health and education services 0.45 0.35 
Public administration and defense 0.49 0.61 
Other services 0.52 0.50 
Source: 2008/09 Italian TUS 
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Table 10: Tobit estimates   
Wage/salary workers with different levels of work-schedule flexibility 
 Total work= 
market+domestic work 
Leisure 
 Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
Sun -9.368 (11.37) 9.249 (6.290) 
Flex 29.29** (15.17) -13.33 (8.234) 
Interaction ( ) -40.10** (18.09) 18.73** (8.927) 
Female 93.71*** (8.346) -80.81*** (4.004) 
Kids 6-13 years 20.15*** (7.651) -10.48** (4.450) 
Kids<=5 years 75.60*** (9.125) -49.88*** (5.379) 
Age 5.560* (3.115) -5.839*** (1.470) 
Age^2 -0.0567 (0.0359) 0.0713*** (0.0171) 
Education dummies     
    University degree 6.326 (10.43) 1.672 (7.261) 
    High-school 12.72 (12.98) 1.029 (5.415) 
    Less than high-school (omitted)    
Industry dummies     
    PA & Defense -40.87 (28.75) 5.272 (7.335) 
    Commerce -3.040 (26.09) -16.26*** (5.937) 
    Construction -62.45** (26.48) 8.624 (9.258) 
    Manufacturing -17.96 (25.52) -7.247 (5.688) 
    Oil and mining -73.12*** (26.21) 12.60** (6.053) 
    Other services omitted  -28.14* (16.65) 
Season dummies     
    Winter 18.13 (14.57) 7.141 (5.622) 
    Spring 47.45*** (12.03) -6.838 (6.743) 
    Fall (omitted)  24.98*** (5.925) 
    Summer 22.86** (9.027)   
Region dummies     
    Piemonte - Val d'Aosta 3.241 (20.84) 0.382 (8.515) 
    Lombardia -15.14 (21.92) 10.69 (8.801) 
    Trentino -40.13* (21.09) 23.20** (9.478) 
    Veneto 7.352 (22.85) -0.845 (8.319) 
    Friuli 1.808 (21.90) -4.928 (10.50) 
    Liguria 1.440 (22.47) 12.83 (9.650) 
    Emilia Romagna -23.77 (21.00) 2.184 (9.325) 
    Toscana 7.938 (21.54) 3.740 (10.73) 
    Umbria -5.368 (25.31) 6.463 (11.48) 
    Marche -20.75 (24.71) 16.64 (11.87) 
    Lazio 7.753 (36.68) -14.00 (13.55) 
    Abruzzo 2.519 (25.67) 4.379 (13.50) 
    Molise 9.461  17.16 (10.46) 
    Campania -12.06 (23.46) 1.423 (10.47) 
    Puglia -19.07 (21.60) 18.52* (10.69) 
    Basilicata -9.043 (23.64) 23.02* (11.92) 
    Calabria 7.649 (23.74) 8.319 (13.65) 
    Sardinia -6.282 (20.39) -6.288 (12.30) 
    Sicily  (omitted) (21.52)   
Occupation dummies     
    Top management -67.68 (47.93) 61.35* (34.28) 
    Management -76.61 (46.45) 60.07* (33.58) 
    Primary and high-school 
teacher 
-88.06* (49.65) 71.21** (34.83) 
    Professor -105.4** (46.57) 70.86** (33.44) 
    Employee – white collar -76.97* (46.08) 57.21* (32.95) 
    Employee – blue collar -41.00 (47.64) 40.48 (34.42) 
    Worker on probation -45.36 (53.08) 43.27 (38.54) 
Married 35.91*** (9.505) -20.53*** (4.838) 
Part-time -34.83*** (8.556) 15.22*** (5.780) 
Constant 199.0** (83.38) 449.1*** (46.39) 
Observations 11,190  11,190  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Clusters represent regions and months.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Tobit estimates, allocation of time on non-working days 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Outdoor leisure Socializing Indoor leisure Domestic work 
     
Sun 26.41*** 15.64** -15.92*** -12.72* 
 (8.504) (6.309) (5.977) (6.833) 
     
Self-employed 26.80 1.715 -17.21 -18.13 
 (17.51) (12.47) (13.03) (15.06) 
     
Interaction ( ) -4.664 10.87 16.51 -30.81 
 (22.28) (16.40) (16.12) (19.07) 
     
Female -45.95*** -31.89*** -80.59*** 184.1*** 
 (8.003) (6.184) (5.573) (6.703) 
     
married -11.35 -26.64*** 0.135 56.96*** 
 (10.45) (7.577) (7.453) (8.542) 
     
Kids 6-13 years -3.786 -2.460 -10.55 28.39*** 
 (9.985) (7.255) (6.741) (8.309) 
     
Kids<=5 years -17.22* -57.58*** -13.46** 132.4*** 
 (10.19) (7.132) (6.774) (8.806) 
     
# of household members -1.213 0.372 6.577* -9.812** 
 (4.678) (3.425) (3.402) (3.810) 
     
Age 0.265 -5.565*** -0.572 11.55*** 
 (2.450) (1.947) (2.030) (2.077) 
     
Age^2 -0.000245 0.0443* 0.0326 -0.0963*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0227) (0.0238) (0.0241) 
     
Education dummies     
    University degree 25.76** 6.255 9.030 -23.74** 
 (11.92) (9.000) (8.436) (10.32) 
     
    High-school  4.952 -2.888 3.314 -6.948 
 (8.860) (6.715) (6.491) (7.299) 
     
    Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
     
Region dummies     
    Northern regions -6.673 -36.61*** 14.56** 26.33*** 
 (8.758) (6.908) (6.177) (7.872) 
     
    Southern regions (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Constant 20.84 367.9*** 220.0*** -415.3*** 
 (57.06) (42.97) (45.32) (47.27) 
Observations 3,453 3453 3,453 3,453 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 12: Tobit estimates. Dependent variables: time spent shopping in minutes and time 
spent driving for shopping in minutes. 
 (1) (2) 
 Time shopping Time driving for shopping 
 Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
     
Self-employed -23.23*** (3.678) -12.10*** (1.769) 
Female 24.04*** (3.032) 13.58*** (1.626) 
Age 5.115*** (0.968) 2.432*** (0.389) 
Age^2 -0.0449*** (0.0107) -0.0200*** (0.00462) 
Education dummies     
    Less than high-school -10.99** (4.311) -5.221** (2.448) 
    High-school -0.670 (4.083) -1.173 (2.098) 
    University degree  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Industry dummies     
    PA & Defense -2.284 (6.672) 0.586 (2.515) 
    Commerce -12.52*** (4.875) -6.809*** (2.110) 
    Construction -9.076 (5.610) -2.913 (2.603) 
    Manufacturing -2.198 (4.940) -0.893 (2.432) 
    Oil and mining 7.616* (4.351) 3.889** (1.980) 
    Other services 1.661 (13.12) 3.580 (6.591) 
    Health & education  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Kids<=5 years -0.0886 (3.661) 2.551 (2.077) 
Kids 6-13 years 2.208 (2.860) -0.251 (1.387) 
Region dummies     
    Piemonte - Val d'Aosta 10.24 (7.498) 4.173 (3.744) 
    Lombardia -3.308 (7.587) -1.785 (3.533) 
    Trentino -15.14** (7.709) -6.606* (3.642) 
    Veneto -1.745 (8.677) 0.0398 (4.219) 
    Friuli 2.080 (9.233) 2.173 (4.292) 
    Liguria -2.977 (7.699) -0.501 (4.006) 
    Emilia Romagna -1.036 (8.045) 0.328 (3.683) 
    Toscana -7.690 (7.660) -3.849 (3.720) 
    Umbria -4.765 (9.997) -1.970 (5.354) 
    Marche 2.968 (9.069) 1.249 (4.343) 
    Lazio 18.20 (12.34) 6.006 (4.156) 
    Abruzzo -1.190 (7.676) -2.297 (3.930) 
    Molise -10.10 (9.828) -5.674 (4.529) 
    Campania -4.443 (8.721) -1.082 (4.152) 
    Puglia -7.735 (8.241) -4.453 (4.183) 
    Basilicata -25.01*** (9.502) -7.721* (4.688) 
    Calabria -20.56*** (10.43) -8.234* (4.782) 
    Sardinia -3.732 (7.642) -2.434 (4.096) 
    Sicily  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Month dummies     
    January -11.78* (6.207) -7.883** (2.972) 
    February -16.92*** (6.823) -10.69*** (3.016) 
    March -14.78** (5.026) -7.844** (3.682) 
    April -18.57*** (5.061) -9.499*** (3.166) 
    May -23.22*** (6.526) -13.55*** (3.141) 
    June -21.69*** (5.483) -13.12*** (2.831) 
    July -22.27*** (5.419) -11.65*** (3.336) 
    August -3.117 (13.90) -7.294** (3.115) 
    September -20.40*** (4.421) -11.98*** (2.744) 
    October -24.77*** (6.722) -12.10*** (3.051) 
    November -7.103 (6.582) -5.670* (3.145) 
    December  (omitted)  (omitted)  
Week-day -33.25*** (3.823) -16.24*** (1.777) 
Constant -161.1*** (20.82) -85.90*** (9.247) 
Observations 14,879  14,879  
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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2  The Added Worker Effect for 
Married Women in Italy 
2.1  Introduction 
Since the second quarter of 2008 the Italian economy has performed poorly: between 2008 
and 2012 the country lost more than 6 percent of its real GDP (Figure 7). The consequences of this 
prolonged crisis on the labour market have been severe, with a significant worsening since the third 
quarter of 2011. In particular, 2012 was characterized by a significant surge of the unemployment 
rate (10.7 percent, 4.6 percentage points higher than in 2007).  The increase in unemployment was 
associated with a sharp increase in female labour force participation: in the North it went from 59.7 
in 2007 to 62.3 in 2012, in the South went from 36.6 to 39.3 in the same years. The increase in 
female labour force participation may be a manifestation of the Added Worker Effect 
(AWE, henceforth). By AWE we refer to the increase in labour supply of married women due to 
their husband’s job loss. 
Among the OECD countries, Italy shows one of the lowest female labour force 
participation rates. In 2012 only 53.5 percent of women between 15 and 64 year participated in the 
labour force. Italy is also characterized by wide regional disparities: in the North the female 
participation rate is about 62.3 percent, 23 percentage points higher than in the South. The 
participation rate of married women in 2012 was 59 percent, a 3 percentage point increase over 
2007. This increase is mostly due to the change in participation rates between 2011 and 2012. The 
economic crisis hit married men: in 2012 their unemployment rate was 4.7 percent, against only 1.9 
percent in 2007, and the probability of transition from employment to unemployment more than 
doubled in a few years (Figure 8). In 2006 the probability of an employed married man becoming 
unemployed within 12 months was 1.5 percent; the same probability between 2011 and 2012 
reached 3.6 percent. All these factors, together with the tight borrowing constraints that the current 
fragility of the banking system is imposing on Italian households, provide indeed conditions for 
finding a significant AWE. The literature shows mixed results, with some studies finding almost no 
AWE and other studies finding some AWE. Italy may therefore represent an upper-bound on the 
magnitude of AWE in countries around the World. 
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We address whether the AWE is a relevant phenomenon for the Italian economy by 
exploiting retrospective questions provided in the new labour force survey which begun in 2004. 
Retrospective questions allow the identification of transitions between labour market states. In 
particular we study how the wife’s probability of joining the labour force and that of becoming 
employed are influenced by her husband’s job loss. Moreover, unlike previous studies on the AWE, 
we estimate how the full transition matrix between labour market states is affected by the husband’s 
job loss. 
The dataset provides information on the reason for the husband’s job loss. This 
information allows us to distinguish between expected and unexpected job losses. This distinction 
is crucial for estimating the AWE for two reasons. The first one is that when the husband’s job loss 
is fully anticipated, likely we do not observe any change in the wife’s behaviour after the husband’s 
transition occurs. That is because she may have acted before the occurrence of the husband’s 
transition. The second reason is the AWE depends on the magnitude of the income loss. For 
instance, when the husband retires the income loss is usually relatively small, whereas when he quits 
his job for a health reason the income loss is likely to be large. During a deep recession the 
identification of the AWE is easier. In fact, the occurrence of the husband’s transition from 
employment to unemployment is more random than in normal times, when the job loss is more 
likely to hit workers with low productivity. Moreover, during recessions the magnitude of the 
income loss is larger, due to the longer unemployment spells. 
Our results show that the husband’s job loss significantly affects both the wife’s probability 
of becoming employed and that of entering the labour force. In particular, the wife’s probability of 
finding a job within a year increases by 2.1 percentage points when the husband is laid off. The 
probability of joining the labour force significantly increases by 3.4 percentage points. Large and 
statistically significant responses are also found when the husband quits his job for health reasons.  
The estimated transition matrices show clear positive assortative mating between spouses. 
High skilled men with low risk of being laid off are more likely to marry high skilled easily 
employable women. The AWE is particularly relevant for participation in the labour force: the 
transition probability from unemployment to inactivity is significantly lower when the husband 
loses his job.  
 Finally, we also provide a description of one of the possible factors limiting a wife’s 
response. In particular, focusing on mothers, we find positive and significant correlation between 
the magnitude of the AWE at the regional level and local provision of child care services.  
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In section 2.2 we present the relevant related literature. Section 2.3 contains information 
on the data used for the analysis and descriptive statistics of the selected sample. In section 2.4 we 
discuss the identification strategy. Section 2.5 shows the results for the AWE and transition 
matrices between labour market states. Section 2.6 discusses the role of child care services as a 
potential factor limiting wife’s labour supply response. Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2  Literature 
The theoretical framework for studying the increase in a married woman’s labour supply in 
response to her husband’s job is provided by an extension of the standard life-cycle model of 
labour supply with uncertainty (Stephens, 2002). The relevance of the AWE in a life-cycle model 
crucially depends on the magnitude of the income loss due to the husband’s unemployment spell, 
on the family wealth and on the magnitude of income elasticity of labour supply in the short-run. 
When the labour market is efficient and unemployment spells are short, a significant response of 
the wife’s labour supply is unlikely to be found since the household can smooth the income loss 
over the life-cycle. However, the literature has noted at least two possible mechanisms preventing 
the smoothing of the income loss. The first and more traditional mechanism is due to inefficiency 
of the financial market (Lundberg, 1985). If households face tight borrowing constraints, in 
particular when the main income recipient loses his labour income, the welfare cost of even short 
unemployment spells can be high, leading to a significant labour supply response of other 
household members. The second and more recently highlighted mechanism points out the role of 
consumption commitments, which magnifies the effect of even small inefficiencies in the financial 
market (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007). In fact, when a relevant fraction of total household expenditure 
cannot easily be reduced in the short term (consumption commitments) the welfare cost associated 
with unemployment is high, leading to larger income elasticity of labour supply than usually found 
in the literature (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). The impact of credit constraints and consumption 
commitments are, however, mitigated by the generosity of unemployment benefits (Cullen and 
Gruber, 2000). Yet, unemployment benefits are temporary. Hence, even in the presence of rich 
unemployment benefits, the wife’s response may be significant if she expects her husband’s 
unemployment spell to be long. The role of credit constraints on the wife’s labour supply have also 
been studied in a similar context under the “family investment hypothesis” (Cobb-Clark and 
Crossley, 2004). According to this hypothesis, a wife may join (temporarily) the labour force to 
allow her husband to invest in human capital. This hypothesis seems to be particularly relevant for 
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immigrants, whose skills are not perfectly transferrable across countries (Baker and 
Benjamin, 1997). 
Formal unemployment benefits in Italy are not very generous: the replacement rate is 40 
per cent for a period up to seven months. Moreover, only workers who have been employed for at 
least 52 weeks in the 2 years before the unemployment spell are eligible for receiving the benefit. 
However, formal unemployment benefit is not the most common form of assistance to individuals 
with temporary difficulties. The redundancy fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) is currently the main 
program. It covers workers who are suspended from work for temporary difficulties of the firm. 
This program became the main way to support “workless” workers during the economic crisis 
started in 2008. We use the expression “workless workers” because individuals benefiting from the 
redundancy fund are actually still formally employed with their last employer, even though they 
often do not work at all (sometimes the redundancy fund is used to reduce temporarily the hours of 
work). For the majority of these workers the probability of returning to their job is very low, and 
their situation is very similar to that of unemployed individuals. The redundancy fund can however 
last for much longer than the regular unemployment benefit (in special cases even up to five years).  
The empirical literature on the AWE presents mixed evidence. On the one hand, some of 
the studies find negligible impacts of the husband’s job loss (Mincer, 1962; Heckman and MaCurdy, 
1980 and 1982). However, these studies do not distinguish between partners who recently 
experienced job losses and those who are long-term unemployed. Without this distinction it is hard 
to estimate a pure AWE. More recent work, which uses the husband’s actual transitions from 
employment to unemployment, finds a significant AWE in different countries: USA 
(Stephens, 2002), Canada (Morissette and Ostrovsky, 2009), Australia (Xiaodong, 2011).   
Congregado et al. (2011) study the AWE after the big slump of the Spanish economy, 
which started in the third quarter of 2009. They exploit aggregate data to find that the AWE 
dominates the discouraged-worker effect when the unemployment rate is not too high. We try to 
exploit the recession that hit Italy almost at the same time as Spain. The deep and long recession 
has increased the incidence of job loss among husbands, which helps us identifying the AWE. 
Unlike Congregado et al. (2011), we use micro-data, which allows us to account for the other 
relevant socio-demographic factors affecting a wife’s labour supply. 
The study of the AWE sheds more light on the long lasting problem of low female labour 
force participation in Italy. Among the main factors for low female labour force participation in 
Italy we find the low-level of education of women, in particular till the 1990s, the lack of child care 
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services, and the culture8 (Del Boca et al., 2000). Child care in Italy is heavily subsidized, and there 
are long queues for spots in child care facilities. When formal child care is not available, informal 
child care becomes the common substitute. Informal care is often given by grandparents. It is 
known that when one of them lives near the family, the demand for formal child care is 
significantly reduced (Del Boca et al., 2005). However, the recent reform of the retirement 
system (2011) and the demographic changes of Italian families, in particular the reduction of the 
average number of household members, could potentially limit the possibility of choosing informal 
child-care in the future. We explore the relation between the AWE and the child care services 
provision, which highlights one channel through which the welfare effects of future recessions 
could be larger. In fact, any factors limiting the ability of the wife to respond to income shocks 
hitting other family members reduce the effectiveness of marriage as an insurance mechanism.    
2.3  Data  
The Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS henceforth) is conducted by the National Statistics 
Office (Istat). Interviews are continuously carried out in every week of the year. The population of 
interest is household members above age 15. About 70,000 households are interviewed for a total 
of 125,000 individuals each quarter. The Italian LFS was radically changed at the beginning of the 
last decade, and the new series started on January 2004. We use 36 quarters of this survey, from 
January 2004 to December 2012.  
According to the rotation scheme of the Italian LFS, individuals stay in the survey for two 
quarters, skip for one quarter and return for the fourth quarter of their survey year. Therefore the 
structure of the data permits the study of quarterly and yearly transitions. However, only the full file 
provides the identifier that allows tracking people through time. With the standard file available to 
us we can study only yearly transitions by means of retrospective questions. These questions focus 
mainly on labour force status. This is the main source of information we use, and it allows the 
analysis of a wife’s labour supply response to her husband’s job loss. Unfortunately, we can study 
only responses in terms of the extensive margin and within the one year time window provided by 
the data. This means that we cannot study responses on the intensive margin, such as the increase 
of number of hours worked by a wife when her husband is laid off. 
                                                     
8 The role of family background and culture is studied by analyzing the labour supply behavior of a woman and the 
behavior of her mother (or mother in law).  
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Since our interest is the labour supply of married women, the dataset is restricted to 
married individuals. Pooling together all quarters from 2004 to 2012, we obtain 961,000 married 
couples. Table 13 reports the descriptive statistics for women conditional on husband’s work status. 
As expected, strong evidence of positive assortative mating emerges (people do not get married 
randomly). When the husband is employed, 55 percent of women are employed as well, against 
only 39 percent when the husband is unemployed. The husband’s and wife’s probability of being 
unemployed are also positively correlated. Only 36 percent of women with unemployed husband 
have more than primary education, against 57 percent for women with employed husbands. The 
regional distribution of couples with unemployed husband is uneven, with about sixty percent of 
them living in Southern regions. 
The data confirm well-known facts about Italian economy, which is characterized by wide 
regional differences in terms of income, employment rate, female labour force participation and 
education.  
2.4  Identification 
2.4.1  Added worker effect 
The literature defines the AWE in two ways. The first one defines AWE as the increase in 
the transition probability from “non-employment” to employment for married women whose 
husband experienced a recent job loss. By “non-employment” we mean both unemployed and 
inactive individuals. The second one defines AWE as the increase in the probability of participating 
in the labour force for inactive women in case of husband’s job loss. Joining the labour force 
means moving from being inactive to employed or unemployed.  
The first measure of AWE, which studies transitions into employment, is however directly 
affected by labour demand as well. During recessions, not only are husbands at higher risk of being 
laid off, but work opportunities for wives are also reduced. Transition from inactivity to activity is 
on the other hand less affected by labour demand, even though discouragement could also 
attenuate wife’s labour supply response during recessions. In this work we estimate the response in 
terms of both probabilities. We also go a step further, estimating the impact of husband’s job loss 
on the full transition matrix for the wife’s labour market states. 
The main challenge in estimating the impact of the husband’s job loss on the wife’s labour 
supply is the construction of a credible counterfactual, namely what would have happened if the 
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husband had not lost his job. If both the factual and counterfactual situations were observable, the 
AWE would simply be: 
    (  
   |        
      )    (  
   |        
      )     [2.1] 
   Where   
 is an indicator dummy equal to one when wife i works at time t, and equal 0 
otherwise.     indicates whether her husband experienced a job-loss between t-1 and t. Therefore,   
provides a measure of the AWE, since it captures the difference between the transition probabilities 
from “non-employment” to employment in case the husband loses his job and in case he does not. 
However, we cannot observe both the factual and the counterfactual situation; therefore 
some identifying assumptions are required. Since the same individual cannot be observed in both 
states, we adopt the sample of women whose husband did not lose his job to construct the 
counterfactual needed for estimating the AWE. The validity of this approach relies on the 
assumption that the conditioning vector X of observable characteristics removes systematic 
differences between the two groups. In effect, we assume that estimates for the AWE are not 
biased by unobservable characteristics: 
    (  
   |        
         )    (  
   |        
         )  [2.2] 
where     represents the sample of treated women and     represents the control 
group (no husband’s job loss).  
Assuming that [2.2] holds and provides unbiased estimates of  , we estimate the wife’s 
transition probability by a logit specification. The model can therefore be written as: 
  (  
   )  
   
 
     
      [2.3] 
and 
  
      
     
      
                 
where   
  and   
  represent respectively wife’s and husband’s characteristics,    represent 
regional fixed effects and     year fixed effects. The vector   captures the AWE for each of the 
reasons for the husband’s job loss (retirement, family reasons, dismissal, and health problems). We 
allow the standard errors to be correlated at the regional level. 
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According to the theory, the AWE is increasing in the size of income loss and on how 
unexpected the husband’s job loss was. In particular, fully anticipated husband’s transitions from 
employment to “non-employment” may produce very little posterior responses, since the action 
may well take place before the husband loses his job. In order to account for this implication of the 
theory and for the fact that some transitions are associated with small (if any) income losses, the 
vector    provides an estimate of the AWE for each reason for the husband’s job loss. The Italian 
LFS provides detailed information on the reason why a working individual at time t-1 is 
“non-working” at t, when the interview in carried on. The first element of   caputres the effect of 
husband’s retirement between t-1 and t. Retirement is usually a fully anticipated transition. The 
second element of   captures the effect of the husband’s job losses due to family reasons. These 
also are likely to be quite anticipated, since we can imagine a joint decision between the spouses. 
Finally, the third and fourth elements of   capture the effect of two types of job losses that usually 
are less anticipated: dismissal and health problems. Our main focus will be on cases when the 
husband is dismissed by the employer. 
2.4.2  Full transition matrix 
The standard approach to the AWE relies on the estimation of the effect of the husband’s 
job-loss on the two transition probabilities discussed above. However, we can imagine that the 
probability of transition between any two labour market states is affected by the husband’s job loss. 
In this section we estimate the full transition matrix between labour market states for women 
experiencing, or not, husband’s job loss. 
 The empirical methodology adopted in this section follows previous work that estimated 
transitions between types of jobs and labour market states for immigrants (Skuterud and Su, 2012) 
or self-employment dynamics (Kuhn and Schuetze, 2001). In particular, we estimate the effect of 
husband’s job loss on the wife’s full transition matrix between labour market states assuming that 
such dynamics are approximated by a first-order Markov process.  This assumption implies that all 
the relevant dynamics can be represented by a 3x3 matrix, where the labour market states are 
employment, unemployment and inactivity at time t-1 and at time t. Given our data, the lag between 
t-1 and t is 12 months. This means that our data do not allow us to identify action that is taking 
place between t-1 and t. For instance, if the husband loses his job between t-1 but he finds the new 
job before t, this transition is not captured in the data and in our estimation. The main LFS file, 
which allows tracking individuals over quarters, would partially solve this problem. Similarly, we are 
not able to identify cases when the wife was employed for a short period between t-1 and t. 
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Each element of the transition matrix is estimated by a multinomial logit, restricting the 
sample to individuals in each of the origin states separately. For instance, to estimate the transitions 
from employment in t-1 to all other states in t, we restrict the sample to individuals who are 
employed at t-1. To estimate transitions from unemployment and from inactivity we similarly 
restrict the sample to individuals who happened to be respectively in each of the two states at t-1. 
The specification of the multinomial logit includes a dummy indicating whether the 
husband lost his job between t-1 and t, a vector of spouse’s characteristics, region and year fixed 
effects. Since the group of women whose husband lost his job shows different average observable 
characteristics from women whose husband did not lose his job and we are interested in isolating 
only the AWE, we construct the transition matrices as follow. We first obtain the marginal effects 
evaluated at the overall sample mean for each initial state. Then we calculate the value of each 
element of the two transition matrices adopting the sample means of wives with non-laid off 
husbands for both groups. We sum the estimated marginal effect of   (evaluated at the mean) to 
each element of the transition matrix referred to women whose husband lost his job. Therefore, the 
difference between the transition matrices of the two groups of wives is entirely attributable to the 
estimated AWE.  
2.5  Results 
We begin by discussing the wife’s response to the different types of husband’s job loss. We 
first consider transitions from “non-employment” to employment. Individuals that are 
non-employed are either unemployed or inactive.  
Table 14 reports estimated coefficients of the logit model [2.3]. The first column of 
coefficients refers to transitions from “non-employment” to employment. The second refers to 
transitions from the state active to inactive. The first coefficient provides an estimate of the AWE 
when the husband is laid off; the second coefficient refers to cases when the husband stops 
working for health problems; the third and the fourth coefficients report AWE estimates when the 
husband retires or when he quits his job for family reasons. 
One of the main predictions of the theory is borne out in these estimates. In fact, when the 
husband’s transition from employment to non-employment is anticipated and the income loss is 
small, the estimated AWE is very small and statistically insignificant. In particular, when the 
husband retires there is no response in terms of wife’s labour supply. Similarly, when the husband 
stops working for family reasons, the estimated AWE is not significant. 
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On the other hand, when the husband is laid off we find a significant increase in the wife’s 
transition probability from non-employment to employment. The estimated marginal effect at the 
mean implies that women whose husband was laid off between t-1 and t are 2.1 percentage points 
more likely to become employed between t-1 and t.  
When the husband quits his job for health reasons, we also find a significant increase in the 
wife’s probability of becoming employed: the estimated marginal effect at the mean implies an 
increase of 2.6 percentage points. It’s interesting that in this latter case the response seems to be 
stronger than in the case when the husband is laid off. This supports the hypothesis that the 
response is stronger the higher the expected income loss. In fact, the income loss associated with a 
severe health problem is likely to be larger than the income loss associated to an unemployment 
spell, even when long-term unemployment is frequent. 
The other covariates exhibit the expected signs: the higher the education of the wife, the 
higher her probability of becoming employed between t-1 and t. The probability of transition is also 
higher in Northern regions, where the labour market is more efficient. The magnitude of the 
response is decreasing in both partners’ age. 
We now consider whether the probability of participating in the labour force for inactive 
women is affected by the husband’s job loss. Here we consider the AWE in terms of the transition 
probability from inactivity to either unemployment or employment. It should be remarked that we 
are not considering the formal definition of unemployment. According to the ILO definition of 
unemployment adopted in Italy, an individual is statistically considered unemployed if the following 
conditions are satisfied: i) he is job-less, ii) he states that he wants to work  iii) he did active job 
search in the last 4 weeks, iv) he is willing to start working within two weeks. The literature has 
shown that these conditions tend to underestimate significantly the number of actually unemployed 
people (Jones and Riddell, 1999; Brandolini et al, 2006). I therefore require only the first two 
conditions for considering an individual as unemployed. This choice solves another problem that is 
often discussed in the AWE literature. The discouraged worker effect tends to act in opposite 
direction of the AWE and can lead to significant attenuation of these estimates. Discouraged 
people are individuals who would like to work, but they are not officially counted in the pool of 
unemployed since they do not actively search for a job. The Italian LFS permits the identification 
of both officially unemployed individuals and those who would like to work but who have not 
performed any active job search in the four weeks before the interview.  
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The second column of Table 14 reports coefficients affecting the wife’s probability of 
transition from “inactive” to “active” for the same four cases as before. Even in this case the wife’s 
transition probability is influenced only by the husband’s job losses that entail substantial income 
losses. In fact, when the husband’s transition is due to retirement or family reasons there is no 
significant response by the wife. Wlaid offhen we focus on husbands that have been laid off 
between t-1 and t or husbands that have quitted their job for health problems, a significant AWE is 
found. In the first of these two cases, the marginal effect at the mean indicates that the probability 
for married women to enter the labour force increases by 3.4 percentage points when her husband 
is laid off. When the husband withdraws from the labour market is due to health problems the 
wife’s transition probability increases by 6.2 percentage points.  
When the husband experiences the reverse transition from unemployment to employment 
the effect on his wife’s transition probability is negative and statistically significant. As predicted by 
the theory, when the husband finds a job his wife labour supply is reduced. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is small however, which points to some permanence in the AWE. It is therefore likely 
that the prolonged recession of the Italian economy will produce a permanent increase in female 
labour force participation. 
2.5.1  Full Transition Matrix 
We now discuss the estimated 3x3 matrices describing the transition probability from any 
labour market states at t-1 to any states in t, where the time window is one year. Table 15 refers to 
women whose husband did not lose his job, whereas Table 16 reports the estimated transition 
probabilities when the husband has lost his job. We should remark that these two tables differ only 
for the estimated effect of the binary variable indicating the husband’s job loss, holding the other 
observable characteristics constant at the first group mean values. This isolates the AWE purging 
all other confounding factors, such as higher average education of the group whose husband does 
not experience a job-loss. 
Looking at employed women at time t-1, the probability of still being employed one year 
later is higher when the husband is not laid off. This might seem a contradiction with the AWE, but 
probably it is capturing positive correlation between spouses’ skills and employment shocks. The 
probability of going from employment to unemployment is significantly higher when the husband 
is laid off, leading to lower probability of moving toward inactivity. This indicates that the AWE is 
particularly relevant in terms of labour force participation, rather than in terms of employment. 
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Similar conclusions emerge when we compare women that are unemployed at t-1. The 
probability of finding a job is higher for the group whose husband did not lose his job, likely again 
due to matching between high productivity individuals. However, the probability of going from 
unemployment to inactivity is significantly lower when the husband is laid off (5.9 percent against 
9.2 percent), consistent with the AWE hypothesis. 
When we consider inactive women, the effect of husband’s dismissal positively affects 
both the probability of moving to employment and to unemployment. In this case, where 
unobservable differences among the two groups of women are presumably less important, the 
AWE is found both in terms of transition toward employment and in terms of transition toward 
unemployment (active participation into the labour market).   
Pooling together all years from 2004 to 2012 we are implicitly assuming that the Markov 
chain is time-homogeneous. This means that each entry of the matrix is time independent. This 
assumption might appear problematic, since the last four years have been characterized by a 
prolonged recession. However, between estimates for years before the crisis (2004-2008) and years 
after (2009-2012), the transition matrix changes only marginally. The main difference is found 
looking at women that are unemployed at t-1. In years 2009-2012 the probability of finding a job 
for unemployed women whose husband did not lose his job is lower the in the first 5 years under 
analysis (2004-2008), as expected given the poor performance if the Italian economy performance 
after the second half of 2008. Nevertheless, the probability of finding a job for unemployed women 
whose husband lost his job increases after 2008. In bad times the expected unemployment spell of 
the husband is longer, leading to a larger expected income loss. This can induce a reduction of 
wife’s reservation wage and an increase of her search effort. Together these two responses may 
explain an increase of the transition probability from unemployment to employment even when 
labour demand is weak.  
2.6  Barriers to wife’s response     
The literature on the AWE has not identified the different factors limiting changes in 
female labour supply. In this section we focus on one of the possibilities. We provide some 
descriptive evidence that the wife’s response could be significantly limited by the quantity (and 
quality) of child care services offered. 
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Lack of child care services is one of the main established factors limiting female labour 
supply. Relative to the OECD average, women with children in Italy are significantly less attached 
to the labour market, particularly in Southern regions where child care services are meagre.  
The presence of children in the household has ambiguous effects on the AWE. When the 
family suffers the husband’s job loss, the presence of children could lead to a smaller response of 
mothers through additional constraints limiting her labour supply. But consumption commitments 
might be more relevant for families with children, leading to larger welfare loss due to the 
husband’s unemployment. When young children require goods and services that cannot be easily 
reduced, the husband’s job loss could induce a stronger response in a mother rather than in a 
woman with no children.  
A point that should be made clear is that even if we do not know whether mothers are 
more or less responsive to husband’s job loss than women with no kids, their response should be 
ceteris paribus larger in regions where more child care services are provided.  
We first study whether mothers respond differently from wives with no children. To 
estimate the differential response between women with and without children, we estimate a model 
that is similar to [2.3], and include an interaction term indicating women with children whose 
husband lost his job between t-1 and t. As recent studies pointed out, the interpretation of 
interaction terms in logit and probit models is often problematic (Ai and Norton, 2003; Berry et al., 
2010). The main difficulty arises from the fact that each estimated coefficient and marginal effect in 
these non-linear models implicitly depends on the level of all other covariates. Therefore the sign 
and the statistical significance of the interaction term are often hard to interpret. To avoid these 
difficulties, we abandon the logit specification in favour of a linear probability model (LPM) 
including an interaction term. In particular, we include a dummy indicating whether one of the 
household member’s age is less than 14 (Ki), and we interact this indicator variable with   
 , 
capturing whether the husband was laid off or not. 
  
       
         
       
      
             [2.4] 
The interaction term’s coefficient   captures the differential between mothers and other 
married women with no children below age 14 in the family. The dependent variable of the 
estimated model is the transition probability from the state “inactive” to the state “active”. Since we 
are interested in studying the role of child care services, we run separate regressions for Northern 
and Southern regions given the wide provision gap of such services between these two areas. This 
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also suggests focusing on the transition from state inactive to state active, since the labour market is 
much more efficient in the North. If we were focusing on transition from non-employment to 
employment our results would be heavily affected by the different development of the labour 
market between the two areas. In particular, North-South comparisons would be problematic given 
the wide differences in vacancy and unemployment rates. Table 17 reports estimates for model 
[2.4]. The first column refers to the whole country, whereas the second and the third columns 
report the coefficients for separate estimates for the North and for the South.  
The interpretation of the parameter   is complicated by the fact that we cannot control for 
different preferences for work between stay-at-home women with and without children. However, 
the positive and significant estimate of all three regressions suggests that when the husband loses 
his job, the response of the wife is stronger when the couple has children. This might also reflect 
the fact that the unemployed husband can look after the kids and make the constraints due to poor 
child service provision less important for the family. 
On average women with kids tend to respond more to their husband’s job loss: the 
estimates for the whole country of the interaction term reveal an increase of 2.97 percentage points 
relative to women with no children.  The point estimate of the differential response is larger in the 
North than in the South. There are at least two competing explanations for this difference between 
the North and the South. The first one is related to selection into inactivity. The wide gap between 
the North and the South in terms of female labour force participation makes it likely that average 
unobservable characteristics of inactive women are significantly different in the two areas. The 
second reason is related to the provision of child care services, which is much higher in the North. 
Better child care services could explain why mothers respond more to the husband’s job loss in the 
North.  
Publicly available data do not allow the identification of the structural relation between 
child care service provision and female labour supply. However some descriptive analyses support 
the idea that the lack of these services poses relevant constraints on the magnitude of the AWE.  
Italy, like other members of the European Union, receives resources from the Union’s 
budget to reduce social regional gaps. These funds are called structural and cohesion funds and they 
are the financial tools implementing the European “cohesion policy”. Several goals are set when 
these resources are assigned to each country. One of the goals that Italy had to pursue with the 
structural funds was to reduce the gap between the North and the South in terms of provided child 
care services. This objective is part of the more general target of increasing female labour supply in 
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the South. Among other conditions, the use of these funds requires the target to be measurable and 
its measures publicly available. Therefore, from the Department for Economic Development and 
Cohesion of the Italian Government, we can access regional data on one of the main measures for 
child care service provision, such as the day care coverage rate (percentage of children that can 
access free day care). This is indicator is available for each Italian region. 
For each region we produce separate estimates of the AWE, restricting the sample only to 
women with children. As before, the AWE is measured in terms of the transition probability from 
the state inactive to active, in order to reduce the confounding role played by the different regional 
quality of the labour market. Figure 9 shows the correlation between the regional day care coverage 
rate and the estimated AWE at regional level. A positive correlation emerges, suggesting that child 
care services provision significantly affect labour supply responsiveness of married women when 
their husband is laid off. Among other implications, this suggests that lack of child care services 
also reduces the household’s ability to minimize the impact of the husband’s job-loss.    
2.7  Conclusion 
We study the labour supply response of married women to their husband’s job loss. 
Exploiting retrospective questions of the new labour force survey, we identify transitions between 
labour market states in a 12-month time window both for the husband and for the wife. This 
explicitly allows the identification of the short-run response of the wife’s labour supply to her 
husband’s job loss. The study covers years 2004-2012. Starting from 2008, the performance of the 
Italian economy was negative, and about 6 percent of national GDP was lost in these 5 years. The 
labour market reflects the negative performance of the economy, with a sharp increase of 
unemployment and of the transition probability from employment to unemployment. For married 
men, this probability more than doubled between 2007 and 2012.  
Consistent with the theoretical framework for the AWE, we find that only the unexpected 
husband’s job losses associated with high income losses produce a significant change in the wife’s 
labour force behaviour. When the husband retires or quits for family reasons, no significant effect 
is found, either before 2008 or after the economic crisis began. Conversely, when the husband is 
laid off or he stops working for health problems, the wife’s response is positive and significant. We 
find a positive effect both on the wife’s transition probability from non-employment to 
employment and from the state inactive to active. Between the North and the South we find a 
significant difference in the magnitude of the response studying only transitions toward 
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employment, whereas transitions in terms of labour force participation are not very different 
between the two areas. This seems to reflect the different quality of the labour market and it 
suggests that there is not clear evidence that the willingness to work is different between North and 
South. This result also reflects our choice to define as unemployed a larger pool of individuals than 
just those officially defined as unemployed. The discouraged worker effect is a much more severe 
problem in the South, where people tend to do less job search than in the North. 
In addition to estimating the AWE in the traditional manner proposed by the literature, we 
also estimate the effect of the husband’s job loss on the full transition matrix between labour 
market states of the wife. We find that AWE is particularly relevant in terms of labour force 
participation, since the husband’s job loss clearly reduces the wife’s transition probability from 
unemployment to inactivity. Clear evidence of positive assortative mating emerges as well. 
Finally we focus on how the provision of child care services affects the AWE. Exploiting 
the significant regional variation in the provision of day care coverage, we find that mothers with 
children are much more responsive to their husband’s job loss in regions where they can easily 
access day care services. This provides further motivation for reducing the gap in terms of child 
care services provision between the North and the South. In fact, our evidence suggests that the 
lack of child care services magnifies the welfare cost associated to job losses. Therefore, not only is 
it much harder to find a job and long term unemployment is more frequent in the South, but also 
the ability of the family to mitigate the welfare reduction due to the husband’s job loss is lower. 
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2.8    Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 7: Italian GDP growth rate – percentage points 
 
Source: IMF data 
 
 
Figure 8: Unconditional transition probability  
from employment to unemployment for married men  
Age 15-64 – percentage points 
 
Source: Italian labour force survey 
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Figure 9: AWE and regional provision of day care 
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Table 13: Descriptive wife's characteristics conditional on husband's employment status 
 
Employed husband Unemployed husband Inactive husband 
Employment status 
 
St. Err. 
 
St. Err. 
 
St. Err. 
  Employed  0.55 (0.0009) 0.39 (0.0049) 0.29 (0.0015) 
  Unemployed 0.04 (0.0003) 0.14 (0.0033) 0.01 (0.0004) 
  Inactive 0.41 (0.0009) 0.48 (0.0049) 0.69 (0.0016) 
Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Primary 0.43 (0.0009) 0.64 (0.0047) 0.71 (0.0015) 
  High-school 0.43 (0.0009) 0.30 (0.0045) 0.24 (0.0014) 
  Univeristy 0.14 (0.0006) 0.06 (0.0024) 0.05 (0.0007) 
Household size 3.47 (0.0016) 3.53 (0.0096) 3.10 (0.0032) 
Kid 0-5 0.27 (0.0009) 0.28 (0.0045) 0.05 (0.0008) 
Kid 6-14 0.37 (0.0009) 0.39 (0.0048) 0.10 (0.0010) 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  15-24 0.01 (0.0002) 0.02 (0.0016) 0.00 (0.0002) 
  25-34 0.21 (0.0008) 0.25 (0.0045) 0.04 (0.0007) 
  35-44 0.39 (0.0009) 0.37 (0.0048) 0.09 (0.0009) 
  45-54 0.30 (0.0008) 0.28 (0.0043) 0.31 (0.0016) 
  55-64 0.08 (0.0004) 0.08 (0.0024) 0.55 (0.0017) 
Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  North 0.46 (0.0009) 0.25 (0.0044) 0.43 (0.0017) 
  Centre 0.19 (0.0008) 0.14 (0.0040) 0.17 (0.0014) 
  South 0.34 (0.0008) 0.60 (0.0051) 0.40 (0.0016) 
  
Source: Italian labour force survey - 2004/2012 
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Table 14: AWE – Wife’s transition probabilities. 
 Transition from 
non-employment to employment 
Transition from the state inactive  
to the state active 
   
Reason for the husband’s job loss   
Dismissal 0.448*** 0.696*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0455) 
   Health problem 0.513* 1.050*** 
 (0.291) (0.259) 
   Retirement -0.0502 -0.00948 
 (0.134) (0.147) 
   Other family reasons 0.288 0.716 
 (0.637) (0.552) 
Wife’s education   
Less than high school Omitted Omitted 
   High school diploma 0.502*** 0.406*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0231) 
   University degree 1.208*** 1.064*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0622) 
   
Husband’s education   
Less than high school 0.0820 0.193** 
 (0.0736) (0.0770) 
   High school diploma 0.173*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0677) 
   University degree Omitted Omitted 
   Wife’s age   
15-19 2.334*** 3.122*** 
 (0.687) (0.406) 
   20-24 2.123*** 2.418*** 
 (0.313) (0.273) 
   25-29 2.469*** 2.558*** 
 (0.268) (0.249) 
   30-34 2.556*** 2.575*** 
 (0.256) (0.250) 
   35-59 2.566*** 2.522*** 
 (0.231) (0.246) 
   40-44 2.402*** 2.374*** 
 (0.229) (0.244) 
   45-49 2.203*** 2.091*** 
 (0.208) (0.237) 
   50-54 1.878*** 1.677*** 
 (0.180) (0.210) 
   55-59 1.117*** 0.919*** 
 (0.229) (0.188) 
   60-64 Omitted Omitted 
   Husband’s age   
20-24 1.279*** 0.746*** 
 (0.307) (0.289) 
   25-29 0.793*** 0.458*** 
 (0.250) (0.176) 
   30-34 0.708*** 0.485*** 
 (0.218) (0.154) 
   35-59 0.539*** 0.370*** 
 (0.193) (0.139) 
   40-44 0.415*** 0.293** 
 (0.147) (0.128) 
   45-49 0.296** 0.176 
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 (0.138) (0.122) 
   50-54 0.1000 0.0504 
 (0.122) (0.107) 
   55-59 0.0250 -0.0223 
 (0.113) (0.111) 
   60-64 Omitted Omitted 
   Husband’s industry at t-1   
Agriculture 0.0783 0.0418 
 (0.103) (0.0543) 
   Mining and Oil -0.200** -0.150** 
 (0.0902) (0.0639) 
   Manufacturing -0.0988 -0.0764* 
 (0.0670) (0.0409) 
   Construction -0.230*** -0.115* 
 (0.0877) (0.0652) 
   Commercial services -0.0904 -0.0266 
 (0.0607) (0.0489) 
   Tourism 0.000663 0.0237 
 (0.0503) (0.107) 
   Transp. and telecomm. -0.120 -0.0683 
 (0.0938) (0.0764) 
   Finance -0.134** -0.0201 
 (0.0630) (0.0688) 
   Professional services -0.0788 -0.0302 
 (0.0719) (0.0659) 
   PA & defense -0.202*** -0.0581 
 (0.0714) (0.0640) 
   Education and health -0.0373 0.0585 
 (0.104) (0.0913) 
   Other services Omitted Omitted 
   Region fixed effects Y Y 
   Year fixed effects Y Y 
   Constant -5.884*** -5.463*** 
 (0.232) (0.209) 
Observations 335806 274399 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by region) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 15: Conditional transition probabilities – Non laid off husbands 
 
Employed (t) Unemployed (t) Inactive (t) 
Employed (t-1) 0.959 0.025 0.016 
 (0.265) (0.0162) (0.0116) 
Unemployed (t-1) 0.198 0.710 0.092 
 (0.0864) (0.0866) (0.0391) 
Inactive (t-1) 0.024 0.026 0.950 
 (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0355) 
Transition probabilities are predictions from three separate multinomial logit regressions (one for each origin state). 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Conditional transition probabilities – Laid off husbands   
 
Employed (t) Unemployed (t) Inactive (t) 
Employed (t-1) 0.909*** 0.070*** 0.021*** 
Unemployed (t-1) 0.182* 0.759** 0.059*** 
Inactive (t-1) 0.034** 0.060*** 0.906*** 
    
Transition probabilities are predictions from three separate multinomial logit regressions (one for each origin state). All 
predictions are made at mean values of the covariates for women whose husband did not lose his job. The transition 
probabilities of wives whose husband lost his job differ from those referred to wives with non-laid off husbands only by 
the estimated AWE (marginal effect of the AWE dummy). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 refer to the estimated coefficient 
of the AWE dummy. 
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Table 17: Differential AWE between women with and without children 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Italy Northern and Central Southern 
    
L (husband’s job loss) 0.0135*** 0.0102*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00348) (0.00376) 
    Kids<14 -0.00955*** -0.0138*** -0.00284 
 (0.00173) (0.00268) (0.00196) 
    Interaction 0.0297*** 0.0355*** 0.0261*** 
 (0.00593) (0.0102) (0.00732) 
Wife’s education    
Less than high school Omitted Omitted Omitted 
    High school diploma 0.0203*** 0.0214*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.00135) (0.00195) (0.00178) 
    University degree 0.0777*** 0.0725*** 0.0867*** 
 (0.00394) (0.00491) (0.00628) 
Husband’s education    
Less than high school -0.00263** -0.00276 0.00623 
 (0.00133) (0.00195) (0.00381) 
    High school diploma Omitted Omitted 0.00865** 
    University degree -0.0170*** -0.0200*** Omitted 
 (0.00259) (0.00347)  
Wife’s age    
15-19 Omitted Omitted Omitted 
    20-24 -0.0385 -0.0397 -0.0206 
 (0.0296) (0.0387) (0.0324) 
    25-29 -0.0282 -0.0131 -0.0275 
 (0.0294) (0.0384) (0.0323) 
    30-34 -0.0282 -0.0155 -0.0252 
 (0.0294) (0.0384) (0.0324) 
    35-59 -0.0326 -0.0176 -0.0331 
 (0.0295) (0.0385) (0.0325) 
    40-44 -0.0429 -0.0316 -0.0393 
 (0.0295) (0.0385) (0.0325) 
    45-49 -0.0574* -0.0483 -0.0505 
 (0.0296) (0.0386) (0.0326) 
    50-54 -0.0724** -0.0669* -0.0594* 
 (0.0296) (0.0386) (0.0326) 
    55-59 -0.0882*** -0.0833** -0.0699** 
 (0.0296) (0.0386) (0.0326) 
    60-64 -0.101*** -0.0920** -0.0866*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0387) (0.0327) 
Husband’s age Y Y Y 
    
Husband’s industry at t-1 Y Y Y 
    
Region fixed effects Y Y Y 
    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y 
Constant 0.046 0.195*** 0.0870** 
 (0.0311) (0.0388) (0.0352) 
Observations 286,759 144,995 141,764 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3  Effects of Sunday Shopping 
Deregulation on the Allocation of 
Time 
3.1  Introduction 
Sunday shopping is the ability of retailers to operate stores on Sunday. Sunday shopping 
regulation varies around the World. In Europe, there are countries that still forbid Sunday shopping 
(like Belgium and Switzerland). In Canada, the process of Sunday shopping deregulation started in 
1985, when the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the existing regulation banning Sunday 
shopping (the Lord's Day Act) was against freedom of religion. Since then all Canadian provinces 
have passed laws permitting Sunday shopping. These changes did not happen however all at the 
same time, providing the opportunity of exploiting the provincial variation in the time of the policy 
change for the identification of its effects. A previous study by Skuterud (2005) determined the 
exact time of the policy change in each Canadian province. This study focussed on the effects of 
the policy change on firms’ behaviour, in particular on labour demand. We focus on the effects of 
the policy change on the allocation of time and on time spent on paid work in particular. Among 
other consequences, Sunday shopping deregulation has in fact removed a constraint on the time 
allocation.   
In this work we study the allocation of time of prime-aged individuals with and without 
children. The main reason that we study these two groups is that the introduction of Sunday 
shopping is a relatively small shock for people that can easily re-allocate their time. In this 
perspective, women with children are likely to be much more time constrained than women 
without children. Therefore, studying the effects of Sunday shopping on these two different groups 
helps the identification of the effects of relaxing such constraint on the allocation of time. 
A similar work by Jacobsen and Kooreman (2005) analyses the effect on labour supply, on 
shopping, and on leisure of extending shopping hours in The Netherlands. However, probably due 
to the heterogeneity of their sample, they claim that extending shopping hours does not affect the 
total time devoted to work or leisure. This is the motivation for focussing on women with children, 
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since mothers usually face high time costs related to child care and they are therefore more likely to 
change their behaviour. 
After developing a simple theoretical model showing how Sunday shopping deregulation 
should affect the allocation of time, and the amount of paid work in particular, we test the main 
predictions of the model using five waves of the time use file of the Canadian General Social 
Survey.  
We find that after the introduction of Sunday shopping, individuals with children reduce 
the amount of weekday and Saturday shopping. The amount of time that is saved by moving some 
of the weekday and Saturday shopping to Sunday is used to increase market work. The response is 
however statistically significant only among women. Even though this difference between men and 
women could be due to several factors, the fact that men’s labour supply is less elastic than female’s 
likely accounts for their statistically insignificant response.  Individuals without children that do not 
face the same tightness of their time constraints do not respond to the policy change. The 
robustness checks performed with data from the Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) support the 
idea that our results are not driven by the long-run increasing female labour force participation 
trend, which represents one of the main challenges and confounding factors for our analysis.  
Our results suggest that even small additional constraints on the allocation of time can 
produce relevant changes in the behaviour of busy individuals. In particular, we interpret our results 
as another piece of evidence that the labour supply of mothers responds significantly to changes in 
these constraints, and that policy makers aiming to increase female labour supply should play close 
attention to relaxing these constraints.  
Section 3.2 contains the literature review. In section 3.3 the theoretical model is developed. 
Section 3.4 describes the data set; section 3.5 explains the identification strategy; section 3.6 
contains the results, which are discussed and further interpreted in section 3.7. Section 3.8 
concludes. 
3.2  Motivation – Literature review 
The determinants of female labour supply and the performance of women in the labour 
market have been widely studied. Costa (2000) provides a detailed description of the long run 
increasing trend of female labour force participation. Among other factors, such as the change in 
the nature of most jobs or the change in social norms, the lower time input required for domestic 
work seems to be one of the most important drivers of the observed dramatic increase of female 
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labour force participation in most OECD countries. This mechanism leading to increasing market 
work of women is formally developed in a life-cycle framework by Greenwood, Seshadri, and 
Yorukoglu (2005). They showed how the adoption of labour-saving durables such as washing 
machines or vacuum cleaners accounted for almost 50 percent of the increase in female labour 
force participation that occurred during the last century in the United States.  
Time affects the decision to have children as well. The cost of children is not just a 
monetary cost, but it also entails a large time cost. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 
(2005) attribute the baby boom to the adoption of the same time saving technologies that also 
contributed to the increase in female labour force participation. The technological progress in 
home production technology has reduced significantly the time cost of having children.       
Attanasio et al. (2008) calibrate a life-cycle model addressing the relative ability of 
competing (but also complementary) explanations for the dramatic changes in labour supply profile 
in the US. Again, their results show that the reduction of child care cost is one of the most 
powerful driving forces for augmenting female labour supply. With reference to the Canadian 
experience, Baker et al. (2008) show that the reduction of child-care cost approved by the province 
of Quebec in the late 1990s had large and statistically significant positive effect on female labour 
supply.  
All the above papers only implicitly or indirectly address how constraints on the allocation 
of time affect women’s decisions. They however make clear, with an approach completely different 
from ours, the crucial role of time allocation and its constraints. They point out that anything that 
helps individuals save time or that improves efficiency of the time use can lead to large changes in 
behaviour.  
Becker (1965) and Becker and Ghez (1975) developed an elegant theory that explicitly 
introduced the time dimension and its allocation into static and life-cycle models. The empirical 
work on the allocation of time was initially based on aggregate data, due to lack of detailed and 
reliable micro-data. However, since the mid-1980s many more micro-data sets have become 
available. Juster and Stafford (1991) explain the challenges related to reliable time use data 
collection (micro-data) and their analysis. In recent years the number of studies based on time use 
micro-data has increased significantly. The European statistics office (Eurostat) is trying to develop 
a harmonised (multinational) time use survey to make cross-country comparisons easier.   
One of the less-explored issues on time use research is how timing constraints affect 
economic decisions. Hamermesh et al. (2008) is one of the few papers focusing on the importance 
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of timing. In particular he shows how the need for leisure synchronization affects agents’ 
behaviour. We study how people respond to changes in the limitation of shopping hours. Jacobsen 
and Kooreman (2005) study how the extension of shopping hours from Monday to Friday changed 
the allocation of time in The Netherlands. They find only small effects of changing shopping hours. 
Even though they focus on married versus single individuals, they do not clearly highlight the role 
of children on their parent’s allocation of time. Therefore they do not focus on the most severely 
time constrained group. However, the identification of a constraint relaxation is easier when 
focusing on individuals that are more severely affected by such constraint. The presence of children 
in the family dramatically reduces the degree of flexibility of time re-allocation. Therefore, focusing 
on couples with offspring can lead to better understanding of how the extension of shopping hours 
affects the allocation of time. Gruber and Hungerman (2008) study the effect of Sunday shopping 
deregulation on Church attendance in the US. They find that Sunday shopping caused a reduction 
in Church attendance through the increase in the opportunity cost of religious participation.  
In this paper we study the effects of Sunday shopping deregulation in Canada on time use. 
In particular we focus on women with children, showing that the higher ability of allocating 
activities over the entire week induces an increase in labour supply. The reaction of women without 
children, who are less time constrained, is consistent with the findings of Jacobsen and Kooreman 
(2005).  
3.3  The Model 
To understand the effects of Sunday shopping deregulation on the allocation of time, we 
use a model similar to the model that Jacobsen and Kooreman (2005) use to describe the effect of 
longer shopping hours in The Netherlands. With some modifications to the original model, it is in 
fact possible to capture the effects of the policy change on three broad activities: market work, 
leisure and shopping. Denote by Mt the time spent on market work, by St the time spent shopping 
and by Lt the amount of time devoted to leisure. Jacobsen and Kooreman (2005) split a day into 
day time and night time. Whereas, since we are analyzing the effect of Sunday shopping, we 
distinguish between weekdays including Saturday and Sunday. The following notation is adopted:    
t = w indicates weekdays, t = s indicates Sunday. 
The main improvement of the model presented here is that we assume that each individual 
has a set of unavoidable daily activities that need to be done, both on weekdays and on Sunday. 
67 
 
Such activities can be thought as fundamental child or personal care. In particular, we assume that 
fundamental child care implies some fixed time costs. 
We define by      with   {   } the fixed time costs that individual i faces during 
weekdays or on Sunday. Therefore, defining with    the total weekdays time endowment, we can 
think at         as the disposable amount of time that individual i can allocate to market work, 
leisure or shopping during from Monday to Friday. In this model leisure is whatever activity is left 
after paid work and shopping. Introducing domestic work explicitly would not change the insights 
of the model. We also assume that people can work only on weekdays. The effect of Sunday 
shopping deregulation on shift workers or on individuals that usually work on Sunday is in fact 
likely very different than on Monday to Friday (or Saturday) workers. 
Following Jacobsen and Kooreman (2005), we assume that agents are homogeneous in 
terms of preference and productivity. However, we consider a dimension of heterogeneity, 
assuming that they differ in terms of disposable time (alternatively, in terms of fixed time costs). 
The disposable time for individual i on Sunday is denoted by        . We therefore assume the 
existence of two types of agents, with high fixed time cost     
  and with low fixed time cost    
 . 
Individual i's maximizes following utility function: 
 (                      )             (         )      (         ) 
 [3.1] 
With            
subject to the following constraints: 
               [3.2] 
                           [3.3] 
                          [3.4] 
(              )      
           [3.5] 
(         )      
        [3.6] 
where [2] says that total consumption cannot exceed earned salary. Condition [3] states the 
time budget during the week days and [4] gives the time constraint associated with Sundays. 
Constraints [5] and [6] are standard feasibility conditions, with: 
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  [         ]  [         ]  [         ] 
And 
    
  [         ]  [         ] 
If Sunday shopping is not allowed, we have a further constraint       . We begin by 
discussing the case in which Sunday shopping is permitted, which means       . The assumed 
utility function implies that leisure on weekdays and on Sunday are perfect substitutes. The same is 
true for weekday and Sunday shopping. Even though the reasonability of this assumption is 
questionable, the only requirement for the model to convey the same message is that there is 
substitutability between weekdays’ and Sunday’s activities.  
3.3.1  Solution with Sunday shopping 
Given the homothetic utility function, the optimal choice implies constant budget shares. 
It is easy to show that the solution is: 
    
      
    (               ) 
    
      
    (               ) 
  
 
 
   (               ) 
In order to assess how time tightness affects the reaction to Sunday shopping deregulation, 
assumption 1 is imposed. 
Assumption 1: the low time fixed cost type is characterized by     
      
         
  and the high 
time fixed cost type by     
      
         
 . 
Assumption 1 simply implies that agents with low fixed time cost want to consume more 
leisure than the total amount they can consume on Sunday. Therefore, they consume some leisure 
also on weekdays. On the other hand, the total amount of leisure consumed by high cost agents is 
less than the total Sunday’s time endowment. In other words, on Sunday these agents allocate some 
time to other activities different from leisure. In our model the other possible Sunday activity is 
shopping. 
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 Notice that this model does not make any prediction about the distribution of leisure and 
shopping over the week (weekdays vs. Sunday). It just gives the total weekly amount of time spent 
on each activity and it determines whether the amount of time available on Sunday is enough to 
satisfy leisure demand. 
3.3.2  Solution without Sunday shopping 
If Sunday shopping is not allowed, a further constraint is imposed:        . The inclusion 
of this constraint affects in a very different manner agents with          
  and agents characterized 
by          
 . In fact, an individual with plenty of time does not change the total amount of time 
spent working, shopping and consuming leisure. They just re-allocate time over the week, devoting 
Sunday to leisure and performing shopping during the week. Since the total weekly amount of 
leisure demanded by individuals with low fixed time cost is larger than the total time endowment 
on Sunday, the policy change does not lead to any substitution between activities. In particular, 
individuals with low time cost that already devoted all of Sunday to leisure do not respond at all to 
the policy change. 
On the other hand, people with high fixed time costs have to reduce the amount of time 
they work on the market. In fact, since now they cannot shop on Sunday, they have to do shopping 
during weekdays. This induces a reduction of the total amount of time devoted to paid work and it 
induces an increase of leisure. Notice that now individuals with tight time constraints consume 
leisure only on Sunday, since no other activities are allowed in that day and the total time 
endowment on Sunday exceeds their demand for leisure. This implies that high fixed time cost 
individuals are forced to over consume leisure, since they cannot do shopping. This kind of idea 
can be extended to activities other than shopping and to time other than Sunday. Whenever there 
are laws preventing some activities in specific days or hours of the day, this induces a potential 
welfare loss due to a less efficient allocation of time. 
3.4  Data 
Canadian time use data are collected as a separate file of the General Social Survey (GSS). 
The time use file of the GSS is released with a periodicity of about five years. The GSS is a survey 
providing information on social trends in Canada. The target population is individuals aged 15 and 
older, living in one of the Canadian provinces. 
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The time use file provides detailed information on how people living in Canada spend their 
time in a single day. Surveyed individuals are asked to compile a diary, reporting their activities 
every ten minutes, where and with whom. Aggregating this information over the day yields a 
precise description of daily time use. Since the survey is conducted over all 12 months and over the 
different type of days (weekdays, weekends, and holidays) it represents the allocation of time over 
the entire year, accounting also for seasonality. We use all available cycles of the survey: 1986, 1992, 
1998, 2005 and 2010. 
The time use survey provides detailed information on a wide range of activities. The level 
of detail has significantly changed over the years. Since 2005 the survey provides in fact much more 
detailed information in the list of activities recorded. However, to use all five surveys we aggregate 
into broad categories: market work, domestic work, child care, leisure, and shopping. 
The aggregation into broad categories poses some theoretical challenges however. Standard 
economic models usually divide time into market work and leisure, meaning with the former any 
paid activity and with the latter everything else. More detailed analysis of time use requires at least a 
third category: domestic work. When domestic work is determined, time devoted to leisure should 
be purely recreational. The distinction between pure leisure and domestic work is however not 
always unambiguous, and it calls for some arbitrary choices. Activities such as gardening and 
playing with children could be considered either domestic work or leisure. The distinction between 
domestic work and leisure can be done following two different approaches. The first one, suggested 
by Robinson and Godbey (1999), is based on the ranking of activities for self-reported level of 
enjoyment: only the most enjoyable activities are considered as leisure. The second approach, more 
grounded in economic theory, is based on the degree of substitutability between market input and 
time input (Becker, 1965). Leisure is typically characterized by low substitutability between market 
and time input, whereas the time required for domestic activity can usually be substituted with 
market input. The classic example is represented by time spent watching live a soccer game and 
time required preparing dinner. The time needed for the soccer game is always not less than 105 
minutes, no matter how expensive the TV is (market input). Time required to satisfy the need for 
food can, on the other hand, be significantly reduced buying cooked food (market input). 
We focus on individuals aged 20-54 with and without children. This choice was made to 
avoid confounding factors such as retirement for older workers. The total sample size is 34,000 
units (Table 18). The sample size might look quite large, however time use micro-data are quite 
noisy and our identification strategy requires splitting the sample between Sunday and other days, 
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and between the two genders, which leads in some cases to relatively small cell sizes. Table 19 
reports the average allocation of time by gender and by presence of children in the household from 
1986 to 2010. Over these 25 years some changes emerge. First of all, the contribution of men to 
domestic work has dramatically increased over this period. This change is registered for men with 
and without children. This finding matches similar trends in other developed countries (Ramey, 
2008). Extra time in domestic work displaces market work and leisure for fathers, whereas men 
without children reduce only leisure.  
Women, both mothers and other women with no children, have increased minutes of paid 
work. It’s interesting that the increase in time at work has come mostly from the reduction of 
leisure. This means that the overall workload on women has increased in the last 25 years. This 
makes even more relevant the issue of efficient and flexible allocation of time. Looking at leisure 
trends of prime aged individuals, Canada behaves quite differently from the United States, where 
leisure has increased over the last 40 years (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007). Finally, we note that shopping 
represents only a small fraction of the daily allocation of time (from about 15 to about 40 minutes). 
Women do more shopping, but the time spent in such activity has decreased for all groups over 
this period.  
Skuterud (2005) carefully identifies the date at which the regime switches likely occurred 
and Sunday shopping became widely available. Table 20 displays Skuterud’s dates for the policy 
change in each province. These dates are consistent with evidence from the Canadian time use 
surveys. Table 21 shows the average fraction of the population spending at least one minute on 
Sunday shopping in provinces with and without Sunday shopping and the number of minutes spent 
shopping on Sunday. Even though this table shows that the law prohibiting Sunday shopping was 
not fully enforced, the policy change (deregulation) had a significant unconditional effect. We 
should however note two things that are problematic. First of all, in 1992 the gap between the two 
groups shrinks significantly, because of a sharp reduction of Sunday shopping in provinces where it 
was allowed. Second, in the last survey (2010), the gap is reduced due to the sharp increase in 
shopping in the only province left in which Sunday shopping was not allowed (Prince Edward 
Island). British Columbia is excluded from the analysis because the policy was implemented at the 
municipal level. This makes impossible to identify the time of the policy change at the provincial 
level. 
Since the number of provinces not permitting Sunday shopping decreased over time, the 
control group used for estimating the effect of the policy change has also reduced. For observations 
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from the last wave the counterfactual is based only on individuals living in Prince Edward Island. 
However, even excluding the last wave of the survey from our estimate, when the counterfactual 
could be considered less credible, the main results that we are going to show in the next sections do 
not change.  
3.5  Identification 
Regression analysis with time use data requires some care since a large number of 
individuals report zero time allocated to several activities. This problem is even more relevant when 
focusing on very specific (disaggregated) activities, such as shopping. The time use literature has 
recently focused on the appropriate choice of the model to study the allocation of time 
(Stewart, 2009; Foster and Kalenkoski, 2013). Specifically the problem is whether zeros should be 
treated as pure corner solutions or as the observed outcomes of an infrequent activity. In the 
former case, models dealing with corner solution and censoring are appropriate. Several models 
deal with left censoring at zero such as Tobit I, Tobit II and double-hurdle models. Flood and 
Grasjo (1999) discuss how all these models perform in estimating labour supply for Swedish 
women. They show that when the data generating process is not fully known, a simple Tobit I 
model produces the least biased estimates. Since the index equation does not enter into the Tobit I, 
this model is in fact robust to misspecification of the index equation. On the other hand, using a 
Tobit II model can lead to large bias when the index equation is misspecified. 
When the horizon of analysis is longer, OLS could lead to less biased results 
(Stewart, 2009). The horizon of the analysis is therefore very important. With a longer horizon (a 
month or even a week), for a large variety of activities reporting zero minutes in a single day it is 
hard to consider these observed zeros as actual corner solutions. For instance, an individual that is 
reporting zero shopping time in a day may well do some shopping over the entire week. The longer 
the horizon the less credible the assumption that zeros represent corner solutions. However, when 
the focus is on the allocation of time in a single day, zeros likely represent actual corner solutions. 
Therefore, when we study the allocation of time on Sunday, the adoption of a model that deals with 
corner solution seems therefore the preferable choice. For estimates on the remaining days of the 
week, on the other hand, the adoption of such models might be less convincing. Therefore, for the 
key results we will show both Tobit and OLS estimates, in order to make explicit that they do not 
depend on the choice of the model.  
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Identifying how Sunday shopping deregulation affected labour supply and the overall 
allocation of time of married individuals poses more challenges other than left censoring. In 
particular, since there is no province experiencing the opposite policy change and other changes 
presumably occurred over the considered span of time (1986 – 2010), our estimates could capture 
other long-run trends that are unrelated to Sunday shopping deregulation. For instance, female 
labour supply has increased in response to other policies that have been implemented in Canada 
(Baker et al., 2008). The increasing trend of female labour supply is not the only long run change. 
In fact, there is also the well documented secular decrease of market work for men (Costa, 1998), 
and the tendency for men to work more at home (Ramey, 2008). 
These likely sources of bias are tackled through the use of provinces that never adopted a 
widespread deregulation of Sunday shopping as control group and through the inclusion of 
province specific time trends in our model. The effects of Sunday shopping deregulation are 
identified by jumps over a quadratic time trend.  
We begin by showing that Sunday shopping deregulation had a larger effect on the 
shopping behaviour of individuals with children. This group is more severely time constrained than 
its complement. We therefore estimate the differential impact of Sunday shopping deregulation on 
weekday shopping time (measured in minutes). In particular, after pooling together the available 
five cycles of the GSS, we estimate the following model:  
                                              [3.7] 
where    represents the daily minutes of shopping (Mon to Fri) done by individual i. The 
binary variable      indicates whether Sunday shopping is possible for individual i (depending on 
the province and on the year);    is equal to one if the family has at least one child. The parameter 
  captures therefore the differential response of Monday to Saturday shopping between families 
with and without children to the introduction of Sunday shopping. Controls    and    are year and 
province fixed effects, and X is a set of individual and household characteristics, such as gender, 
age, education, employment status or household size. Ti represents the quadratic province specific 
time trend. We also run the same regression on time spent shopping on Sunday, in order to show 
that busy individuals reallocate their time reducing weekdays shopping and increasing Sunday 
shopping. 
After having shown that individuals with children free up some of the Monday to Saturday 
time endowment reallocating shopping to Sundays, we study how they change the overall allocation 
74 
 
of time.  In order to do so, highlighting the difference between individuals with and without 
children, we estimate the impact of the policy change on four activities exhausting the time 
endowment, distinguishing for gender, for the type of household (with and without kids), and for 
type of day (week days plus Saturday vs. Sunday).  
We estimate the following model 
  
                             [8] 
where   
  is the amount of time (measured in minutes per day) spent by individual i doing 
activity a. As before,    and    represent year and province fixed effects, X the vector of individual 
and household characteristics, and Ti the province specific quadratic time trend. Since      
indicates whether Sunday shopping is possible for individual i, the coefficient   captures the effect 
of Sunday shopping deregulation on the time spent on the considered activity a. 
The data allows identification of the effect of Sunday shopping on a much more detailed 
variety of activities than those included in the theoretical model. Even though the main focus of 
our analysis is on paid work, we also study how other activities are affected. The rich variety of 
activities provided by the time use survey is reduced to only four main macro-activities. The first is 
market work, which includes time spent on any paid activity. Domestic work includes all activities 
for the care of the house and of other family members (child care is therefore fully included in it). 
Leisure includes sleep, personal care activities, outdoor and indoor pure leisure activities. The 
fourth activity is shopping time, which refers to time spent purchasing goods. Time spent for 
acquiring services is included in domestic work since it is not clearly affected by the Sunday 
shopping deregulation.  
The main prediction of the model is that after introducing Sunday shopping, market work 
should increase for individuals with high fixed time cost, while it should remain the same for 
individuals with more disposable time. As pointed out by Heckman (1988), children and domestic 
work absorb some unavoidable amount of time. Therefore, comparing people with children to 
people without children captures the idea of comparing agents with lower disposable time (those 
with children) and agents with plenty of disposable time (those without children). In terms of the 
notation introduced above, this means that the average person with children is characterized 
by         
 , whereas the average person without children is assumed to be characterized 
by         
 .  
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Our analysis identifies the response on the allocation of time. Welfare comparisons 
between the two groups are on the other hand not directly allowed, since time commitments of 
children and domestic work are ultimately endogenous. 
3.6  Results 
We begin by discussing the differential impact of Sunday shopping deregulation between 
individuals with and without children on the time spent acquiring goods. Table 22 reports the 
estimated effect on Sunday (column 1) and on weekdays and Saturday (column 2). The estimate of 
the interaction term tells us the differential effect of Sunday shopping deregulation between the two 
groups. It emerges that the introduction of Sunday shopping induced a larger reduction in weekday 
shopping for individuals with children. The policy changed caused in fact a 17 minutes daily 
reduction in weekdays shopping for individuals with children, whereas it had very little effect on 
those with no children.  
Column 1 refers to time spent acquiring goods on Sunday. The interaction term shows that 
the policy change had a larger effect on individuals with children (about 29 minutes). The picture 
that emerges is therefore consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model. In particular, 
individuals with higher fixed time cost respond to the introduction of Sunday shopping reducing 
weekdays shopping time, freeing up time for other activities, and increasing the amount of time 
spent doing shopping on Sunday. The response of individuals with lower fixed time costs is on the 
other hand much smaller and it is statistically insignificant.    
Since Sunday shopping deregulation had a greater impact on the allocation of time for busy 
individuals, we now study how time spent on the other activities has changed in response to the 
analyzed policy change. In particular, we are going to show that women with children allocated 
some of the extra time to paid work. Freeing up busy women’s time induces a labour supply 
increase.  
Table 23 reports the estimated coefficients of model [8] describing the effect of Sunday 
shopping deregulation on the allocation of weekday time of women with kids. Consistent with the 
estimates of the interaction term on the full sample, it emerges that with respect to this group the 
introduction of Sunday shopping led to a reduction of weekdays shopping time (-20 minutes per 
day). The fewer minutes of shopping allowed the reallocation of time toward paid work. The other 
activities were not significantly affected. Since shopping time includes also the time spent driving to 
the stores, the reduction of weekday shopping seems to be compensated by the increase of Sunday 
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shopping. Our estimates suggest that the total weekly shopping time fell between 1986 and 2010, 
but part of this reduction was likely due to the lower amount of time spent driving to the stores. 
Table 24 refers to the Sunday allocation of time of mothers. The policy change seems to have 
dramatically changed the allocation of time on Sunday, causing a sharp increase in shopping time 
and a strong reduction of leisure. This is associated with an increase in domestic work, even though 
it is not statistically significant. Shopping and domestic work often move in the same direction 
because they are complementary activities, such as storing the purchased food. As predicted by the 
model for individuals with high fixed time costs, leisure consumed on Sunday registers a statistically 
significant contraction (-112 minutes). The increase in market work likely captures changes in 
labour demand due to the policy change and to the general increasing provision of different kind of 
services on Sunday. 
The effect of Sunday shopping deregulation on women facing weaker time constraints is 
on the other hand very small. Our estimates show that Sunday shopping deregulation had no 
statistically significant effects on the allocation of time of women without offspring (Table 25 and 
Table 26). In fact, time devoted to shopping during the week does not decrease and time spent 
shopping on Sunday does not significantly increase. Consistent with the model, this suggests that 
less time-constrained individuals do not substitute weekdays (and Saturday) shopping with Sunday 
shopping and they don’t free-up time that could be reallocated to other activities. As the model 
predicts, the amount of time spent working during the week, shopping and on leisure over all seven 
days of the week do not change. The negative effect of the policy change on Monday to Saturday 
shopping and the increase of market work for mothers is confirmed with an OLS approach (Table 
32). The increase of market work is however marginally insignificant. Women with no kids result, 
similarly to Tobit estimates, not affected by the introduction of Sunday shopping. 
The results for men complement the analysis of women’s behaviour. Table 27 reports the 
impact of the policy change on the Sundays’ time use of fathers, whereas Table 28 refers to 
weekday’s and Saturday’s. The introduction of Sunday shopping had an effect on fathers similar to 
the effect that we found for women with children. However, the increase of market work that 
comes with the decrease of shopping time from Monday to Saturday is not statistically significant. 
Our results also suggest that the introduction of Sunday shopping produced no changes in the 
behaviour of men without children, who are likely not affected much by this policy change.  
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3.7  Discussion and robustness 
In general, the results presented in the previous section support the idea that legal (and 
technological) constraints limiting the allocation of time can have relevant welfare costs on busy 
individuals, such as mothers. Before Sunday shopping was permitted, agents with very busy 
weekdays were forced to over-consume leisure on Sunday. In fact, their ability to reallocate tasks 
from the very busy weekdays to the less busy Sunday was limited. Moreover, according to the 
model, restrictions on Sunday shopping induce a reduction of paid work on the weekdays. Hence, 
the inefficient allocation of time is associated with less paid work and lower income.  
Several studies have sought to explain why female labour participation has increased so 
much over the last 40 years. Among other factors such as gender based discrimination, the role of 
the allocation of time has received a lot of attention. Following this stream of research, our analysis 
suggests that some women would be willing to work more if they could manage their time more 
flexibly. This can contribute to explaining why some policies aiming to increase female labour 
supply only through money transfers may have failed. In fact, if women face tight time constraints, 
given their home production technology, a (small) money transfer can be ineffective in raising their 
labour supply. Sunday shopping deregulation provides in this sense a reasonable framework for 
studying how improvements of time use flexibility (i.e. improvements of the home production 
technology) increase labour supply.  
One of the problems in our analysis is that part of the increase in minutes of work on 
weekdays may be due to the effects of Sunday shopping on labour demand. Therefore, there is the 
risk that the estimated effects of Sunday shopping on market work are actually a mixture of 
demand and supply effects. In order to address this problem, we estimate equation [3.8] again, 
dropping from the sample workers in the retail industry. This industry is in fact directly affected by 
Sunday shopping deregulation. The positive effect of the policy change on minutes of paid work 
for women with children is confirmed, along with the other main results previously discussed 
(Table 31). However, precision decreases due to the smaller sample size. 
Another concern is related to the fact that even though we are exploiting the provincial 
variation of the policy change and we include a province specific time trend, we might still be 
capturing some of the unrelated long-run increasing trend of female labour force participation. This 
worry is in part fueled by the large estimated coefficient for the effect of Sunday shopping 
deregulation on paid work. The Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) allows some, though limited, 
robustness checks. Since the main prediction of the model is that the policy change induced an 
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increase in weekdays’ paid work for busy individuals (women with children), the most conservative 
way of testing this prediction is by restricting the sample only to employed women. Doing so, we 
study the effect of Sunday shopping deregulation only on the intensive margin, neglecting any 
effect on the extensive one. This strategy removes the effects due to the increasing trend of female 
labour force participation. The LFS permits studying how Sunday shopping deregulation affected 
weekly usual hours of work and weekly overtime hours. The same analysis cannot be performed 
with the time use data from the GSS because of sample size limitations. The evidence obtained 
from the labour force survey suggests that Sunday shopping deregulation affected usual hours of 
work, changing permanently the regular allocation of time over a week. The estimated increase is 
about 1 hour for women with children, against a statistically insignificant effect for women without 
children (Table 33). Therefore, even though the magnitude of the estimated effect is reduced and 
direct comparison between GSS and LFS estimates is not easy, we find consistent evidence 
supporting the predictions of the model exploiting both data sources.   
3.8  Conclusion  
We study how the progressive removal of bans limiting Sunday shopping in Canada 
affected the allocation of time. We are in particular interested in analyzing how constraints on the 
use of time influence behavior of certain groups and their welfare.  
We first develop a simple model showing that tight time constraints may affect the 
allocation of time only for busy individuals that cannot easily reallocate time over the week. The 
lack of such ability is often due to unavoidable time consuming activities, such as child care. 
Therefore, we study in particular the allocation of time of women with and without children.  
Using five different cycles of the Time Use File of the General Social Survey of Canada, we 
estimate the effects of the policy change on market work, domestic work, leisure, and shopping. 
Identifying the correct magnitudes of these effects requires some care since they can be biased by 
other contemporaneous changes, such as the increasing female labour force participation. We try to 
deal with this problem mainly by exploiting the provincial variation in the timing of the policy 
change. 
The results show that when Sunday shopping is introduced, women with children reduce 
minutes spent on weekdays shopping and increase time spent on Sunday shopping. This reduction 
of weekday shopping allows an increase of time in paid work. On the other hand, no significant 
effects are found for women without children.  
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Paying careful attention to the details of time constraints offers a better understanding of 
the behaviour of certain groups of the Canadian population. In particular, our analysis suggests that 
time and timing constraints are a crucial determinant of female labour supply. Acknowledging and 
understanding the role of these constraints may help the design of more efficient policies aiming to 
increase female labour force participation.  
At the beginning of 2012 the Italian government passed a set of norms that aimed to 
increase the competitiveness of the Italian economy. Among these reforms there was the complete 
deregulation of shopping hours and Sunday shopping. The Italian data do not yet allow us to study 
whether this policy change produced effects similar to those we find for Canada. It would however 
be interesting to study how shopping hours deregulation affects women’s behaviour in a country 
such as Italy where female labour force participation is low, work-schedules are quite rigid, and 
social norms are probably very different from Canada. This topic is left for future research.      
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3.9  Tables and Figures 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics (weighted shares),  
Married individuals 20-59, Canadian Time Use Survey 
 
1986 1992 1998 2005 2010 
Male 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Kids 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.47 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Labour force status 
     
     Employed 0.65 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.68 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
     Inactive (not retired) 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
     Retired 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.06 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
    Other  0.10 13.0 0.09 0.05 13.0 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.001) 
Province 
     
     Newfoundland 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.017 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     Prince Edward Island 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
     Nova Scotia 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.031 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
     New Brunswick 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.024 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0015) 
     Quebec 0.302 0.312 0.284 0.272 0.263 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
     Ontario 0.406 0.410 0.437 0.451 0.453 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
     Manitoba 0.045 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     Saskatchewan 0.041 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.034 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
     Alberta 0.108 0.106 0.112 0.121 0.133 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0037) (0.0055) 
Observations 5,878 5,273 5,993 10,497 6,927 
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics - Allocation of time (minutes) 
 
1986 1992 1998 2005 2010 
Var. %  
1986 -2010 
Individuals with children 
      
Men 
      
Paid work 389 357 394 410 372 -4.4 
 (10.8) (11.6) (11.4) (8.8) (10.4)  
Domestic work 114 167 174 170 187 64.0 
 (5.2) (6.0) (6.3) (4.7) (5.8)  
Shopping 26 17 18 16 20 -23.1 
 (2.3) (1.8) (1.6) (1.3) (1.6)  
Leisure 909 898 853 844 859 -5.5 
 (10.2) (9.9) (8.9) (7.2) (8.8)  
Women 
      
Paid work 166 188 215 229 220 32.5 
 (7.5) (8.0) (8.2) (6.5) (7.6)  
Domestic work 296 311 315 308 325 9.8 
 (5.2) (6.0) (5.6) (4.8) (5.9)  
Shopping 42 29 28 29 26 -38.1 
 (2.5) (1.8) (1.6) (1.2) (1.5)  
Leisure 935 911 880 874 868 -7.2 
 (7.4) (6.9) (6.7) (5.3) (6.3)  
Without children 
      
Men 
      
Paid work 310 347 341 331 313 0.1 
 (11.0) (10.6) (10.4) (7.4) (10.0)  
Domestic work 67 79 93 95 101 50.7 
 (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.1) (3.8)  
Shopping 22 13 19 19 16 -27.3 
 (1.9) (1.2) (1.6) (1.2) (1.5)  
Leisure 1039 1000 986 994 1008 -3.0 
 (11.2) (9.9) (9.6) (6.7) (9.3)  
Women 
      
Paid work 244 269 275 308 299 22.5 
 (10.0) (10.3) (9.3) (6.9) (8.9)  
Domestic work 172 162 157 145 142 -17.4 
 (5.4) (5.6) (4.6) (3.3) (4.1)  
Shopping 32 26 28 30 26 -18.9 
 (2.2) (1.9) (1.9) (1.4) (1.8)  
Leisure 996 981 979 957 973 -2.3 
 (10.7) (9.1) (8.5) (6.1) (8.2)  
Source: Canadian Time Use Survey 
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Table 20: Occurrence time of the policy change 
Province Date 
Newfoundland January 1998 
Prince Edward Island Each  December since 1992 
Nova Scotia October -2006 
New Brunswick August to December since 1992 
Quebec January 1993 
Ontario June 1992 
Manitoba December 1992 
Saskatchewan May 1988 
Alberta November 1984 
 
 
Table 21: Sunday shopping diffusion 
 
1986 1992 1998 2005 2010 
Fraction on the population shopping at least 1 minute on Sunday 
Sunday shopping not permitted 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.31 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.031) (0.060) 
Sunday shopping permitted 0.18 0.25 0.35 0.33 0.36 
 (0.056) (0.042) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) 
Average time of shopping on Sunday (minutes) 
Sunday shopping not permitted 8.7 8.5 7.2 6.5 28.0 
 (1.71) (1.27) (2.62) (1.57) (7.2) 
Sunday shopping permitted 13.2 12.1 27.5 29.4 31.5 
 (4.89) (2.88) (2.42) (2.05) (2.63) 
Source: Canadian Time Use Survey 
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Table 22: Differential effect of Sunday shopping on individuals with and without children. 
Dependent variable: minutes of shopping 
 Sunday Weekdays and Saturday 
   SUN 47.66* -3.473 
 (26.29) (9.167) 
   Kids  -11.10 20.15*** 
 (15.31) (5.160) 
   Interaction (SUNxKid) 28.93** -17.19*** 
 (14.64) (5.115) 
   Male -14.56** -40.34*** 
 (6.482) (2.632) 
Education   
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) 
   High-school 15.79 21.75*** 
 (10.05) (3.537) 
   Post-secondary education 42.51*** 26.15*** 
 (11.39) (4.068) 
Labour force status   
Employed 21.64** -22.11*** 
 (9.321) (3.664) 
   Inactive (not retired) -6.399 12.75*** 
 (11.35) (4.428) 
   Retired -17.06 8.884 
 (27.39) (10.94) 
   Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) 
Household size   
1 member 24.41 18.06*** 
 (15.43) (5.944) 
   2 members 28.54** 13.22*** 
 (12.93) (5.109) 
   3 members 21.92* 4.071 
 (11.94) (4.667) 
   4 members 8.873 3.996 
 (11.50) (4.470) 
   More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) 
   
Age dummy   
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) 
   AGE2529 11.00 13.26*** 
 (12.77) (4.993) 
   AGE3034 7.327 6.213 
 (13.60) (5.150) 
   AGE3539 -1.469 20.95*** 
 (13.42) (5.090) 
   AGE4044 5.598 22.11*** 
 (13.26) (5.218) 
   AGE4549 -8.010 23.89*** 
 (13.11) (5.410) 
   AGE5054 60.40 -33.59** 
 (39.66) (15.72) 
   
Province dummy   
New Brunswick 60.40 -33.59** 
 (39.66) (15.72) 
   Quebec 10.71 -30.92*** 
 (23.85) (10.77) 
   Ontario 24.30 -19.35* 
 (23.25) (10.21) 
   Manitoba -12.67 -18.04 
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 (28.72) (13.42) 
   Saskatchewan -22.63 -25.56* 
 (27.59) (13.07) 
   Alberta -1.798 -23.11** 
 (25.20) (11.78) 
   Nova Scotia -45.43 -5.390 
 (30.96) (12.31) 
   Prince Edward Island 18.45 -28.51* 
 (45.23) (17.22) 
   Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) 
   
Time trend   
Linear term 14.09*** 2.906 
 (5.189) (2.191) 
   Quadratic term -0.773*** -0.142 
 (0.284) (0.114) 
   
Province specific time trend    
Linear terms   
New Brunswick -5.174 -3.475 
 (6.706) (2.655) 
   Quebec -14.32*** -6.255*** 
 (5.217) (2.197) 
   Ontario -8.805* -2.667 
 (5.160) (2.142) 
   Manitoba -10.73 -0.730 
 (6.925) (2.649) 
   Saskatchewan -13.91** -2.353 
 (6.384) (2.720) 
   Alberta -13.07** -2.005 
 (5.649) (2.400) 
   Nova Scotia -8.676 -0.809 
 (7.378) (2.822) 
   Prince Edward Island -16.35 -4.240 
 (12.16) (3.141) 
   Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) 
   
Quadratic terms   
New Brunswick -0.409 -0.0548 
 (0.293) (0.111) 
   Quebec -0.716*** -0.223** 
 (0.229) (0.0897) 
   Ontario -0.440* -0.0425 
 (0.228) (0.0886) 
   Manitoba -0.498 0.0651 
 (0.321) (0.107) 
   Saskatchewan -0.770*** -0.0218 
 (0.276) (0.109) 
   Alberta -0.646** -0.00959 
 (0.258) (0.101) 
   Nova Scotia -0.251 -0.0172 
 (0.330) (0.122) 
   Prince Edward Island -0.747 -0.104 
 (0.530) (0.134) 
   Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) 
   Constant -167.8*** -63.98*** 
 (38.44) (15.01) 
   
N 4,955 29,608 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 23: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Women with children – Monday to Saturday 
 Shopping Market work Domestic work Leisure 
     
SUN -20.04* 75.55* -20.53 7.335 
 (11.60) (43.33) (20.61) (17.79) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 18.54*** -51.38*** 11.87 14.18** 
 (4.436) (16.92) (8.014) (6.624) 
     Post-secondary education 15.11*** -28.85 -7.389 28.64*** 
 (5.205) (19.93) (9.632) (8.124) 
Labour force status     
Employed -26.54*** 531.0*** -181.7*** -97.85*** 
 (4.996) (22.66) (10.56) (8.340) 
     Inactive (not retired) 2.586 -142.4*** -51.28*** 95.07*** 
 (5.138) (26.00) (10.89) (8.940) 
     Retired -5.645 -50.22 -37.97 79.66** 
 (31.83) (221.0) (86.30) (34.87) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     2 members -0.263 7.984 68.30*** -77.17*** 
 (7.129) (27.20) (14.35) (11.62) 
     3 members -4.149 12.10 37.25*** -50.37*** 
 (4.778) (19.16) (9.119) (8.177) 
     4 members -4.443 29.10 10.14 -32.27*** 
 (4.371) (18.42) (8.493) (7.608) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 16.34* 34.75 -35.42** 17.25 
 (8.578) (33.55) (14.44) (12.71) 
     AGE3034 16.28** 46.78 -36.30*** 11.18 
 (8.235) (31.46) (13.86) (12.13) 
     AGE3539 16.94** 79.70** -25.09* -12.17 
 (8.208) (31.39) (13.92) (12.17) 
     AGE4044 40.57*** 73.05** 8.735 -49.64*** 
 (8.311) (31.91) (14.16) (12.23) 
     AGE4549 32.92*** 62.64* 10.05 -58.94*** 
 (9.008) (34.23) (16.07) (13.34) 
     AGE5054 47.41*** 60.79 34.09* -82.27*** 
 (10.59) (41.23) (18.84) (14.80) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick -22.93 -10.73 7.155 13.96 
 (20.91) (86.66) (47.02) (37.00) 
     Quebec -25.30* -52.49 26.01 -2.632 
 (13.48) (48.97) (24.59) (21.28) 
     Ontario -6.136 -4.567 -10.43 8.688 
 (12.26) (47.02) (23.11) (19.94) 
     Manitoba -26.68* -6.781 33.06 -15.90 
 (15.44) (59.71) (27.54) (24.97) 
     Saskatchewan 2.364 -9.066 31.11 -35.32 
 (16.58) (58.84) (30.03) (25.42) 
     Alberta 2.797 -17.95 30.28 -19.75 
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 (14.09) (54.33) (26.60) (22.50) 
     Nova Scotia -7.367 -43.52 27.29 4.167 
 (15.40) (61.14) (28.93) (24.50) 
     Prince Edward Island -13.74 25.06 2.664 -5.094 
 (23.11) (87.23) (40.29) (31.41) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 0.298 5.025 -2.747 -0.981 
 (2.714) (11.84) (5.386) (4.414) 
     Quadratic term 0.0204 -0.135 0.201 -0.0900 
 (0.145) (0.588) (0.289) (0.231) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -0.928 -6.774 -3.040 9.041 
 (3.607) (15.51) (7.862) (6.038) 
     Quebec -4.028 -1.813 -0.524 5.507 
 (2.838) (11.87) (5.342) (4.342) 
     Ontario 0.173 -1.436 -1.365 5.381 
 (2.683) (11.66) (5.227) (4.254) 
     Manitoba 0.912 -2.415 3.365 2.164 
 (3.299) (13.56) (6.049) (5.134) 
     Saskatchewan 2.579 -5.884 1.242 4.614 
 (3.526) (13.92) (6.497) (5.332) 
     Alberta 2.622 -3.357 2.595 0.691 
 (3.043) (12.86) (5.888) (4.774) 
     Nova Scotia -0.0985 -13.86 6.610 3.180 
 (3.693) (14.80) (6.622) (5.706) 
     Prince Edward Island 0.0875 -3.303 0.996 3.496 
 (4.310) (17.26) (7.338) (6.279) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick 0.0621 -0.391 -0.135 0.470** 
 (0.147) (0.608) (0.310) (0.237) 
     Quebec -0.117 -0.0714 0.0189 0.283* 
 (0.116) (0.471) (0.228) (0.172) 
     Ontario 0.0827 -0.0630 -0.00510 0.242 
 (0.112) (0.465) (0.227) (0.170) 
     Manitoba 0.182 0.000690 0.183 0.0714 
 (0.139) (0.544) (0.258) (0.204) 
     Saskatchewan 0.198 -0.180 0.0906 0.217 
 (0.141) (0.551) (0.269) (0.209) 
     Alberta 0.168 -0.136 0.0533 0.0696 
 (0.129) (0.520) (0.258) (0.197) 
     Nova Scotia 0.0536 -0.437 0.271 0.136 
 (0.161) (0.615) (0.287) (0.239) 
     Prince Edward Island 0.0531 -0.172 0.0353 0.223 
 (0.185) (0.685) (0.308) (0.259) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -44.54** -245.6*** 202.1*** 367.2*** 
 (19.39) (74.89) (2.468) (31.37) 
     
N 8,152 8,152 8,152 8,152 
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Table 24: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Women with children – Sunday 
 Shopping Leisure Domestic work Market work 
     
SUN 95.87** -112.1** 10.74 270.1 
 (45.89) (55.21) (44.31) (220.6) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 28.75* 2.860 49.15*** -121.6 
 (16.01) (22.55) (17.92) (86.71) 
     Post-secondary education 43.30** -14.80 68.30*** -83.59 
 (19.88) (26.52) (21.74) (99.93) 
Labour force status     
Employed 37.00** -55.77 11.03 558.0*** 
 (17.19) (34.58) (22.01) (111.0) 
     Inactive (not retired) 20.48 -12.58 53.05** 107.7 
 (18.11) (34.68) (22.44) (117.7) 
     Retired 56.92 304.4*** -208.4*** -2774.0 
 (40.48) (56.21) (36.28) (.) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     2 members 11.49 117.8*** -59.85** -265.8* 
 (25.48) (32.35) (27.95) (142.0) 
     3 members 15.51 79.27*** -28.15 -233.1** 
 (15.52) (23.90) (20.10) (90.41) 
     4 members 14.07 38.20* -10.50 -123.0 
 (14.85) (22.34) (18.41) (82.40) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 -5.799 10.05 42.28 -247.5* 
 (22.92) (35.32) (28.22) (142.6) 
     AGE3034 -19.25 17.25 19.13 -140.1 
 (22.87) (35.83) (28.19) (137.7) 
     AGE3539 -1.012 20.91 19.00 -135.3 
 (21.93) (34.87) (27.15) (134.1) 
     AGE4044 -6.011 35.39 -37.82 -59.93 
 (22.69) (40.00) (27.58) (143.7) 
     AGE4549 12.30 93.73** -41.78 -242.4 
 (25.24) (38.97) (30.60) (153.1) 
     AGE5054 -38.82 87.56* -36.07 -112.1 
 (32.72) (46.60) (45.46) (191.7) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick 86.75 -65.84 47.13 -786.4* 
 (59.03) (83.08) (70.51) (458.6) 
     Quebec -11.92 68.07 -32.30 -242.3 
 (29.41) (51.96) (42.29) (188.6) 
     Ontario 0.361 91.68* -48.92 -384.3** 
 (26.80) (49.54) (38.76) (162.6) 
     Manitoba -8.901 70.53 -19.16 -442.1** 
 (35.15) (56.86) (46.51) (217.1) 
     Saskatchewan -18.40 204.0*** -160.9*** -338.9 
 (35.31) (61.96) (52.03) (235.8) 
     Alberta -29.67 39.98 -95.37** 27.49 
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 (31.80) (57.04) (45.85) (186.9) 
     Nova Scotia 20.60 39.41 -63.67 104.8 
 (44.20) (63.98) (53.99) (179.8) 
     Prince Edward Island 46.02 -86.98 -23.33 20.94 
 (66.33) (98.60) (92.50) (427.4) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 8.984 -15.05 19.20** -14.32 
 (7.470) (11.15) (8.704) (43.13) 
     Quadratic term -0.277 0.217 -0.824 3.333 
 (0.439) (0.623) (0.514) (2.525) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -8.311 11.93 1.396 -163.4** 
 (9.429) (14.03) (11.14) (76.13) 
     Quebec -19.84** 16.52 -12.15 -2.792 
 (7.832) (10.96) (8.371) (47.86) 
     Ontario -9.115 26.01** -20.63** -45.62 
 (7.497) (11.12) (8.449) (43.41) 
     Manitoba -10.64 25.97** -22.57** -43.04 
 (11.71) (12.48) (10.83) (56.52) 
     Saskatchewan -13.96 32.44** -38.79*** 30.31 
 (9.186) (14.62) (11.25) (65.01) 
     Alberta -22.41*** 19.41 -27.38*** 45.45 
 (8.574) (12.07) (9.530) (49.12) 
     Nova Scotia -3.721 25.55* -18.58 1.032 
 (13.11) (14.61) (12.11) (58.96) 
     Prince Edward Island -18.80 5.342 -11.59 -23.06 
 (12.67) (16.67) (15.74) (76.84) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -0.573 0.625 -0.0555 -5.018 
 (0.431) (0.556) (0.454) (3.148) 
     Quebec -0.965*** 0.594 -0.606* 1.561 
 (0.357) (0.435) (0.330) (2.095) 
     Ontario -0.332 0.917** -0.925*** 0.000436 
 (0.340) (0.464) (0.349) (1.956) 
     Manitoba -0.666 1.000* -0.995** 0.327 
 (0.497) (0.522) (0.469) (2.476) 
     Saskatchewan -0.813** 1.038* -1.539*** 3.660 
 (0.408) (0.604) (0.439) (2.769) 
     Alberta -1.098*** 1.018** -1.188*** 2.867 
 (0.409) (0.495) (0.382) (2.271) 
     Nova Scotia -0.189 1.143* -0.873* 1.343 
 (0.614) (0.597) (0.499) (2.683) 
     Prince Edward Island -1.052* 0.278 -0.576 1.148 
 (0.553) (0.679) (0.629) (3.070) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant 119.6*** 218.1*** 179.4*** 573.9*** 
 (9.302) (9.060) (3.999) (31.15) 
     
N 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 
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Table 25: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Women without children – Monday to Saturday 
 Shopping Market work Domestic work Leisure 
     
SUN 11.74 -56.04 28.84 -3.622 
 (14.59) (44.24) (24.26) (16.52) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 16.49*** -20.59 22.62** -8.563 
 (5.380) (19.54) (10.34) (6.755) 
     Post-secondary education 22.58*** -12.20 26.93** -22.65*** 
 (6.118) (22.63) (12.62) (7.728) 
Labour force status     
Employed -7.569 556.5*** -289.1*** -34.23*** 
 (4.658) (18.64) (9.399) (5.724) 
     Inactive (not retired) 20.65*** -168.1*** -66.38*** 114.9*** 
 (6.736) (32.21) (12.66) (9.133) 
     Retired 20.12 -348.7*** 1.023 48.54** 
 (14.55) (75.67) (24.45) (20.71) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member 11.88 -33.62 33.84* -21.12 
 (11.57) (34.14) (19.27) (13.02) 
     2 members 11.88 -51.81 41.08** -11.70 
 (11.39) (34.20) (19.10) (13.19) 
     3 members 7.227 -47.29 39.02* -19.24 
 (11.97) (36.24) (20.13) (13.84) 
     4 members 15.83 -71.61* 51.78** -17.04 
 (12.47) (37.72) (20.95) (13.94) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 10.23 15.93 -43.04*** 35.86*** 
 (6.260) (21.04) (11.94) (6.773) 
     AGE3034 11.84* 12.86 -38.91*** 35.66*** 
 (6.945) (23.36) (13.55) (7.566) 
     AGE3539 6.223 -18.88 -48.57*** 60.37*** 
 (7.520) (25.04) (13.86) (8.594) 
     AGE4044 6.878 -5.925 -68.68*** 74.67*** 
 (7.031) (24.37) (14.76) (9.211) 
     AGE4549 20.65*** -44.87** -55.95*** 81.67*** 
 (6.317) (20.81) (11.84) (7.895) 
     AGE5054 17.64*** -38.75* -59.35*** 89.11*** 
 (5.978) (20.33) (11.48) (7.585) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick -6.203 51.53 -3.548 -18.18 
 (23.61) (75.68) (40.37) (26.19) 
     Quebec -29.26** 127.8*** -38.05 -38.98** 
 (13.93) (48.20) (24.42) (15.89) 
     Ontario -26.15** 68.53 -24.45 -17.46 
 (13.15) (44.15) (22.25) (15.19) 
     Manitoba -20.11 90.02 -17.70 -17.45 
 (17.77) (62.21) (31.79) (21.39) 
     Saskatchewan -26.71 -10.28 10.72 6.096 
 (17.55) (57.32) (29.67) (21.63) 
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     Alberta -32.80** 63.84 -5.460 -31.50* 
 (15.44) (51.18) (25.67) (17.84) 
     Nova Scotia -1.511 7.872 -5.186 -2.041 
 (16.13) (58.40) (28.99) (20.07) 
     Prince Edward Island -0.252 -42.42 64.12 -53.08* 
 (24.10) (76.54) (40.21) (27.90) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 0.701 11.12 -1.684 -0.740 
 (3.218) (12.33) (5.408) (3.723) 
     Quadratic term -0.00373 -0.227 -0.121 -0.0876 
 (0.166) (0.621) (0.298) (0.197) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -0.405 -3.446 -2.159 3.508 
 (4.331) (15.13) (6.803) (4.601) 
     Quebec -6.383* 11.06 -6.717 -2.325 
 (3.436) (12.82) (5.574) (3.781) 
     Ontario -1.945 -15.65 6.094 2.143 
 (3.335) (12.26) (5.304) (3.654) 
     Manitoba 0.0701 -14.36 4.988 2.675 
 (4.080) (14.80) (6.962) (4.571) 
     Saskatchewan -1.449 -13.42 5.268 4.931 
 (4.267) (14.69) (6.722) (4.946) 
     Alberta -3.276 -22.10* 11.53* 1.557 
 (3.742) (13.34) (6.056) (4.101) 
     Nova Scotia -1.827 -6.730 -3.500 4.838 
 (4.560) (15.80) (7.712) (5.201) 
     Prince Edward Island -5.974 -18.05 9.112 -7.277 
 (4.816) (16.73) (8.236) (6.393) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -0.00858 -0.318 -0.118 0.227 
 (0.187) (0.645) (0.288) (0.203) 
     Quebec -0.276* 0.319 -0.321 -0.0246 
 (0.147) (0.537) (0.233) (0.157) 
     Ontario -0.0340 -0.637 0.185 0.120 
 (0.144) (0.521) (0.225) (0.154) 
     Manitoba 0.0512 -0.627 0.134 0.161 
 (0.173) (0.608) (0.285) (0.184) 
     Saskatchewan -0.00653 -0.398 0.116 0.213 
 (0.179) (0.608) (0.276) (0.206) 
     Alberta -0.134 -0.811 0.392 0.0857 
 (0.164) (0.575) (0.267) (0.177) 
     Nova Scotia -0.113 -0.291 -0.246 0.242 
 (0.202) (0.687) (0.354) (0.229) 
     Prince Edward Island -0.251 -0.850 0.119 -0.170 
 (0.219) (0.713) (0.377) (0.290) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -81.80*** -89.53 1137.6*** 120.0*** 
 (22.51) (73.15) (38.76) (25.70) 
     
N 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 
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Table 26: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Women without children – Sunday 
 Shopping Leisure Domestic work Market work 
     
SUN 29.04 -19.19 40.88 219.4 
 (48.74) (64.77) (50.06) (240.1) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 49.13** 25.41 12.33 -64.60 
 (19.73) (28.75) (18.03) (94.55) 
     Post-secondary education 75.02*** 50.72* -18.84 -18.15 
 (22.77) (30.23) (21.23) (104.6) 
Labour force status     
Employed 51.15*** -65.01*** 16.13 238.0*** 
 (16.60) (22.54) (17.93) (87.82) 
     Inactive (not retired) -15.15 -17.33 36.22 -244.0* 
 (24.35) (31.46) (25.70) (135.6) 
     Retired -8.416 84.06** -54.56 -3227.7 
 (45.63) (37.24) (38.57) (.) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member 0.341 -14.08 98.42** -120.4 
 (37.79) (50.81) (39.22) (161.5) 
     2 members 1.854 -2.315 112.0*** -314.8** 
 (35.62) (51.67) (38.60) (153.8) 
     3 members 14.19 -26.92 81.42** -121.8 
 (41.42) (54.14) (41.19) (167.8) 
     4 members 1.193 -24.32 123.9*** -235.6 
 (39.98) (59.77) (43.36) (192.3) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 8.828 -23.41 66.21** -210.5** 
 (23.96) (31.11) (26.40) (101.6) 
     AGE3034 9.091 -21.08 64.99*** -125.4 
 (23.42) (27.69) (21.66) (112.1) 
     AGE3539 29.85 -1.033 68.91*** -277.0** 
 (26.21) (32.87) (23.63) (123.4) 
     AGE4044 8.593 -52.03* 105.7*** -232.4* 
 (26.76) (30.53) (24.68) (130.2) 
     AGE4549 -8.818 -62.66* 86.34*** -122.6 
 (21.45) (34.82) (22.43) (115.0) 
     AGE5054 -3.056 -20.33 91.32*** -310.0*** 
 (19.68) (29.55) (22.36) (102.4) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick -26.29 -88.74 185.9** -154.1 
 (85.24) (119.8) (86.81) (434.4) 
     Quebec -10.70 109.3* 13.80 -447.4* 
 (51.21) (66.28) (49.77) (232.7) 
     Ontario -8.436 42.47 52.34 -403.3* 
 (49.75) (64.69) (46.72) (219.8) 
     Manitoba -76.89 96.38 79.81 -489.9* 
 (59.52) (78.66) (60.58) (269.0) 
     Saskatchewan -26.26 -22.52 76.50 -225.1 
 (60.71) (72.42) (59.18) (261.9) 
     Alberta 2.472 31.44 56.03 -372.2 
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 (51.92) (68.28) (49.40) (234.8) 
     Nova Scotia -60.47 6.392 73.06 -176.2 
 (58.28) (73.11) (55.75) (255.0) 
     Prince Edward Island -88.87 166.4 44.39 -228.4 
 (98.63) (103.3) (92.16) (430.1) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 19.16* 12.43 -17.92 4.253 
 (11.23) (14.62) (11.37) (52.65) 
     Quadratic term -1.195** -0.815 0.337 2.113 
 (0.602) (0.749) (0.604) (2.539) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick 1.107 -27.19 51.08*** -115.7 
 (15.50) (20.68) (14.64) (83.00) 
     Quebec -17.15 -7.365 18.19 -16.16 
 (11.21) (15.07) (11.65) (57.01) 
     Ontario -13.08 -5.526 22.82* -56.29 
 (11.12) (15.01) (11.68) (56.03) 
     Manitoba -16.19 -0.876 35.68*** -88.76 
 (13.97) (17.07) (13.29) (65.08) 
     Saskatchewan -17.73 0.485 18.01 -70.27 
 (14.15) (18.39) (15.21) (66.84) 
     Alberta -10.62 -11.28 23.01* -73.35 
 (11.69) (16.64) (12.01) (58.01) 
     Nova Scotia 4.078 -24.11 25.74* -26.95 
 (14.64) (18.62) (15.43) (74.30) 
     Prince Edward Island -29.73 20.24 23.62* -102.0 
 (26.41) (18.04) (14.23) (84.92) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -0.113 -0.723 1.687*** -6.072* 
 (0.671) (0.832) (0.630) (3.369) 
     Quebec -0.927* -0.485 0.531 0.647 
 (0.477) (0.631) (0.522) (2.193) 
     Ontario -0.815* -0.156 0.727 -1.978 
 (0.493) (0.632) (0.538) (2.190) 
     Manitoba -0.786 -0.0419 1.238** -3.247 
 (0.592) (0.690) (0.570) (2.588) 
     Saskatchewan -0.926 0.198 0.366 -2.996 
 (0.587) (0.804) (0.691) (2.699) 
     Alberta -0.540 -0.668 0.652 -3.034 
 (0.517) (0.825) (0.573) (2.389) 
     Nova Scotia 0.341 -1.005 0.914 -1.485 
 (0.652) (0.797) (0.682) (3.169) 
     Prince Edward Island -1.006 0.778 0.684 -4.022 
 (1.111) (0.779) (0.601) (3.694) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -153.1* 1180.9*** -111.1 -110.3 
 (81.27) (108.0) (84.85) (362.8) 
     
N 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 
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Table 27: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Men with children – Sunday 
 Shopping Leisure Domestic work Market work 
     
SUN 98.68** -110.2** 60.72 -33.46 
 (41.46) (51.79) (43.04) (209.0) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 3.061 2.888 59.02*** -168.7** 
 (22.82) (26.31) (19.19) (80.73) 
     Post-secondary education 41.33* -19.19 80.78*** -139.6 
 (22.71) (29.83) (22.47) (91.55) 
Labour force status     
Employed -7.635 -93.99*** 7.712 472.7*** 
 (19.32) (24.07) (20.77) (104.2) 
     Inactive (not retired) -4.822 -14.50 -11.58 231.8 
 (35.58) (47.57) (46.55) (176.8) 
     Retired -672.2 -0.908 16.36 -2924.8 
 (.) (76.86) (132.6) (.) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     2 members 49.93 26.29 -3.852 49.19 
 (68.06) (66.71) (58.93) (256.5) 
     3 members 29.62 37.95 -57.56*** 15.43 
 (18.56) (27.11) (20.77) (85.60) 
     4 members -8.284 29.76 -5.033 -21.67 
 (17.91) (24.52) (20.74) (79.21) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 -1.988 52.89 -86.57* -85.72 
 (58.77) (115.7) (44.19) (407.1) 
     AGE3034 23.62 97.76 -105.4*** -134.4 
 (55.86) (112.7) (38.50) (403.8) 
     AGE3539 -22.05 102.6 -107.9*** -126.6 
 (55.72) (113.5) (39.74) (408.4) 
     AGE4044 -1.463 113.3 -95.66** -197.4 
 (56.10) (113.8) (40.29) (407.9) 
     AGE4549 -11.81 150.2 -148.6*** -231.0 
 (56.92) (115.9) (42.26) (413.9) 
     AGE5054 -6.428 116.5 -161.4*** -40.46 
 (57.85) (116.5) (45.41) (413.5) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick 136.5* -178.6 85.86 76.79 
 (82.41) (117.9) (102.2) (375.4) 
     Quebec 12.40 33.38 -77.80 286.9 
 (62.58) (69.15) (52.07) (241.7) 
     Ontario 9.106 98.80 -103.3** 124.9 
 (61.45) (64.62) (43.52) (234.5) 
     Manitoba -13.38 156.5 -104.2 47.25 
 (74.73) (95.14) (64.11) (298.8) 
     Saskatchewan -52.01 -8.244 -32.62 214.3 
 (69.23) (79.10) (60.95) (279.9) 
     Alberta -1.244 170.0** -200.7*** 257.1 
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 (68.27) (86.08) (57.26) (294.6) 
     Nova Scotia -130.0 -165.6* 29.49 538.7* 
 (79.21) (87.17) (68.86) (281.4) 
     Prince Edward Island 123.2 -129.8 62.70 140.7 
 (83.18) (115.8) (89.40) (436.6) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 8.525 -24.70* 27.43*** -52.46 
 (11.98) (13.01) (9.914) (53.41) 
     Quadratic term -0.174 1.017** -1.004** 2.466 
 (0.449) (0.517) (0.430) (2.693) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick 5.286 14.86 -14.58 13.88 
 (14.86) (21.39) (17.56) (65.92) 
     Quebec -6.289 23.10 -27.38** 29.23 
 (12.86) (14.71) (11.51) (51.87) 
     Ontario -3.056 23.45 -24.99** 24.27 
 (12.62) (14.54) (11.13) (51.89) 
     Manitoba -3.463 40.84** -21.94 -30.68 
 (15.85) (19.59) (14.43) (63.23) 
     Saskatchewan -15.31 17.68 -26.52* 15.90 
 (14.93) (16.85) (13.69) (58.30) 
     Alberta -8.002 42.34** -40.54*** 23.98 
 (14.26) (18.52) (14.04) (61.36) 
     Nova Scotia -14.01 -1.911 -27.57* 92.03 
 (16.42) (19.15) (14.71) (64.68) 
     Prince Edward Island 175.6 -8.490 -23.85 207.2** 
 (.) (24.39) (17.91) (94.06) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick 0.182 1.045 -0.742 0.325 
 (0.570) (0.828) (0.677) (2.621) 
     Quebec -0.203 1.102* -1.142** 0.447 
 (0.480) (0.582) (0.477) (1.990) 
     Ontario 0.0813 0.785 -0.899* 0.893 
 (0.471) (0.598) (0.480) (2.027) 
     Manitoba 0.214 1.470* -0.734 -1.686 
 (0.652) (0.752) (0.600) (2.414) 
     Saskatchewan -0.662 0.969 -1.324** 0.463 
 (0.620) (0.662) (0.572) (2.227) 
     Alberta -0.378 1.799** -1.677*** 0.753 
 (0.545) (0.760) (0.605) (2.369) 
     Nova Scotia -0.122 0.0494 -1.484** 3.175 
 (0.661) (0.824) (0.617) (2.622) 
     Prince Edward Island 5.260 -0.0798 -1.566** 9.736** 
 (.) (1.109) (0.769) (3.976) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant 122.2*** 227.6*** 176.9*** 553.4*** 
 (9.524) (6.443) (5.357) (27.54) 
     
N 937 937 937 937 
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Table 28: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Men with children – Monday to Saturday 
 Shopping Market work Domestic work Leisure 
     
SUN -39.49** 40.14 -18.24 -1.745 
 (20.04) (40.23) (19.80) (24.81) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 16.97** -23.31* 14.25** 10.98 
 (7.083) (13.36) (7.042) (8.505) 
     Post-secondary education 30.75*** -23.39 27.67*** 5.316 
 (7.935) (15.20) (7.739) (9.564) 
Labour force status     
Employed -37.64*** 524.6*** -98.09*** -240.6*** 
 (8.002) (20.59) (8.857) (11.46) 
     Inactive (not retired) -3.539 -95.22** 126.1*** -72.83*** 
 (13.73) (40.04) (17.30) (19.19) 
     Retired 6.356 -398.8*** 12.05 63.48 
 (27.37) (136.8) (41.10) (59.18) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     2 members 15.57 -55.32 -16.58 56.68** 
 (19.66) (44.60) (19.87) (27.54) 
     3 members 10.74 -25.57* -12.52* 28.91*** 
 (7.470) (14.57) (7.513) (9.180) 
     4 members 3.710 -13.14 -4.351 14.95* 
 (6.802) (13.65) (7.029) (8.479) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 11.60 7.317 18.93 -28.75 
 (20.99) (41.57) (18.69) (24.70) 
     AGE3034 18.68 19.36 26.87 -44.37* 
 (20.15) (40.34) (17.81) (23.83) 
     AGE3539 13.28 35.58 4.770 -35.22 
 (20.01) (39.88) (17.67) (23.63) 
     AGE4044 20.38 35.91 -4.816 -38.21 
 (20.11) (40.07) (17.87) (23.68) 
     AGE4549 22.14 15.77 -22.40 -8.592 
 (20.50) (40.84) (18.24) (24.32) 
     AGE5054 39.15* -9.641 -15.45 5.367 
 (21.24) (42.81) (19.45) (25.41) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick -62.00* 54.87 -58.23* 23.56 
 (33.81) (73.02) (33.71) (44.38) 
     Quebec -24.06 54.05 -32.68 -13.84 
 (21.49) (49.02) (23.25) (29.80) 
     Ontario -14.34 37.92 -32.90 0.447 
 (19.72) (46.90) (21.76) (28.91) 
     Manitoba 18.04 7.866 -26.43 12.64 
 (25.62) (55.59) (26.10) (32.31) 
     Saskatchewan -51.93** 97.87* -30.34 -26.87 
 (24.91) (55.35) (25.91) (34.55) 
     Alberta -28.12 73.29 -56.47** 1.010 
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 (24.06) (51.21) (24.46) (32.65) 
     Nova Scotia 7.311 87.91 -17.76 -56.51 
 (25.49) (61.75) (27.11) (37.90) 
     Prince Edward Island -54.85 102.8 -72.81** 2.846 
 (35.76) (74.95) (34.93) (45.96) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 5.141 2.811 5.548 -5.850 
 (4.555) (9.894) (4.778) (6.129) 
     Quadratic term -0.358 0.0213 -0.249 0.0744 
 (0.242) (0.488) (0.244) (0.303) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -0.956 -14.90 -5.882 14.13* 
 (5.774) (12.39) (5.818) (7.685) 
     Quebec -3.318 2.180 -3.008 2.152 
 (4.713) (10.10) (4.897) (6.220) 
     Ontario 2.863 -18.78* -1.000 15.01** 
 (4.543) (9.818) (4.763) (6.146) 
     Manitoba 5.156 -5.713 -2.680 4.664 
 (5.552) (11.77) (5.826) (7.154) 
     Saskatchewan -6.903 0.353 -3.837 7.004 
 (5.746) (12.23) (5.906) (7.593) 
     Alberta 1.306 -3.583 -1.515 6.578 
 (5.199) (10.70) (5.255) (6.751) 
     Nova Scotia 5.909 -4.383 -1.432 2.724 
 (6.412) (12.96) (6.259) (8.037) 
     Prince Edward Island 4.177 -17.05 -4.914 19.28** 
 (6.694) (12.96) (6.485) (8.056) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick 0.146 -0.707 -0.170 0.516* 
 (0.244) (0.488) (0.238) (0.308) 
     Quebec -0.0467 0.0982 -0.0980 0.0877 
 (0.197) (0.389) (0.194) (0.243) 
     Ontario 0.269 -0.775** -0.0108 0.564** 
 (0.193) (0.382) (0.191) (0.243) 
     Manitoba 0.313 -0.104 -0.159 0.104 
 (0.230) (0.459) (0.234) (0.290) 
     Saskatchewan -0.123 -0.148 -0.144 0.356 
 (0.237) (0.472) (0.236) (0.296) 
     Alberta 0.267 -0.208 0.0537 0.222 
 (0.223) (0.423) (0.216) (0.268) 
     Nova Scotia 0.300 -0.263 -0.0934 0.193 
 (0.290) (0.520) (0.262) (0.326) 
     Prince Edward Island 0.340 -0.819 -0.101 0.825** 
 (0.284) (0.524) (0.270) (0.324) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -47.26 -153.6* 306.4*** 1038.0*** 
 (37.46) (83.63) (37.70) (50.05) 
     
N 5,659 5,659 5,659 5,659 
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Table 29: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Men without children – Sunday 
 Shopping Leisure Domestic work Market work 
     
SUN 32.38 35.85 0.799 -13.19 
 (49.36) (65.44) (42.19) (212.1) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school -3.615 39.73 -3.005 -56.85 
 (17.29) (26.45) (15.86) (83.43) 
     Post-secondary education 14.64 11.95 4.688 86.34 
 (20.19) (30.95) (19.69) (92.80) 
Labour force status     
Employed -0.0106 -86.21*** 24.36* 322.3*** 
 (15.89) (19.69) (13.84) (76.07) 
     Inactive (not retired) -37.32 -87.46 44.06 246.6 
 (32.66) (54.82) (33.96) (197.1) 
     Retired -56.17 66.83* 34.17 -779.9*** 
 (38.38) (36.72) (33.13) (256.2) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member 36.57 -41.80 -34.89 333.2* 
 (30.15) (43.13) (34.34) (179.3) 
     2 members 23.15 -61.82 -12.07 335.3* 
 (30.29) (42.71) (33.90) (179.6) 
     3 members 1.206 -50.68 -34.56 395.1** 
 (32.21) (43.35) (33.70) (180.5) 
     4 members 24.48 -51.66 -49.34 358.8* 
 (32.96) (48.45) (34.85) (188.4) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 0.192 9.341 18.87 -39.44 
 (18.84) (27.67) (17.33) (88.99) 
     AGE3034 7.820 -5.119 43.53** -101.9 
 (20.80) (31.30) (21.67) (97.33) 
     AGE3539 27.38 -35.48 64.93*** -87.03 
 (28.57) (31.01) (21.37) (99.17) 
     AGE4044 -46.05* -16.25 46.29* -30.87 
 (27.43) (35.84) (24.30) (108.3) 
     AGE4549 20.81 -23.25 114.7*** -262.7** 
 (24.53) (30.53) (24.67) (103.0) 
     AGE5054 -13.17 -5.018 59.42** -99.17 
 (22.21) (32.55) (23.48) (98.13) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick 29.42 80.76 6.279 -24.33 
 (75.15) (126.7) (80.93) (419.1) 
     Quebec 62.73 -4.175 -18.49 128.6 
 (43.36) (79.83) (36.25) (297.7) 
     Ontario 88.26** 15.21 2.479 58.74 
 (42.37) (77.23) (32.91) (290.6) 
     Manitoba 40.54 31.59 24.51 -104.0 
 (58.85) (95.28) (57.29) (321.0) 
     Saskatchewan -16.07 -32.17 22.84 268.7 
 (50.85) (94.13) (43.49) (330.1) 
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Alberta 44.56 -127.0 -10.44 444.1 
 (45.47) (103.4) (38.98) (315.9) 
     Nova Scotia -59.63 65.40 32.55 -239.6 
 (56.21) (98.10) (77.41) (337.1) 
     Prince Edward Island -131.9 124.9 20.93 8.909 
 (179.3) (138.5) (112.6) (438.5) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 8.937 -3.579 7.174 -14.22 
 (9.830) (13.64) (8.059) (55.63) 
     Quadratic term -0.649 -0.0719 -0.427 0.665 
 (0.565) (0.735) (0.500) (2.784) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -24.11** 17.71 -1.906 -21.37 
 (12.24) (20.77) (13.94) (69.92) 
     Quebec -9.540 4.341 -15.92** 47.75 
 (9.551) (13.23) (8.060) (55.48) 
     Ontario -9.211 14.18 -7.482 17.28 
 (9.613) (13.02) (7.832) (54.47) 
     Manitoba -14.22 23.84 -12.18 -34.09 
 (12.98) (16.93) (11.46) (61.79) 
     Saskatchewan -10.84 2.276 -3.985 54.02 
 (12.28) (17.88) (11.10) (64.25) 
     Alberta -8.482 -12.25 -11.53 68.62 
 (10.24) (18.03) (8.692) (59.89) 
     Nova Scotia -24.32* 6.996 -4.189 -19.24 
 (13.25) (18.16) (14.04) (70.15) 
     Prince Edward Island -51.91 27.02 -21.26 41.67 
 (36.58) (33.61) (37.08) (81.73) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -1.358** 0.551 -0.195 0.0118 
 (0.549) (0.801) (0.565) (2.849) 
     Quebec -0.546 0.191 -0.719** 2.234 
 (0.432) (0.503) (0.365) (2.266) 
     Ontario -0.594 0.533 -0.481 1.583 
 (0.434) (0.497) (0.360) (2.225) 
     Manitoba -0.926* 1.066* -0.679 -1.302 
 (0.548) (0.610) (0.464) (2.551) 
     Saskatchewan -0.655 0.0914 -0.344 2.754 
 (0.556) (0.675) (0.506) (2.592) 
     Alberta -0.502 -0.508 -0.571 3.168 
 (0.474) (0.761) (0.417) (2.590) 
     Nova Scotia -1.001* 0.152 -0.392 0.501 
 (0.601) (0.733) (0.581) (2.974) 
     Prince Edward Island -2.117* 1.078 -1.234 2.150 
 (1.241) (1.282) (1.460) (3.523) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -213.4*** 1246.7*** 51.23 -858.3** 
 (70.37) (101.6) (60.82) (377.1) 
     
N 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
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Table 30: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Men without children – Monday to Saturday 
 Shopping Market work Domestic work Leisure 
     
SUN -1.967 -21.01 13.61 4.670 
 (16.68) (36.10) (14.73) (22.46) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 28.30*** -40.41*** 12.53** 18.35** 
 (5.863) (12.95) (5.000) (7.804) 
     Post-secondary education 45.70*** -21.29 5.208 16.34* 
 (6.630) (14.77) (5.670) (9.093) 
Labour force status     
Employed -18.00*** 605.6*** -35.19*** -329.0*** 
 (5.157) (13.83) (4.662) (7.035) 
     Inactive (not retired) 37.45** -151.6*** 87.48*** -44.13** 
 (14.71) (49.75) (15.61) (18.90) 
     Retired 42.76*** -260.0*** 43.19** 12.44 
 (15.15) (67.57) (17.88) (20.98) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member 13.84 -26.43 33.29*** 1.387 
 (14.47) (29.38) (10.69) (17.37) 
     2 members 8.114 -60.26** 20.20* 32.04* 
 (14.50) (29.25) (10.71) (17.21) 
     3 members -5.468 -59.01* 7.392 35.99** 
 (14.98) (30.50) (11.10) (17.90) 
     4 members -5.087 -62.83* 15.83 25.64 
 (15.86) (32.23) (11.91) (18.76) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     AGE2529 7.508 5.263 29.23*** -31.22*** 
 (7.271) (15.71) (5.931) (9.670) 
     AGE3034 15.86** 23.13 29.64*** -40.99*** 
 (7.661) (16.76) (6.249) (10.53) 
     AGE3539 12.91 -17.18 46.49*** -41.04*** 
 (8.657) (18.57) (7.274) (11.64) 
     AGE4044 20.22** 5.871 55.42*** -55.48*** 
 (8.627) (19.12) (7.579) (11.63) 
     AGE4549 26.20*** -18.56 66.68*** -53.53*** 
 (7.885) (17.95) (7.267) (10.92) 
     AGE5054 15.38** -31.62* 56.71*** -29.74*** 
 (7.614) (16.79) (6.526) (10.26) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick -46.50 34.50 -12.81 -11.08 
 (31.22) (66.98) (27.07) (39.51) 
     Quebec -40.55* 6.494 -29.41* 26.19 
 (20.83) (43.73) (16.78) (25.24) 
     Ontario -36.53* 35.27 -36.13** 13.11 
 (20.11) (41.94) (15.58) (24.36) 
     Manitoba -43.78* -84.37 -15.51 72.85** 
 (25.17) (53.00) (19.81) (30.84) 
     Saskatchewan -27.94 50.05 -29.62 -3.505 
 (25.00) (49.45) (20.35) (30.25) 
     Alberta -54.88** 56.58 -42.99** -1.520 
 (22.67) (46.92) (18.05) (27.66) 
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     Nova Scotia -40.09* 19.51 -1.615 -6.036 
 (23.55) (53.79) (19.88) (31.00) 
     Prince Edward Island -33.97 86.76 -43.11 -9.846 
 (34.99) (77.85) (28.69) (44.66) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 5.222 10.70 0.334 -4.598 
 (4.294) (9.398) (3.803) (5.560) 
     Quadratic term -0.201 -0.696 -0.167 0.289 
 (0.212) (0.470) (0.187) (0.278) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -11.11** 1.576 3.252 -3.445 
 (5.443) (12.29) (5.052) (7.254) 
     Quebec -10.08** -2.883 4.520 -1.016 
 (4.377) (9.707) (4.007) (5.738) 
     Ontario -7.036 -5.320 4.315 1.375 
 (4.293) (9.514) (3.850) (5.673) 
     Manitoba -9.107* -26.61** 4.992 13.59** 
 (5.181) (11.40) (4.427) (6.876) 
     Saskatchewan -4.582 -4.512 5.833 -0.847 
 (5.350) (11.34) (4.762) (7.079) 
     Alberta -11.69** -11.52 2.736 7.393 
 (4.730) (10.41) (4.255) (6.276) 
     Nova Scotia -8.943 -2.601 0.388 3.135 
 (5.487) (12.43) (4.938) (7.444) 
     Prince Edward Island -9.145 5.342 -4.428 1.171 
 (6.380) (14.82) (6.014) (8.470) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -0.446** 0.0215 0.140 -0.145 
 (0.224) (0.496) (0.204) (0.298) 
     Quebec -0.412** -0.156 0.196 -0.0677 
 (0.179) (0.396) (0.165) (0.235) 
     Ontario -0.276 -0.244 0.208 0.0296 
 (0.177) (0.391) (0.161) (0.234) 
     Manitoba -0.334 -0.908** 0.178 0.434 
 (0.210) (0.460) (0.181) (0.280) 
     Saskatchewan -0.201 -0.238 0.294 -0.0328 
 (0.216) (0.460) (0.193) (0.290) 
     Alberta -0.486** -0.528 0.146 0.334 
 (0.198) (0.431) (0.180) (0.261) 
     Nova Scotia -0.346 -0.158 -0.0323 0.200 
 (0.235) (0.519) (0.207) (0.315) 
     Prince Edward Island -0.327 -0.0315 -0.0660 0.0634 
 (0.268) (0.615) (0.261) (0.358) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -106.8*** -124.0** 42.38* 1203.8*** 
 (29.36) (62.56) (23.19) (37.27) 
     
N 7,740 7,740 7,740 7,740 
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Table 31: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Women with children – No retail sector 
 Sunday Weekdays 
 Shopping Leisure Shopping Market work 
     
SUN 78.35** -69.67 -25.29** 59.24 
 (39.00) (46.53) (11.75) (38.85) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 29.69** -6.510 19.26*** -14.45 
 (13.73) (16.99) (4.496) (14.59) 
     Post-secondary education 39.81** -26.83 15.68*** 3.028 
 (16.32) (20.39) (5.254) (17.27) 
Labour force status     
Employed 18.77 -48.89** -25.42*** 560.1*** 
 (14.62) (23.65) (5.051) (18.94) 
     Inactive (not retired) 7.147 -13.20 3.014 -97.34*** 
 (15.52) (23.92) (5.174) (21.79) 
     Retired -42.54 238.7*** -5.040 -93.84 
 (68.92) (41.78) (31.62) (172.5) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     2 members -4.193 122.5*** 1.024 14.89 
 (20.06) (29.06) (7.183) (23.22) 
     3 members 8.579 77.07*** -4.090 16.16 
 (13.45) (20.00) (4.827) (16.46) 
     4 members 8.542 53.17*** -5.079 18.75 
 (12.81) (18.62) (4.417) (15.67) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 -17.57 2.155 16.84* 29.96 
 (21.78) (30.67) (8.788) (28.97) 
     AGE3034 -34.14 28.25 14.63* 39.58 
 (22.08) (30.02) (8.420) (27.26) 
     AGE3539 -23.59 29.86 16.32* 69.71** 
 (21.07) (30.07) (8.412) (27.28) 
     AGE4044 -13.97 45.20 39.92*** 51.36* 
 (21.79) (31.67) (8.499) (27.66) 
     AGE4549 1.475 70.48** 32.40*** 35.64 
 (22.87) (32.79) (9.190) (29.47) 
     AGE5054 -36.21 110.8*** 45.31*** 71.30** 
 (29.72) (37.92) (10.75) (35.45) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick 55.15 17.84 -29.36 -18.56 
 (53.47) (77.25) (21.01) (71.21) 
     Quebec -10.27 90.13** -23.29* -61.73 
 (26.99) (43.98) (13.44) (43.51) 
     Ontario -5.893 83.90** -4.814 -34.78 
 (24.78) (40.21) (12.24) (41.76) 
     Manitoba -11.55 69.90 -25.80* -46.55 
 (31.41) (50.05) (15.40) (52.55) 
     Saskatchewan -27.28 182.4*** 3.905 -21.51 
 (32.63) (52.74) (16.61) (54.82) 
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Alberta -28.15 48.25 4.631 -29.94 
 (29.38) (51.32) (14.06) (48.85) 
     Nova Scotia -23.34 37.97 -7.094 -35.05 
 (38.17) (58.21) (15.45) (55.15) 
     Prince Edward Island 64.00 -34.25 -16.63 -10.58 
 (58.56) (86.98) (23.36) (78.58) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Time trend     
Linear term 5.897 -9.096 -0.363 15.00 
 (6.624) (9.676) (2.729) (9.361) 
     Quadratic term -0.115 -0.0466 0.0264 -0.468 
 (0.380) (0.514) (0.145) (0.469) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -6.231 13.96 -1.282 -16.16 
 (8.992) (13.74) (3.658) (12.59) 
     Quebec -16.47** 11.66 -3.071 -10.07 
 (7.321) (10.39) (2.856) (9.726) 
     Ontario -8.060 15.82 1.136 -13.48 
 (7.064) (10.15) (2.710) (9.451) 
     Manitoba -4.044 19.32 1.414 -18.63 
 (9.731) (12.17) (3.341) (11.40) 
     Saskatchewan -10.81 29.38** 3.935 -14.40 
 (8.681) (12.87) (3.565) (12.21) 
     Alberta -10.44 11.92 3.583 -13.05 
 (8.136) (11.97) (3.066) (10.71) 
     Nova Scotia -9.887 13.29 1.829 -21.15* 
 (11.91) (14.19) (3.779) (12.80) 
     Prince Edward Island 0.0145 2.089 1.881 -19.16 
 (11.78) (16.95) (4.473) (15.33) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -0.429 0.539 0.0605 -0.799 
 (0.400) (0.546) (0.149) (0.496) 
     Quebec -0.809** 0.350 -0.0837 -0.402 
 (0.338) (0.419) (0.117) (0.378) 
     Ontario -0.295 0.473 0.120 -0.517 
 (0.324) (0.427) (0.113) (0.371) 
     Manitoba -0.353 0.717 0.192 -0.665 
 (0.430) (0.520) (0.140) (0.452) 
     Saskatchewan -0.567 0.986* 0.246* -0.494 
 (0.394) (0.511) (0.143) (0.477) 
     Alberta -0.508 0.612 0.214* -0.538 
 (0.388) (0.482) (0.130) (0.427) 
     Nova Scotia -0.403 0.539 0.142 -0.852 
 (0.570) (0.597) (0.165) (0.530) 
     Prince Edward Island -0.226 0.0452 0.135 -0.810 
 (0.495) (0.693) (0.191) (0.612) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Constant -136.0** 937.2*** -40.21** -267.7*** 
 (53.73) (72.33) (19.61) (66.52) 
     
N 1,343 1,343 7,814 7,814 
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Table 32: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (minutes).  
Women with and without children – OLS 
 Mothers Women with no kids 
 Shopping Market work Shopping Market work 
     
SUN -11.47** 29.18 7.676 -31.47 
 (5.024) (18.31) (6.039) (22.00) 
     
Education     
Less than high-school (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     High-school 5.141*** -10.64* 4.355** -13.03* 
 (1.911) (6.063) (2.147) (7.885) 
     Post-secondary education 2.649 -2.364 4.724* -5.448 
 (2.198) (8.052) (2.426) (9.819) 
Labour force status     
Employed -8.857*** 305.6*** -3.630** 336.0*** 
 (2.154) (7.432) (1.824) (6.571) 
     Inactive (not retired) 2.477 -25.51*** 9.629*** -35.63*** 
 (2.294) (6.977) (2.940) (7.941) 
     Retired -2.639 -28.90 11.14* -48.71*** 
 (12.91) (47.11) (6.748) (12.43) 
     Unemployed (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Household size     
1 member (omitted) (omitted) 2.194 -9.683 
   (4.091) (17.38) 
     2 members -0.219 15.41 2.077 -25.39 
 (2.891) (11.54) (4.007) (17.17) 
     3 members 0.606 14.08* 0.567 -30.54* 
 (2.043) (7.773) (4.229) (18.13) 
     4 members -0.104 15.29** 3.069 -29.88 
 (1.888) (7.339) (4.491) (18.99) 
     More than 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
Age dummy     
AGE2024 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     
     AGE2529 4.632 7.355 3.959 9.881 
 (3.533) (10.17) (2.431) (9.907) 
     AGE3034 5.065 8.654 2.771 -0.430 
 (3.343) (9.635) (2.710) (11.59) 
     AGE3539 4.881 21.58** 2.381 -8.934 
 (3.305) (9.900) (2.838) (12.18) 
     AGE4044 11.73*** 11.09 0.576 -6.469 
 (3.435) (10.30) (2.607) (11.62) 
     AGE4549 11.52*** 4.277 6.557*** -26.80*** 
 (3.762) (11.76) (2.515) (9.873) 
     AGE5054 15.54*** 23.03 4.600** -30.92*** 
 (4.779) (15.71) (2.297) (9.440) 
     
Province dummy     
New Brunswick -1.473 27.68 6.740 -5.545 
 (8.440) (33.27) (9.828) (39.62) 
     Quebec 1.937 8.091 -3.780 30.33 
 (4.658) (21.28) (5.327) (27.40) 
     Ontario 5.920 16.79 -2.713 35.79 
 (4.313) (19.94) (5.187) (25.88) 
     Manitoba (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
     Saskatchewan 12.31* 12.68 -2.402 -20.57 
 (6.570) (28.41) (6.870) (32.04) 
     Alberta 9.914* 5.141 -4.662 26.19 
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 (5.296) (23.65) (5.862) (29.13) 
     Nova Scotia 3.769 2.236 3.571 0.105 
 (5.581) (26.99) (6.709) (31.50) 
     Prince Edward Island 3.306 33.22 7.379 -43.46 
 (10.00) (38.91) (9.720) (43.05) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador 12.03* 23.08 6.022 -27.75 
 (6.391) (26.52) (6.956) (30.76) 
Time trend     
Linear term 0.860 -3.912 1.406 -0.470 
 (1.177) (4.132) (1.421) (4.893) 
     Quadratic term -0.0571 0.139 -0.0849 0.0991 
 (0.0504) (0.161) (0.0636) (0.222) 
     
Province specific time trend      
Linear terms     
New Brunswick -0.546 4.714 0.0527 2.775 
 (1.707) (5.965) (1.897) (6.650) 
     Quebec -1.609 8.087* -2.080 9.330* 
 (1.366) (4.787) (1.505) (5.527) 
     Ontario -1.016 5.465 -0.977 -1.378 
 (1.364) (4.687) (1.489) (5.281) 
     Manitoba -0.166 2.589 0.269 -5.970 
 (1.564) (5.584) (1.701) (6.880) 
     Saskatchewan 0.569 3.260 -0.900 -2.633 
 (1.793) (6.645) (1.812) (6.794) 
     Alberta 0.0519 4.296 -1.312 -7.313 
 (1.457) (5.391) (1.595) (6.003) 
     Nova Scotia (omitted) (omitted) -1.608 6.183 
   (1.947) (7.023) 
     Prince Edward Island -0.105 1.873 -1.185 -0.273 
 (2.063) (7.551) (2.133) (7.990) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador 0.519 8.365 (omitted) (omitted) 
 (1.607) (5.714)   
Quadratic terms     
New Brunswick -0.00940 0.0621 0.00560 0.0564 
 (0.0705) (0.229) (0.0824) (0.285) 
     Quebec -0.0825 0.292 -0.0906 0.319 
 (0.0622) (0.197) (0.0643) (0.233) 
     Ontario -0.0438 0.178 -0.0238 -0.0821 
 (0.0629) (0.196) (0.0638) (0.227) 
     Manitoba 0.0139 0.108 0.0284 -0.228 
 (0.0748) (0.232) (0.0741) (0.284) 
     Saskatchewan 0.0293 0.101 -0.0209 -0.0471 
 (0.0774) (0.267) (0.0773) (0.282) 
     Alberta -0.00794 0.146 -0.0700 -0.229 
 (0.0613) (0.209) (0.0698) (0.260) 
     Nova Scotia (omitted) (omitted) -0.0778 0.263 
   (0.0851) (0.304) 
     Prince Edward Island -0.0146 0.0101 -0.0347 -0.000501 
 (0.0892) (0.294) (0.101) (0.337) 
     Newfoundland and Labrador -0.0112 0.302 (omitted) (omitted) 
 (0.0722) (0.230)   
Constant 20.65*** 38.16 12.05 156.9*** 
 (7.442) (29.07) (8.811) (38.52) 
     
N 8,152 8,152 8,057 8,057 
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Table 33: Effects of Sunday shopping on the allocation of time (hours).  
Women with and without children – Labour Force Survey data 
 Sunday Weekdays 
   
SUN 0.992*** -0.208 
 (0.149) (0.161) 
      Post-secondary education 1.478*** 2.783*** 
 (0.0637) (0.0594) 
   
Age dummy   
AGE2030 13.41*** 8.607*** 
 (0.0829) (0.109) 
   AGE3040 15.15*** 11.60*** 
 (0.0713) (0.113) 
   AGE4050 15.99*** 11.10*** 
 (0.0734) (0.110) 
   AGE50UP (omitted) (omitted) 
   
Province dummy   
New Brunswick 1.135*** 0.354 
 (0.275) (0.303) 
   Quebec -1.376*** -1.567*** 
 (0.196) (0.220) 
   Ontario -1.587*** -0.848*** 
 (0.191) (0.213) 
   Manitoba -1.799*** -0.381 
 (0.216) (0.240) 
   Saskatchewan -1.694*** 0.517** 
 (0.222) (0.250) 
   Alberta -2.034*** 0.957*** 
 (0.220) (0.233) 
   Nova Scotia -1.382*** -0.815*** 
 (0.233) (0.255) 
   Prince Edward Island 0.129 -0.327 
 (0.308) (0.350) 
   Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) 
   
Time trend   
Linear term 0.0933*** 0.0341 
 (0.0356) (0.0476) 
   Quadratic term -0.00736*** -0.00598*** 
 (0.00148) (0.00168) 
   
Province specific time trend    
Linear terms   
New Brunswick 0.0148 -0.00172 
 (0.0446) (0.0557) 
   Quebec -0.106*** -0.0233 
 (0.0396) (0.0510) 
   Ontario -0.147*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0495) 
   Manitoba -0.0782* -0.0562 
 (0.0438) (0.0548) 
   Saskatchewan -0.138*** -0.0435 
 (0.0457) (0.0570) 
   Alberta -0.0946** -0.0596 
 (0.0436) (0.0531) 
   Nova Scotia -0.165*** 0.0363 
 (0.0492) (0.0601) 
   Prince Edward Island -0.244*** (omitted) 
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 (0.0532)  
   Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) 0.0523 
  (0.0623) 
Quadratic terms   
New Brunswick -0.00520*** -0.00439** 
 (0.00180) (0.00202) 
   Quebec -0.00587*** -0.00323* 
 (0.00159) (0.00178) 
   Ontario -0.00671*** -0.00584*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00171) 
   Manitoba -0.00503*** -0.00441** 
 (0.00177) (0.00195) 
   Saskatchewan -0.00963*** -0.00432** 
 (0.00180) (0.00203) 
   Alberta -0.00577*** -0.00520*** 
 (0.00174) (0.00188) 
   Nova Scotia -0.00940*** -0.000568 
 (0.00202) (0.00225) 
   Prince Edward Island -0.0139*** -0.00175 
 (0.00215) (0.00249) 
   Newfoundland and Labrador (omitted) (omitted) 
   Constant 18.31*** 24.16*** 
 (0.245) (0.280) 
   
N 614,634 504,505 
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Conclusion 
The first years of the new millennium represent the lost decade for the Italian economy. 
Even before the almost continuous recession that has hit the country since the last months of 2008, 
the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in Italy was the lowest among the OECD 
countries. The problems with the Italian economy can be grouped under two titles: fiscal 
sustainability and long term growth. Since 2011 Italy has achieved a sizeable fiscal consolidation, 
having one of the lowest deficits to GDP ratios of the European Union at the end of 2012. The 
burden of debt remains however very high (around 130 per cent of GDP). Reforms to foster 
growth are on the other hand still lacking. The labour market is one of the key factors harming the 
long-term growth of the Italian economy. In the last decade labour productivity grew much less 
than in the other main European economies also as a consequence of low investment in new 
technologies (capital). The Italian labour market has been unable to allocate a significant fraction of 
the working age population efficiently. In 2011, the employment rate was 56.9 per cent, 8 
percentage points below the OECD average. The gap between Italy and other developed 
economies is mainly attributable to the low employment rates of youth, seniors and women.  
These low employment rates are due to a multiplicity of factors limiting both labour 
demand and labour supply. For women in particular, constraints on the allocation of time play a 
crucial role in determining labour supply behaviour.  In Italy the provision of services helping 
mothers reconcile work and family obligations is meagre. In this thesis we try to understand how 
nonstandard time constraints may affect the behaviour of women, and their labour supply in 
particular.  
In the first chapter we study how the constraints on work schedules affect the time 
allocation of workers in Italy. Regulations that shape industrial relations in Italy were enacted 
during the 1970s, when manufacturing and assembly lines played a central role in the economy. 
This kind of economy required high levels of synchronization of capital and labour, and of 
different groups of workers. Therefore, work schedules were rigid and the fraction of jobs offering 
nonstandard hours was low.  With the reduced importance of assembly lines this regulation is 
outdated. In order to understand whether these constraints produce significant effects on the 
allocation of time of wage/salary workers in Italy, we exploit the intrinsic differences between self-
employed and employed workers. In fact, one of the main features of self-employment is the 
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greater control over the days worked and daily hours of work. We use the last wave of the Italian 
time use survey (2008-2009) to provide evidence that the distribution of hours of work of self-
employed workers is much more dispersed than that of wage/salary workers and their average 
standard deviation of daily minutes of work within a week is significantly larger. Then we show that 
self-employed workers respond more to shocks affecting the value of leisure. We show that on 
sunny days the increase of leisure and the reduction of work are significantly larger for self-
employed workers. We address whether unobservable characteristics, such as preferences for 
leisure and for outdoor activities in particular, determine this differential response. Studying the 
allocation of time on non-working days we find no evidence of different preferences between the 
two groups of workers. Therefore, we interpret the differential response to weather shocks as a 
consequence of the time constraints on work schedules. The main result of the first chapter is that 
wage/salary workers in Italy face tight time constraints and they find it difficult to reallocate their 
time when shocks occur. This evidence is relevant for female labour force participation since a large 
fraction of women choose not to work because they would otherwise not be able to reconcile 
family and work responsibilities. 
In the second chapter we study the Added Worker Effect (AWE), which may have been an 
important determinant of the recent increase in female labour supply in Italy. The main factors 
determining a change in the wife’s labour supply in response to their husband’s job loss include the 
magnitude of the income loss and the inability, due to borrowing constraints, to smooth this loss 
over the life cycle. In Italy several conditions coexist that should lead to a significant AWE: large 
increase in the unemployment rate for married men, increase in long term unemployment, tight 
borrowing constraints, and low female labour force participation. The retrospective questions 
provided by the new labour force survey allow identification of transitions between labour market 
states in a 12 month time window. Since we are able to identify the reason for the husband’s job 
loss, we distinguish between transitions associated with low or high income losses. We find that 
both the wife’s probability of joining the labour force and that of finding a job increase when the 
husband is dismissed or he is forced to quit his job for health reasons. Moreover, we estimate the 
wife’s full transition matrix between labour market states and we find that the loss of a job by a 
husband increases the probability that his wife will enter the labour force. Finally, we provide some 
descriptive evidence that time constraints can also impact the magnitude of the AWE. Focusing on 
mothers with young children, we show that the estimated AWE is positively correlated with the 
regional provision of child care services.  
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The third chapter is based on the time use file of the Canadian General Social Survey. We 
study how the relaxation of one constraint limiting the allocation of time changed the behaviour of 
women, with a particular focus on those with children. Since the mid-1980s Canadian provinces 
have deregulated Sunday shopping. We develop a theoretical a model of that makes clear that busy 
individuals are likely to be those who respond most to Sunday shopping deregulation. The 
empirical analysis relies on the provincial variation in the time of the policy change. Our results 
suggest that women with children, who usually face stringent time constraints, respond to the 
policy change by substituting weekday shopping with Sunday shopping. The amount of time these 
women save from doing shopping on weekdays allows them to increase their minutes of work. On 
Sunday, shopping is increased at the expense of leisure. The main result of this chapter is that the 
labour supply of mothers may change even when non-obvious constraints on the allocation of time 
change. 
 The findings of this thesis contribute to the ongoing debate on one of the structural 
reforms that Italy needs to overcome the current difficulties. In particular, our results suggest that 
work schedule flexibility is valued by wage/salary workers and that the reforms of the labour 
market should take this factor into account. There is widespread consensus that the labour market 
in Italy needs a lower level of employment protection for permanent workers and it needs 
realignment between wages and productivity. The achievement of both these targets implies an 
unavoidable welfare loss for those who currently have a permanent job. However, taking full 
advantage of the new technologies that reduce the need for synchronization of production factors, 
this welfare loss may be mitigated by relaxing time constraints. This margin could also simplify 
bargaining with unions. Moreover, the adoption of new technologies would likely help restore 
labour productivity growth. 
Second, our results suggest that new forms of work arrangements and an increase in work 
schedule flexibility would likely produce a significant labour supply response of women, youths and 
seniors, who are largely under-employed in Italy. For women in particular, all three chapters suggest 
that time constraints play a crucial role in determining labour supply behaviour. The relaxation of 
even non-obvious time constraints seems to produce significant responses. The reform of the 
labour market should therefore also induce more flexible forms of work. Work flexibility has a very 
bad reputation in Italy, since its meaning is associated only with the project of reducing 
employment protection. Bringing the value of time and the role of time constraints explicitly into 
the discussion may help to restore the reputation of work flexibility and it may be a small building 
block for the transition of Italy to a better-functioning economy.   
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